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Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben 197258c88c A node can join the bus the mesh runs on
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146, the layers behind the three already fixed.

A new membership says which bus it is for. Empty meant 'whatever the mesh runs
today' while two buses existed, and became a refusal the moment one did: an
enrolled node came up and reconnected for ever against its own record.

The enrolling client takes its inboxes in the space its user may listen in. A
JetStream publish waits for the stream's acknowledgement on an inbox the client
picks, and its default is one this user may not subscribe to — so the enrolment
failed with a permissions violation on a subject nobody had chosen.

And the enrolment publish carries a message id, so the client's own retry is
discarded by the stream rather than enrolling the machine twice. That one is
not finished: the duplicate survives it, and the issue says where the trail
stops.
2026-09-29 17:36:59 +02:00
jschoubben a3b810f1f0 Merge pull request 'A first node gets as far as its own bus: three faults on the way' (#50) from fix/one-foundation-on-the-bus-the-mesh-runs-on into main 2026-09-29 14:06:33 +00:00
jschoubben 971a6d6d03 A first node gets as far as its own bus: three faults on the way
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146. Each was right while the mesh ran on the previous
broker, and nothing has raised a foundation since it changed.

The bus's certificate is made by the program that needs it rather than by
openssl inside the broker's image — the bus's image is Alpine with a shell and
no openssl, so the step exited 127 and no mesh could be raised. Self-signed as
before and on purpose; --user 0:0 because the volume is root's and the control
plane's image runs as nobody.

Enrolment no longer opens a raw TLS connection to check the pin: NATS speaks
its own protocol and upgrades afterwards, so the handshake met a plaintext
greeting. The client that presents the token carries the same pinned config
and verifies inside its own handshake, so the secret still leaves only after
the certificate is checked. The raw dial stays as what its tests prove, and is
no longer a path anything takes.

And the token says which bus it is for. Empty meant 'whatever the mesh runs
today' while two buses existed and became a refusal the moment one did.

