A port reached from local-network is admitted from the private networks the machine is attached to, and only the machine can say which those are. Every network on a link facing outside is said among its facts, and a change is said at the next reconcile.
The packages step sealed the build agent its genesis document and pushed, and the push returned as soon
as it was sent. The sdk step then asked for the SDK's build at once, and the agent reads the document
from the file the node writes when it applies that push: one genesis found it in time, the next was
refused for having neither a binding nor the document. That one push now waits until the node reports
it applied it (push --wait); every other push still returns on sending.
The bundle raised the store as mesh-store, on upstream postgres, in a docker volume; the postgres
module keeps it as postgres, on its pgvector image, in /var/lib/mesh-store owned 999:70, reading its
superuser password from a file. The store step refused, and genesis stopped at step 17 of 24.
The bundle now raises the store with the module's name, image, data directory and password file, and
every step of the bundle and the installer reaches it by that name. The refusal to raise a store over
data it cannot open looks for a cluster in the store's directory, no longer for the old volume.
The bus reads its user list from a file that, until the broker step adopts it as the nats module,
only the installer writes, and the installer wrote it only at enrolment. The build agent's account,
minted with step 13's push, never reached the bus; the agent was refused (Authorization Violation)
and the sdk step's build waited until it was killed. Every push genesis makes now places the composed
list and has the bus re-read it, until the nats module is registered (ADR 0331 §5, ADR 0333 §4).
The build agent declares neither the retired builder's npm-password own-secret
nor a serves setting, so the packages step handed its credential to nothing
and genesis's sdk step had no way to publish. The packages step now seals the
genesis-package-registry own-secret to build-agent: the forge on this node's
loopback, the port given for the package registry, its npm path, and the
mesh-builder account with its password. setFoundationSettings no longer gives
the builder a serves.port.
Genesis's builder step read modules/builder from the catalogue, which retired it on 2026-10-03 for
the build agent (node-build-agent on every machine), so no genesis got past step 13. The step now
installs build-agent from the catalogue, puts the builder image it carried and published where the
manifest names the image it builds, and issues its bus account as any module's.
The controller reads its merge window's settings from a file its manifest declares from its
settings (MESH_MERGE_WINDOW_FILE, ADR 0276). Step 11 took every MESH_..._FILE for a secret and
refused this one as a file nobody writes, so no genesis got past step 11. A _FILE naming a file
resource of the module is now the module's own; one naming neither an own-secret nor a file of the
module is still refused.
The bundle raised the bus as mesh-broker on docker volumes; the catalogue's nats module keeps it as
mesh-broker-nats on directories of the machine, so the broker step refused rather than raise a second
bus, and genesis stopped at step 18 of 24.
The bundle now raises mesh-broker-nats with its configuration and user list in /var/lib/nats-module/conf,
its streams in /var/lib/mesh-broker-nats and its certificate in /var/lib/mesh-broker-tls, published on the
node's bus port. The broker step holds that layout to the module's manifest field by field before
registering anything, says the one restart onto the module's image, and waits until the bus runs that image
and its monitor answers. The installer's bridge writes the composed users at the module's bus-users path and
signals mesh-broker-nats. The bundle's bus configuration and user list are seeds, so a re-run after the
adoption does not put the bundle's one user back over the module's.
mesh/merge-gate head c7b534a08c98 merged into trunk 6fe82c61bd32 — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
A module's own directories need setgid so what is made beneath keeps its own group,
and a mode of 2750 refused the whole declaration while every apply dropped the bit:
a directory's mode now carries setgid (never setuid or sticky), set, kept and said.
A tool runner's account that is missing or root's failed the whole apply and dropped
the library's outcome: it is now a warning, said as runner:<module> or
runner:library:<name>. And a runner that leaves a group is taken out before the
resources apply, so its unit is restarted in that apply to lose it.
A joining module's own directories belong to its own group, and its tools run in the
tool runner, which could not read them. An identity may now name the tool runner's
account: the engine puts it in mesh-<module> as it puts it in a library's group,
says the change as identity:<module> for the runner's unit to restart once, takes
it back when no identity names it, and refuses an account that is missing or root's.
The engine states contract 7.
A re-run's apply writes the bundle's one-entry user list over the list placed at
enrolment, and an enrolled machine skipped placing it: enrolled was taken for adopted,
against ADR 0331 §5. Until the controller knows the nats module, the installer places
the composed list again. Also drop the previous broker's AMQP and management ports,
which nothing raises any more, and say why the bus always carries a ports setting.
