Three ways to do the replay were weighed and the right answer was that the bus being
moved to already does it. A queue on the old bus receives only what is published after
it is bound, so everything built before the catalogue existed was announced to nobody. A
stream is a log and a consumer is a position in it: a consumer created later starts at
the beginning and the builds are simply there. Checked against a running server, because
the decision rested on it.
So "who replays" has no answer because nothing replays. The mechanism was never about
builds — it was about a queue that could not remember, and carrying it across would have
carried a workaround for a limitation that no longer exists, with nothing looking wrong.
Retiring it belongs to step 5, with the rest of what only the old bus needs.
The account existed as a permission model and as nothing a person could be given; there
is a record and three commands now. The client is two surfaces over one thing, a command
line and an MCP server, both using the client a module's runtime uses — so what a person
may do is answered by the same permission list that answers it for a module.
Design 25 §7 says nothing of this is built before its bed passes, and this was built
before. Noted in the task rather than quietly ignored.
A foundation template that stands the server up, writes its settings and the mesh's
first user list beside them, and starts a controller on the new bus. The first user list
is the installer's because at genesis there is no mesh to compose one — a bootstrap
credential, rotated like the store's.
The carried list is checked against what the controller derives, since a mesh cannot be
raised twice to discover they disagreed. That check immediately found the composer
granting a role's whole event branch as well as the one event it follows.
What is left of 4.3 is running it, which is 4.1's bed.
Both sides behind a seam, one implementation per bus, and the outcome is the role's
own event so one publish reaches the asker, the controller and the catalogue. Checked
against a running server, including the part the decision rests on: a third party
hears the same outcome the asker does.
The mesh's own seats said who does a job and nothing about what may be said to
them or by them, and that gap showed up three times in one day looking like three
different problems: a build machine with three audiences for one outcome and no way
to derive a grant for any of them; an event genuinely about a role with nowhere to
live but the namespace of whichever module holds that role today; and a catalogue
catching up on builds, where every option needed a grant the design refuses.
One cause — the mesh has roles it cannot describe. So the `mesh-*` seats take the
same three fields a module's seat has, and the machinery that already derives
authority, queues and consumers from a declared seat does it for these too.
Builds become work submitted to a role, and `mesh.build.request`,
`mesh.control.built` and the BUILDS stream retire. A work queue shared by several
build machines is exactly what a seat's `accepts` is, so a second mechanism for it
was two places a permission could be wrong. The outcome is the seat's own event,
which means one publish still reaches whoever asked, the controller that records it
and the catalogue that places it — the fan-out a shared exchange gave for free,
written as a subject the mesh derived rather than a topology somebody configured.
That also avoids the grant that ruled out the alternatives: no holder needs
permission to publish into an asker's inbox.
The blocking gap is now named rather than incidental: the shared library has no way
for a module to publish on a seat. The build machine is Go and reaches the bus
directly, so it is unaffected; the artifact-store event waits.
Every module named its events the way the old bus spelled a routing key, so on the
new bus every cross-module subscription pointed at a namespace nobody publishes to.
Nothing failed — the services started and none of them reacted. Converted, and the
rule now has checks at both scales: at registration for one manifest, and as a test
across the whole catalogue where a consumed event's emitter is present.
It was larger than the report said, in two directions nobody had looked. Forty-three
files of module code pass the event name at runtime, so the code mattered as much as
the manifests. And both clients had to learn the mapping — without that, converting
the modules would have broken the mesh that is actually running, which is the
opposite of what fixing this was for.
Design 29 gained three things it did not say: what a wildcard is (`*` for one name,
`**` for the rest, spelled the mesh's way and derived to each bus's own), that an
event about a role belongs on the seat and why that is not yet possible, and how the
rule is checked — because "a subscription that matches nothing is silence" is exactly
why nobody noticed thirty-seven manifests being wrong the same way.
