The control plane's manifest existed twice: at the root of its repository, read
whenever the mesh rebuilds it from source, and as a copy in the catalogue, read by
genesis. Nothing kept them equal, and the first rebuild replaced the mesh's record
with the repository's shape while every later push was refused (novox/hq
04-ISSUES/072). The builder's one-shot result already carries the manifest it built,
artifact resolved to the image; step 3 keeps it and step 9 registers it, re-pinning
the built image's bare id to the reference the registry assigned. The catalogue is
still read for the registry's and the builder's manifests and for phase two.
A container on the machine dialling a port the machine publishes reaches it
through the runtime's proxy — input, not forward — and the builder could not
reach the broker. The derived ruleset opens the mesh's own ports in both
chains; the base one now does the same.
031: a window of unacknowledged declarations is drained to the newest; the
rest are set aside and reported as superseded. 035: a file resource may say
create-once — written when absent, kept untouched when present (ADR 0087).
054: the bundle installs nftables and loads a base ruleset before the store
and broker, in the table the filter module later replaces (ADR 0088).
The verify reads the marker with the shell's read, which fails at end of file
without a line ending; the action ran and its verify said no. And the applier
reports each action with its command line, two of which now carry the real
store and broker passwords — the installer masks the values it made in
everything it says.
From review: the store and broker passwords genesis makes were carried into
the controller through a world-readable file in /tmp, a bundle left at 0644 by
an earlier installer kept that mode while now holding them, a mesh raised by
the old installer would have been handed new passwords its servers do not have,
and the broker-admin action's marker did not depend on the value. Secrets now
stage in a 0700 directory owned by the controller's account; the bundle is
chmod'd; an existing store or broker volume with no credential file is refused
by name; the marker holds the password's fingerprint. Also: one install path
for the store, broker and vault, no error-string matching for the operator
key, and no unreachable fallback for the superuser.
The template raises the store with the password 'bootstrap' and the broker
with its image's default administrator, and the installer carried both into
the mesh as accepted secrets — permanent, and not secret (novox/hq issue 071).
Now the installer makes both credentials, once, at the paths the postgres and
lavinmq modules declare as their own secrets, rewrites the produced bundle to
use them (the store reads its password from a file; the broker's default
account is given the new password by an action before anything dials it), and
writes the bundle at 0600 since it now carries them.
Before the first secret is accepted it makes the operator's sealing key beside
the bundle and gives the mesh the public half, so everything minted from there
is sealed to it too (ADR 0085, amended). Phase three adopts the broker as the
lavinmq module beside the store and installs mesh-vault as a foundation module;
the run ends by writing the operator-sealed export beside the key.
Like the store, the amqp provision is plaintext 5672 (vhost-per-login), so a
consumer must reach it — bind 0.0.0.0 (firewall-gated to `mesh`, WireGuard-
encrypted on the wire) instead of loopback. amqps (5671) was already mesh-wide;
management (15672) stays loopback for the host-networked provisioner.
Issue 051 (WBS 3.2).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Not "every module's database"; a module requests one via requires
postgres-database. The one server holds the controller's contexts and the
database of each module that asks for one.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
jschoubben