The installer could not raise a first node: the old bundle's control plane had no
MESH_BUS_NATS and crash-looped, and the NATS bundle was refused because rootsecrets
only knew the previous broker's guest:guest@ template.
One bundle now, the NATS one. rootsecrets makes the controller's bus account and puts
it in both placeholders (the address and the bcrypt hash in the carried user list),
kept with its hash so a re-run writes the same bundle. Preflight refuses a template
naming no bus connection it knows, naming the placeholder, instead of waiting out the
verify step. The broker step adopts the bus as the nats module and refuses, by name,
a catalogue without it or a server that is not the foundation's container.
mesh/merge-gate head 281837847e03 merged into trunk 303d4037e84e — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
An earlier change dropped alpine's RemoveAccount and RemoveGroup, so alpine made no
module identity at all. The sample beneath a root in shape had no test of its own.
And an apply that found the library's lock held read the library as kept even when
what held it was a take act about to be refused for a missing disk; it now does so
only while a take walk is running, and otherwise waits and judges as always.
usermod --gid regroups every file under an account's home, and accounts were made
with / as home: they now have /nonexistent, and an older account's home is moved
there (without its files) before its group changes. A sub-path asked for later that
holds data not in the group waits for the operator as the root would. The take act
gives the group to hardlinked files an account owns (the *arr apps' downloads) and
leaves root's; a file's setuid or setgid bit the regroup takes is never put back, so
no setgid file hands out the library's group; each is counted. An apply no longer
waits for a running take walk.
A root in the group with setgid was kept without a warrant even when the data beneath
it was not in the group, which §7 says the operator is asked about. A root is now
kept without asking only when it is empty, or it and a bounded sample beneath it are
all in the group with group write (and setgid on folders). On busybox, an account the
mesh made is given its added groups with addgroup and delgroup; a change of its
primary group is refused, saying why.
ADR 0328 supersedes ADR 0325: shared data is a library with one home, kept usable by
its group rather than by ACL entries. The engine now makes each library's group and
each module's user in its libraries' groups; keeps a library's root and requested
sub-paths in its group with group write and setgid on its home, making missing
sub-paths as the root is; waits for the operator's word before touching a root that
holds data, and on the take act walks it by descriptor (no link, same filesystem,
bounded and resumed, files with other names left); holds the containers of a library
whose disk or mount is not there; and puts the tool runner's account in the group.
The ACL keeping, mask repair and watch are gone; an access is again as before ADR 0325.
mesh/merge-gate head 5c8e768ef520 merged into trunk ef26dba2753a — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
getent passwd reads an all-digit key as a uid, so a tool runner's account named
"1000" resolved to whoever has uid 1000 and the entry went to them. Only an answer
naming the account asked for is taken.
The controller cannot know the operator's account's uid, names an access by its
declared id (which holds a slash), and should not parse words. A tool runner's
account may now come by name alone and is read here (refused when absent or root's,
its uid said in the access's listing); the take act matches the declared id exactly;
an access wait says its reason (keep or disk) and, for a filesystem that refuses
ACLs, whether the take act can enable them.
mesh/merge-gate head d12bba01090d merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
The build seat runs merge-check as root, so every folder a test made was root's
data, which is never kept (§12), and 28 tests failed for that alone. A test's
folders now stand for an operator's: run as root, they are given to nobody before
they are judged. The root rule is unchanged.
mesh/merge-gate head c85c2804a010 merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
mesh/repo-check head c85c2804a010 merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — fail: its merge-check.sh failed: --- FAIL: TestAnAccessTheMeshMayNotKeepYetIsSaidAsAWait…
The engine delivers before the controller half, and today's controller sends no
identities, users or taken. Keeping now starts only for an access whose folder has
users, or a declaration with identities; every other access is mounted when present
and refused when absent as on main, with nothing made, kept, held or judged. A
leftover whose walk could not run says why, not always that its disk is away.
A name read that timed out gave an empty name, which differed from the recorded one
and so reset the record: a folder kept while empty asked again, a warranted one was
walked again. An unnamed filesystem now leaves the folder exactly as it is, the
access is said not known for that look, and it resumes once it is named.
NFS and FUSE report a zero f_fsid, so another export or another FUSE mount at the
same point was named alike and kept without a warrant; xfs's f_fsid follows the
device number. A filesystem is now named by its UUID (its device matched in
/dev/disk/by-uuid), else a nonzero f_fsid, else mountinfo's source; one that cannot
be named is never kept or taken. Entries left on a filesystem not back within 30 days
are forgotten, said once, and the naming read is shared per mount.