4.2 and 4.3 are unblocked. The catch-up half of 4.5 is not: it is a decision, and it
narrowed rather than closed. It cannot be a reply to a module's inbox, because that
needs the blanket grant design 25 §4 refuses.
Minting on both halves, the file delivered per push, and the bus's objects
asserted on every start — verified against a real server that asserting twice
changes nothing, that a machine joining an already-raised bus is accepted, that
each node's consumer is bound to its own declaration subject, and that CONTROL
does not dead-letter before the controller gives up.
Which bus the mesh is on is one fact, and being told about both is refused at
start rather than warned about: a mesh half on each is one where a declaration
goes out on one bus and the report comes back on the other while every component
logs success — ADR 0074's failure arriving through configuration rather than code.
So 4.1 no longer waits on code. Both links speak NATS, the composition happens,
and every claim behind them has a unit test or a check against a running server.
What none of those can stand in for is a mesh raising itself, which is what the bed
is — this is where the code stops and the lab starts.
Two corrections of fact, both found by building the module's image and connecting
to it as a host would.
The first composed configuration said `verify: true`, which makes the server
demand a *client* certificate — and nothing in the mesh presents one. A host pins
this server's exact certificate and authenticates with the password the mesh
minted, and so does a module's runtime. Every connection in the mesh would have
died at the TLS handshake before any password was looked at, with an error that
reads as a fault in the client. TLS is still required; verify only decides whether
client certificates are checked. Mutual TLS is a later question and would need
machinery the mesh does not have — a certificate per module per node.
And §4 read as though the controller wrote the whole file. It writes the user list
and nothing else: ports, TLS paths and a store directory belong to the container
the module raises. The two files share one directory of necessity, because an
absolute include path is resolved relative to the including file's own directory.
The decision stands in both cases — accounts are composed, not called for, and
passwords are minted and sealed. What changed is what the file says and who writes
which half.
What is in: a bus user's hash is recorded and its plaintext returned once, and
the user list is derived from the machines, what each runs, every manifest and
which machines hold a live token. Permissions stay derived rather than stored,
because a stored copy could disagree with the records it came from while both
looked internally consistent.
What is out, with what each needs, so the next person does not rediscover it:
delivery, which has one open question about what a module declares in order to
receive the file — design 29's ground, not this document's; minting, which is
transport-coupled because an enrolment reply carries one password and a node on
the old bus must not be handed a credential for the new one; and calling the
assertions from a start path.
Correcting a tick and a claim I made one commit ago. 4.1 does not wait on an
enrolment user per live token; it waits on the whole composition, of which that
user is one input.
Tasks 1.3 and 1.4 are honest about what they built — the composer, the
derivation, the permission model, the stream and consumer definitions, the
asserter, all pure and held by unit tests and a golden composition. Nobody wrote
the caller. Measured: outside the package that defines them there is not one use
of the composer, the permission derivation, the stream set, the stream asserter or
the principal type. Step 1's "done when" claims every account and permission
composed from the manifests, and a mesh raised today would stand up a server with
no user list at all.
It also needs state the mesh does not keep. Design 25 §4 says the file holds
bcrypt hashes and that passwords are minted and sealed exactly as today — but
today the mesh mints one, hands it to the broker through a management call, seals
the plaintext to the holder and keeps nothing. With no management call the hash
has to survive every later recomposition, because the first thing a new module or
a person's access change touches is a file that must still hold every other
user's password. No bcrypt hash is stored anywhere in the controller.
Named as its own task rather than folded into 1.3, so the gap between "the parts
of step 1 exist" and "the mesh does any of it" is visible.
All three halves of the host's link are through seams, and the reply address in
the payload is now proved from both ends rather than one — the test asserts the
transport's own field held the consumer's ack address by the time the request
arrived, so a server that stopped claiming it fails a test instead of letting the
reason become folklore.