It now stops at the bus's user list, which is the genesis half of 146.
2026-09-29 15:42:43 +02:00
mesh-admin 04a27caa43 Merge pull request 'A host running as a service says what its apply did' (#49) from fix/a-host-running-as-a-service-says-what-it-did into main 2026-09-29 07:16:01 +00:00
5 changed files with 82 additions and 26 deletions
+28 -12
View File
@@ -706,15 +706,18 @@ func enrol(ctx context.Context, opts options) error {
fmt.Printf(" signing key %s\n",
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(token.Signer)[:16]+"...")
// The check that has to happen before this machine says anything.
conn, err := link.Dial(token.Broker, token.Fingerprint, opts.timeout)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer conn.Close()
fmt.Println("\nthe broker presented the certificate this token pins")
conn.Close()
// **The pin is checked by the connection that presents this token, not by a dial of our own**
// (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146). This opened a raw TLS connection to the bus first, which worked
// against the broker the mesh used to run and cannot work against the one it runs now: NATS
// speaks its own protocol before it upgrades to TLS, so an immediate handshake is answered
// with a plaintext line and the enrolment failed with "first record does not look like a TLS
// handshake" — on every node that has tried to join since the bus changed, which is why this
// went unnoticed: none had.
//
// What ADR 0004 requires still holds, and holds better: the client that presents the token
// carries the same pinned configuration, reads the server's greeting, upgrades, and the
// verification runs inside that handshake — so the one-time secret is sent only after the
// certificate has been checked, and nothing of this node's reaches an impostor.
mine, err := identity.Generate(*name)
if err != nil {
@@ -788,10 +791,16 @@ func enrol(ctx context.Context, opts options) error {
proof := mine.Sign(link.EnrolProof(token.Secret, mine.Public, mine.Overlay.Public,
sealing.Public, serving.Public))
// The token says where to go and which certificate that address must present. It says nothing
// about which bus is there, and does not need to: every token names the one the mesh runs on
// today until the rollout (novox/hq ADR 0116 step 5), and that is what an empty Transport is.
// about which bus is there, and does not need to: there is one, and this host knows which
// (novox/hq ADR 0131 — the mesh speaks to one seat and the old transport is gone).
//
// **It used to leave this empty** and mean "whatever the mesh runs today", which was true
// while two buses existed and became a refusal the moment one did: an empty transport is not
// the bus's name, so every enrolment ended at "this token is for the \"\" bus"
// (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146). Nothing caught it because nothing had enrolled since the bus
// changed.
reply, err := link.Enrol(ctx,
link.Approach{Address: token.Broker, Fingerprint: token.Fingerprint},
link.Approach{Address: token.Broker, Fingerprint: token.Fingerprint, Transport: link.OnNATS},
*name, token.Secret,
mine.Public, mine.Overlay.Public, sealing.Public, serving.Public, reported, proof, found,
opts.timeout)
@@ -807,6 +816,13 @@ func enrol(ctx context.Context, opts options) error {
Fingerprint: firstNonEmpty(reply.Fingerprint, token.Fingerprint),
Signer: firstNonEmpty2(reply.Signer, token.Signer),
Password: reply.Password,
// **Which bus this membership is for, said rather than left empty** (novox/hq
// 04-ISSUES/146). The link refuses a membership that names another bus, and an empty name
// is not this one's — so a node enrolled without it came up and reconnected for ever
// against its own record: "this membership is for \"\", and the mesh's bus is nats". The
// reply does not carry it because there is one bus and the host knows which (ADR 0131);
// what was missing was writing that down where the link reads it.
Transport: link.OnNATS,
}
if mine.Membership.Password == "" {
// The mesh did not replace the token's secret, so it is still this node's broker
+15 -6
View File
@@ -127,12 +127,21 @@
{
"id": "bus-certificate",
"type": "action",
"command": ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", "sh", "-v", "mesh-broker-tls:/tls",
"192.0.2.250:5000/nats@sha256:b83efabe3e7def1e0a4a31ec6e078999bb17c80363f881df35edc70fcb6bb927",
"-c", "test -f /tls/tls.crt || (openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout /tls/tls.key -out /tls/tls.crt -days 3650 -subj '/CN=mesh-broker' -addext 'subjectAltName=DNS:mesh-broker,IP:127.0.0.1' >/dev/null 2>&1 && chmod 644 /tls/tls.crt && chmod 600 /tls/tls.key)"],
"verify": ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", "sh", "-v", "mesh-broker-tls:/tls",
"192.0.2.250:5000/nats@sha256:b83efabe3e7def1e0a4a31ec6e078999bb17c80363f881df35edc70fcb6bb927",
"-c", "test -s /tls/tls.crt && openssl x509 -in /tls/tls.crt -noout"]
// **The mesh makes its own** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146). This ran `openssl` inside the
// broker's image while the broker was one that carried it; the bus that replaced it has a
// shell and no openssl, and no other image the bundle names has one either. So the program
// that needs the certificate writes it — already on this machine, since the schema step ran
// it, and asking nothing of the image it writes into. Self-signed on purpose: a host pins
// this server's exact certificate (novox/hq ADR 0004), and at this moment there is no mesh
// to ask an authority of.
// `--user 0:0` because the volume is root's and this image runs as nobody, which is right
// for the long-running control plane and wrong for a one-shot writing into a fresh volume.
"command": ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--user", "0:0", "-v", "mesh-broker-tls:/tls",
"192.0.2.250:5000/mesh-controller@sha256:c67db38439ff0aee242b467486765467bb95801f52175fc5727cc4e437338ace",
"broker", "certificate", "--into", "/tls"],
"verify": ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--user", "0:0", "-v", "mesh-broker-tls:/tls",