An ext4 or xfs library mounted by UUID can come back from a reboot as another device
(/dev/sdb1 as /dev/sdc1); naming the filesystem by mountinfo's source read that as a
move, stripped the warranted library's entries and asked for a new Approve. A
filesystem is now named by statfs's f_fsid (from the UUID, or the ZFS dataset), its
type and its mount point. Entries left on the filesystem a folder is on now are
merged back or held, never walked away, and a TakenOn naming a mount point is not
taken.
A folder kept because it was empty, then covered by its disk, was said as unhealthy
leftover entries for ever: its entries sit on a hidden empty folder and grant nothing,
so they are now forgotten, and only entries walked onto data under a warrant are kept
to be taken out. A warrant and a kept folder now name their filesystem by mount point,
source and type, so another pool at the same point is a move; records naming a mount
point are read as its name. A record with no access ids is said under a path-free name.
A container was still created over an unmounted mount point, so its writes landed on
the filesystem below; a folder moved to another disk was kept on the old warrant; and
entries left by a drop or a move that could not run lived only in a log line. Every
container mounting an access whose disk is away now waits, the warrant holds only for
the filesystem it was carried out on (the wait names the new one, path-free), entries
left on a filesystem are recorded per mount and taken out when it is back, and every
leftover is said as unhealthy until it is. A hung stat is shared per path, and a
widened mask takes from other entries only the bits it adds.
A walk run while a dataset was unmounted wrote onto root's empty mount point, or
"dropped" entries from it and forgot the ones on the data; a folder kept while empty
below an unnamed mount was then swept whole once the disk mounted, with no warrant.
Every walk is now judged as an apply is, a changed mount judges the folder afresh, and
systemd .mount units and mounts seen are read for the first-sight rule. Widening a
mask caps the entries it limited, so the owning group gains nothing. The watch lets
go of removed folders, re-arms on lost notice, reads users under its lock and ends
with its context. A drop that cannot read an ACL is counted, a broken folder's words
carry no path, a grant's group that could not be left is tried again, and a folder's
stat is bounded.
A module's containers ran as whatever their image chose and shared folders were
made writable by putting accounts in the folder's group (ADR 0312), which ADR 0325
supersedes. The engine now makes each declared module identity as a system account
with the controller's numbers, runs a container declaring `identity` as it, and keeps
each placed shared folder usable through one POSIX ACL entry per user, set through
the kernel's xattrs on descriptors it opened itself. A folder holding data is kept
only after the operator's warrant (the take act); a missing folder is made where its
data lives and waits where its disk is not; root's data is never kept. A watch and a
bounded sweep put back what an app narrows. The group grant is removed, and what it
put an account in is taken back.
Reuses the descriptor walks, the create act, the missing-path wait and the warrant-
backed act message from the paused issue 567 branch.
mesh/merge-gate head c7a4bf5c11d6 merged into trunk d8e785bb4b4b — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
Go's monotonic clock stops while a laptop is suspended, so a day judged by it could pass a day and a half
of wall time before the machine said what it is. And a hung statfs left a goroutine and thread blocked per
apply; now one check runs at a time and reports after it say the sizes unknown until it ends.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
The mesh knew a machine's architecture and kernel family and nothing it is made of, and heard even
that only when it sent the machine something. The profile now carries the machine's memory, each local
filesystem's size and free space, processor model, cores and threads, distribution and version, kernel
release, virtual or physical, boot time and timezone; a fact it cannot read is named unknown with why,
never zeroed. The reconcile says the profile unasked once the mesh last heard it 23 hours ago, so on a
machine nobody pushed to nothing the mesh holds of it is older than a day.
The fix is an order, and nothing failed if the trust call moved after the
push or went: steps 7 and 8 are now one function a test drives against a
runtime that refuses an untrusted push. Preflight now refuses, before
anything is raised, a runtime file that is no JSON object, a docker.service
that is not loaded and active, and a dockerd started with
--insecure-registry, which would refuse the reload. The comment names the
order the docker module's takeover rests on.
Genesis pushed the control plane's image to the mesh's plain-HTTP registry
before anything told the container runtime to trust it; the docker module
that writes that trust is applied long after. Genesis now writes the trust
itself at the registry step, with the same into-json writer and a reload,
for the address given and the node's mesh name on the node's registry
port, and refuses before any push unless the runtime says it trusts each.
The docker module later finds the mesh name there and takes it over
without a change.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)