Two things had to be built for the host to hear anything at all: a node's
declaration consumer, which only the controller may create, and the enrolment
user's inbox, which design 25 §6 names and the composer granted none of. Both
were silent gaps — a node with either missing looks correct and hears nothing.
What remains is a single piece: something that composes an enrolment user per
live token. On the old bus that account is made imperatively through the broker's
management API; here there is no management API, so issuing a token has to
recompose the server's configuration. It is the only thing between the two links
and a mesh raised on NATS from nothing, so 4.1 now says so.
The controller's inbound is through a seam with both transports behind it, and
the store window is now the server's rather than the controller's memory. Seven
claims about that were asked of a running server rather than reasoned.
Wiring the controller's own subscription is what found issue 127: every event
name in the catalogue is still written the way a routing key is, so design 29's
derivation turns a consumer's declaration into a subject no emitter publishes.
Thirty-seven manifests, one that cannot be composed at all. It fails on the first
mesh raised on the new bus and not before, which is why nothing had caught it —
the conformance fixtures pin one emitter against one subject, and both halves of
that pair are correct.
The node-facing flows are unaffected: those subjects are the mesh's own and
derive from nothing a module declares.
It waited on a retirement condition 0119 abolished when it made the
deprecated broker an ordinary provider. A step waiting for a condition
nobody set would sit open forever.
A claim the whole enrolment handshake rests on, now measured against a
running server rather than reasoned from documentation — and held by a test
so it cannot become folklore if a server version changes.
The guarantee is the same and the mechanism is simpler — a nak with a
delay, no parked list, nothing lost when the controller restarts. It costs
one thing: a naked message comes back whatever happened meanwhile, so an
older report is redelivered after a newer was applied. A report already
carries the digest of the declaration it answers, so supersession becomes a
check rather than memory — ordering settled by what a message says, not by
when it arrived.
Two things. A paragraph from the superseded 0117 survived beside the 0119
correction that reversed it, so §5 said both that the amqp interface
retires and that it does not. The stale one is gone.
And the framing. §1 opened with "the bus carries five kinds of traffic
today, and this design keeps the five", with a column mapping each to the
queue it used to be — which describes the mesh's nervous system as a port
of something that did a fraction of this. It now says what the bus is: a
role addressable without knowing its holder, the mesh's own state, work
that queues until somebody can do it, and permissions derived from what a
module declared. Conditions, observation and a person's client land there
too as they are built.
Glossary gains `bus` and `the deprecated broker`, with a note on why not to
say "compatibility broker" or name it after a protocol — the second invites
exactly the backwards framing this commit removes.
Task 3.2. ADR 0074's model is untouched — floor plus capabilities, partial
implementations legitimate, identity from the credential, dedup on
x-event-id, conformance as executable fixtures. The transport beneath it is
rewritten: exchanges and queues become subjects and streams.
Statements marked *verified* were checked against a running server while
the runtime's client was written, not reasoned from documentation. Three
of them are things the specification would otherwise have got wrong:
- the payload is the body alone, with metadata in NATS headers; an
implementation that nested the whole envelope would agree with nobody
- a durable name may not contain a dot, while the ack subject joins two
names with one — conflating them looks right in a permission list and is
refused as a consumer name
- a certificate must carry a name the bus is dialled by, because the NATS
client has no hook to replace hostname verification the way pinning did
on AMQP
And one limitation lifts: a module may now call another's tool. Issue 049
recorded that a scoped account could not declare the reply queue a caller
needs, and ADR 0095 routed every ask through the control plane because of
it. Per-account inbox prefixes plus allow_responses replace that. ADR 0095
is not reversed — the control plane is still how a person asks — but
module-to-module calling stops being a question about capability and
becomes one about policy, which `uses` already answers.
The NATS client has no checkServerIdentity hook, so pinning no longer makes
the name check redundant — the bus's certificate must carry a SAN matching
the address nodes dial.