"192.0.2.250:5000/mesh-controller@sha256:c67db38439ff0aee242b467486765467bb95801f52175fc5727cc4e437338ace",
"broker", "certificate", "--check", "--into", "/tls"]
},
{
"id": "bus-conf-dir",
+21 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package link
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -63,8 +64,15 @@ func presentNats(_ context.Context, to Approach, node, secret string,
// subscribe its own inbox and nothing else (design 25 §6). The secret is its password, the same
// string the request claims, so the server proves somebody holds the token and the request
// proves the same thing to the controller without it having to ask the server who connected.
// **Its own inbox space, because that is the only one it may listen in** (novox/hq
// 04-ISSUES/146). A JetStream publish waits for the stream's acknowledgement on an inbox the
// client picks, and the client's default is `_INBOX.<random>` — which this user may not
// subscribe to, so the enrolment failed with a permissions violation on a subject nobody had
// chosen. The permission is `_INBOX.enrol.<node>.>` (design 25 §6), so the client is told to
// pick its inboxes there; the reply address below is in the same space for the same reason.
conn, err := nats.Connect(natsURL(to.Address),
nats.Secure(config),
nats.CustomInboxPrefix("_INBOX.enrol."+node),
nats.UserInfo("enrol."+node, secret),
nats.Name("mesh-host/enrol/"+node),
nats.Timeout(timeout),
@@ -124,7 +132,19 @@ func (a *natsAsking) Ask(ctx context.Context, request []byte, wait time.Duration
defer cancel()
// Into the stream and awaited: an enrolment the bus never accepted must fail here rather than be
// assumed, because the node has nothing else to go on.
if _, err := a.js.Publish(EnrolSubject, addressed, nats.Context(publish)); err != nil {
//
// **Once, however many times it is sent** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146). The client re-publishes when
// an acknowledgement is slow, and the mesh enrolled the machine on each copy — minting a second
// credential, which replaced the first, which is the one the node had already been given. The
// machine then reconnected for ever as a user whose password the mesh had rotated out from under
// it, and the controller's log said "enrolled anchor" twice in the same second.
//
// The id is the message: the same bytes carry the same id, so the stream discards the client's
// own retry, and a genuine second attempt — which carries a new reply address — is a different
// message and is let through.
sum := sha256.Sum256(addressed)
if _, err := a.js.Publish(EnrolSubject, addressed,
nats.MsgId(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])), nats.Context(publish)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot ask the mesh to enrol this node: %w", err)
}
+14 -3
View File
@@ -73,8 +73,19 @@ func PinnedConfig(pin string) (*tls.Config, error) {
}, nil
}
// Dial opens a TLS connection to the broker, refusing anything but the pinned certificate.
func Dial(address, pin string, timeout time.Duration) (*tls.Conn, error) {
// dialPinned completes a TLS handshake against an address, refusing anything but the pinned
// certificate.
//
// **Not how the bus is reached, and it used to be** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/146). Enrolment opened one
// of these before it said anything, which was right while the broker answered TLS immediately and
// wrong the moment the mesh moved to a bus that speaks its own protocol first. The pin itself was
// never the problem — PinnedConfig is what the NATS client is given, and the verification runs
// inside the handshake that client performs.
//
// It stays here because this is where the pin is proven: the tests beside it run a real TLS server
// and assert that a wrong certificate is refused before a byte of application data is sent. What it
// must not become again is something a caller uses to reach the bus.
func dialPinned(address, pin string, timeout time.Duration) (*tls.Conn, error) {
config, err := PinnedConfig(pin)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -86,7 +97,7 @@ func Dial(address, pin string, timeout time.Duration) (*tls.Conn, error) {
if errors.Is(err, ErrWrongCertificate) {
return nil, err
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot reach the broker at %s: %w", address, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot reach %s: %w", address, err)
}
return conn, nil
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func server(t *testing.T) (address string, fingerprint string) {
func TestTheRightBrokerIsAccepted(t *testing.T) {
address, pin := server(t)
conn, err := Dial(address, pin, 5*time.Second)
conn, err := dialPinned(address, pin, 5*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the broker its token describes was refused: %v", err)
}
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func TestADifferentBrokerIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
address, _ := server(t)
_, other := server(t)
_, err := Dial(address, other, 5*time.Second)
_, err := dialPinned(address, other, 5*time.Second)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a broker presenting a different certificate was accepted")
}
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func TestNothingIsSentToTheWrongBroker(t *testing.T) {
// A pin for a certificate this server does not have.
_, elsewhere := server(t)
if _, err := Dial(listener.Addr().String(), elsewhere, 5*time.Second); err == nil {
if _, err := dialPinned(listener.Addr().String(), elsewhere, 5*time.Second); err == nil {
t.Fatal("the impostor was accepted")
}
if n := <-received; n > 0 {
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ func TestAnUnreachableBrokerIsAnOrdinaryFailure(t *testing.T) {
address := listener.Addr().String()
listener.Close()
_, err = Dial(address, pin, 2*time.Second)
_, err = dialPinned(address, pin, 2*time.Second)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("dialling a closed port succeeded")
}