A holding is derived at resolution from manifests, never stored, so there
are no recorded old names to rewrite. The work is an edit plus a kept rename
table — kept because a module lives in its own repository and may be
registered long after the catalogue stopped using an old name.
The manifest already uses serves for a provision's facts, so a module's
tools take their own key. Declaring them is itself new — until now a
module's tools existed only in a runtime environment variable.
Storage is not a property of a subject — a stream is a separate object that
covers one — so the question is always how many streams, not which topics
are durable.
Three facts decide it, two of them verified rather than assumed: NATS
refuses overlapping streams instead of merging them, so a shared stream
plus a per-module one is not available at all; a filter cannot express an
exception; and a stream per module turns one cross-module consumer into one
per module. So one stream, with per-subject caps for the fairness that
matters. Per-module age is genuinely unavailable, and a module that needs
it declares a seat.
2.3 was already true and is now proved — the seat refusal is generic, and
three tests pin what matters: a second bus is refused by name, a different
bus implementation is refused too (which is what makes the bus replaceable),
and the AMQP broker no longer contends so both run on one mesh.
2.1/2.2 turned out not to be a no-op. The host keeps a container only when
its spec matches exactly; genesis raises the upstream image and the module
declares the mesh-built one carrying the entrypoint, so assigning it
recreates the container. That is ADR 0067's pivot and it is safe only
because the bus carries nothing yet — which is why step 2 comes before
anything speaks NATS. After it, never again: the config is a directory
mount, so accounts change without touching the container's spec.
Design 29 said no module requires the bus. The catalogue disagrees: 49 of
72 modules take a broker credential and 23 do not, so an ambient connection
mints an account for a third of the catalogue that never speaks — and the
49 each hand-write the path it lands at, which is provisioning done badly
by hand.
The bootstrap argument that made it ambient was narrower than it looked.
"A provisioner needs an account before it can run" is true of a provisioner
process and says nothing about a provision the controller answers, and the
controller is not waiting on a bus account to compose one.
So: the mesh-broker seat delivers mesh-bus; a module requires it and gets an
address, a sealed credential and the trust to verify the server; a module
that requires nothing has no account at all. The requirement delivers the
connection, the declarations shape the authority, and declaring a subject
without requiring the bus is refused as incoherent.
mesh-bus and nats are deliberately two names: a module may run its own NATS
as a backing service exactly as one provides amqp, and a manifest saying
"nats" would otherwise mean either the mesh's nervous system or a private
queue.
The seat's Delivers was wrong twice today — amqp, then empty — and the
comment says so rather than reading as though it were always right.
0117 went a step further than it had grounds for. It was right that the bus
is the only bus, and wrong that the amqp interface must therefore retire —
because it conflated two reasons to want a broker. Using one to reach
another module is a second bus and stays refused. Needing an AMQP broker as
a backing service, the way something needs a database, is ordinary, and
forbidding it would make the mesh unable to run normal software while
calling that architecture.
So the broker becomes a plain provider module: no seat, not foundation,
never raised at genesis, no retirement condition. lavinmq now claims nothing
and provides amqp; nats claims mesh-broker and provides nothing.
The rule that survives is about direction, not software: inter-module
communication goes over the bus. A module may hold a broker for itself; it
may not use one as a channel to another module. That is a review judgement
where 0117 could have used a parser, which is the honest cost.
0106's progressive insight was itself wrong and is corrected by a second one
there — nothing moves off the old broker, so its "one purpose" sentence does
not become true, it is just not what that server is.
The insight check needed two fixes it found itself: a date may carry
trailing words, and a bold run with a link is discussing an insight rather
than marking one. All four bad shapes still fire.
1.1 to 1.4 built and tested. 1.5 turned out to need no controller change:
it already resolves the broker by seat and names no broker module in its
source, which is what ADR 0079 was for. The genesis module set naming is
scenario and installer config, carried with the bed.
Recorded what must NOT change yet: the amqps:// credential shape and the
5671 default are correct until the rollout, because steps 1-4 leave every
node on AMQP.
29 put a module's events and tools in one namespace, 25 kept mesh.events.*
and mesh.tools.*. One namespace is right — a module's authority over its own
name becomes a single pattern the server enforces — but it needs a kind
token, because a stream is a subject filter and mesh.mod.*.> would persist
every tool call in the mesh. Tools stay on core NATS for the reason 25
already gives.
So: mesh.mod.<module>.event.<name>, .tool.<name>, and seats the same shape.
Found composing the first real configuration. Scoping every inbox to its
owner is right and leaves a responder unable to reply, because the answer
goes to the caller's inbox. The fix is not a wider grant but the server's
own allow_responses: one reply to the subject of a message the user actually
received. Without it every tool call times out while the permission list
looks correct.
Versioning: additive is free; a breaking change is refused while callers are
bound, and the refusal names them, because the mesh already holds the uses
graph; a real break versions the subject, not the seat name, so the role
does not fork; binding is a recorded pin, not a drift to whatever is newest.
Semantic change stays open — no fingerprint sees it, and saying so beats
implying the check is complete.
Provisioning: a provisioner's create/remove/holds IS a serves protocol, so a
provision interface is a seat that also delivers a credential — which is why
design 26 already allowed that. The per-consumer resource is what stops the
two collapsing into one.
Secrets: sealed, so the bus is never trusted with plaintext — but sealed is
not enough, because a stream persists and a durable ciphertext is an archive
the day a key leaks. So a secret never enters a stream: core request/reply
only, and a declaration names a secret rather than carrying one, which is
0098's fetch-don't-store applied where carrying is worst. The vault's own
credential and the bus's own accounts are the two bootstrap exceptions,
resolved the way 0067 resolves the control plane.
Also rewrote the addresses paragraph, which was too compressed to follow:
on-bus addresses disappear because nothing stores them, off-bus ones are
untouched and still 0098's problem, and the bus's own address is the one
that cannot be a subject.
The architecture 0117 opened needs a module to offer a service as a role on
the bus — one holder, addressed by what it does. A closed table in the
controller cannot express that: a capability a module contributes would
require changing the mesh itself.
But 0110 closed the set for a good reason — nothing could say what seats a
mesh had, and the hand count came out at eleven of thirteen. That argues for
enumerable, not hardcoded, and 0110 weighed free-form against a fixed table
without considering a third option: closed at any moment and derived from
the catalogue. A derived list cannot drift, which is how the count broke.
So: the mesh's seats stay the mesh's, reserved by the mesh- prefix so the
prefix is the rule and there is no list to maintain; ten seats are renamed
to restore 0079's convention; everything 0110 decided about what a seat IS
survives untouched.
Design 29 carries the declaration model: three namespaces, subjects derived
from local names so a manifest survives the wire changing, queues never
declared, five relationships (the job and state shapes 0041 had no room
for), and the build-publish-deploy lifecycle with hard, soft and build-time
dependencies distinguished.
0041 gets a progressive insight: "no per-consumer setup, only a
subscription" was a fact about a topic exchange, and a JetStream durable
consumer is a real object someone creates.
WBS 1.3/1.4 were wrong and say so: streams come at registration and
consumers at assignment, so only the foundation set belongs at genesis.
Issue 115 is resolved and converted four modules away from named volumes;
the bus's own data is not the place to bring one back. Also: NATS carries
TLS on the client port rather than beside a plaintext one, so there is no
5671/5672 pair to mirror.
A module does declare requirements the provisioner fulfils — but the broker
it gets that way is a private vhost, the analog of a database, not the
mesh's bus. Two modules of the new mesh depend on it, so the compatibility
broker was never single-purpose and its retirement would have stranded them.
NATS is the heart: one bus, a module's messaging is subjects on it scoped by
what it declares, and no module is handed a server of its own. The seat
delivers nothing; the interface retires with the broker. Also closes the
EVENTS question — one stream, on the bootstrap argument, not preference.
Designs 25 and 28 go in-progress: step 1 is starting.
The insight check caught a false positive on its own first real use — its
bold-run pattern crossed newlines and joined an unrelated `**` to the
marker. Constrained to one line, still catching all four bad shapes.
Both repository checks fail on main. 0115 is cited by no design, and it is
marked accepted while resting on 0112, which is proposed.
Design 27 already states the rule the record decides — "a module is assigned
at most once to a node, and that pair is the assignment's identity" — so it
is the home, and now says so. And 0112, 0113, 0114 and design 27 are all
proposed: the batch is under review, so the record is too. Promoting 0112
instead would be marking a record accepted to satisfy a check, which
check_rests_on names as a failure this repository already made once.
PR #133 landed a different 0115 while this branch was open. The bus record
is now 0116, with every citation in designs 19, 25, 28 and the index
following it.
Note: cycle.py and records.py both fail on main as merged, on that record —
nothing cites it, and it rests on 0112, which is still proposed. Both
pre-date this branch and are left for their own change.
A record can assert a fact that goes stale while the decision it supports
stays right. Superseding for that buries a sound record under a second one
and makes every reader work out which is live. So a correction of fact is
now made in place, marked and dated, with the old wording quoted — bounded
by three conditions and checked by records.py, which fires on an unmarked,
undated or back-dated note. Judgements still supersede.
Applied to 0115: no conformance suite exists to recapture, and the full
genesis bed cannot run until the links exist. Designs 25 and 28 follow.
Counting the surface first changed the plan twice: the genesis bed cannot run
until the links exist, so it belongs to step 4, and there is no conformance
suite to recapture — step 3 builds one against the current bus before moving
it. Both corrections are recorded in the breakdown rather than edited into
ADR 0115. Also indexes design 25, which was never listed.
The NATS change was recorded as one undivided item, which hid three gaps:
a mesh already running had no adoption path, the protocol specification did
not know its transport was being replaced, and nothing was runnable until
everything was. Dividing it is what surfaced them.
125: a hold is not a line in the apply report — sixteen resources held
for an untaken module while four surfaces reported success, and the
operator stopped the edge's predecessor on their word (the route-proxy
flip outage). 126: a changed volume path neither recreates a running
container nor warns, and a roll-out upgrade policy makes a build a
deployment — together they turned a data-path migration into a forge
outage (the /var/lib move). Filed as 119/121 in the novox session
before syncing; renumbered past the other session's 119-124.
Extends ADR 0075. Surfaced fixing builder's hand-faked package-registry
binding tonight: gitea's manifest declares the provision once with a single
npm-path, conflating what should be independently assignable per ecosystem
(npm/cargo/docker/...) the same way artifact-store and package-registry
were themselves split. Cited in 22-the-work-ahead.md's Phase 2, where the
target state this decision points at was already described a week ago.
Numbered 109, not 108: route-proxy's policy feature (mesh-controller PR
still-unwritten decision record — reserved but never committed. Renumbered
around it rather than colliding.
Fixing builder's hand-faked package-registry binding tonight (requires:
package-registry, a real mesh grant instead of a hardcoded JSON fragment)
broke three tests describing a deliberate carried-binding fallback for
exactly this: gitea's own image is built by builder, so builder cannot
yet hold a real grant from gitea the first time either has to exist.
Invisible on novox (already bootstrapped, gitea already live) — real on
any genesis from scratch. Fix left in place, tests left failing rather
than reverted or hacked, so the gap stays visible.
Filed after a session where every mesh-controller interaction went through
docker exec — its manifest runs it as a container with network: host, using
none of the isolation that resource type usually buys, while ADR 0006 makes
it the mesh's single point of coordination. Open question, not a claimed
defect: does type: container get the controller anything type: process
(supervised the way the host supervises its own unit, per ADR 0005) would not.
Comparing route-proxy against what HAL's actual Traefik config does today,
not Traefik's general feature set, per the standing rule that the nox mesh
must do at minimum what the HAL mesh it replaces already does. Everything
else checked out even or better; these two are real, confirmed gaps —
RedisInsight has no login of its own and depends entirely on Traefik's
basicauth middleware, and the gitea-internal route depends on an IP-scoped
deny rule. Neither has any equivalent in route-proxy's single-lookup
request path.
Records the rule the operator gave directly, mid-session, after checking
that HAL's own postgres and lavinmq both used a directory bind and the
mesh's adoption of them three weeks ago switched to a named volume without
a reason recorded anywhere.
Already built and rolled out on novox (mesh-catalog PR #54) before this
record -- urgent enough to fix first and write down after. Includes the
incident: the new host directories needed the container's own UID, which a
named volume gets for free and a directory bind does not; mesh-store
crash-looped on Permission denied until ownership was matched to what the
original volume already had.
Closes issue 115. Checks pass.
The decision (the mesh assigns a container's machine-side port; a module
says only what it needs) was proposed 2026-09-01, and the machinery
already implements it in full -- internal/inventory/ports.go's PortFor,
declaration.go's publishedOn. What was missing was the catalogue actually
complying: 14 of 46 modules baked a machine-side number into their own
manifest anyway. mesh-catalog PR fixes 11 of them (the two defensible
kinds -- foundation, protocol-fixed -- are left alone, per the issue's own
categories). Accepting the decision now that it's actually enforced, and
closing the issue it was blocking.
Checks pass.
Playbook 03 step 2: move status to diagnosing, then located once the
owner is known. located-in is filled with four confirmed packages —
the owner is known.
The carried-peer record (CarriedPeer/TunnelPeer) lives in mesh-controller
internal/inventory, not internal/catalogue. internal/catalogue is the
right package for the zone-generation side of the fix (facts.go's
nodeZones), but a different concern from where the name field itself
would go. Split the two so a decision record doesn't get pointed at the
wrong package.
Fixes, each named where it was wrong:
- reload-on is a service field; a container only has restart-on, which
recreates. Cited precedent (registry-trust-reload) is a service resource,
not a container. Fix: nats-server's own SIGHUP reload, triggered by an
in-image entrypoint watching a directory-mounted config file (issue 103's
recreate-on-change applies to a directly-mounted file, not a directory's
contents) -- asks nothing new of the host.
- A JetStream-delivered message's Reply field is already claimed by the
consumer's own ack address, so a responder using it answers nobody. Fix:
every CONTROL message needing a reply carries its reply subject in its own
payload; the controller publishes there explicitly, never via Respond().
Enrolment is the case this design actually depends on, so it's fixed there
too, not just noted.
- The listed permissions never granted publish on a durable consumer's own
ack-reply subject -- a module could receive but never ack, so every
message redelivers forever. Fixed with a scoped grant per module's own
consumer.
- One account (a deliberate choice, kept) means inbox privacy is the
permission list or nothing. The design granted 'its reply inbox' without
scoping it, which read as any user reaching any inbox. Fixed: each user's
inbox prefix is derived from its own identity and its permissions name
only that prefix.
New open question from this revision, not closed: whether the in-image
watch-and-SIGHUP shape belongs in mesh-sdk if a second module ever needs it.
Checks pass (records.py, cycle.py, index.py).
Checked why ADR 0104's forward-to-predecessor shape doesn't transfer to the
resolver the way it did the proxy: DNS is one process on one port, and
assigning the mesh's dnsmasq module replaces it in place, so there is no
predecessor process left standing to forward to.
But /etc/dnsmasq.d/hal-dns.conf's static address= lines for ace/shanks/g14
match the mesh's own carried-peer addresses from overlay show exactly. The
name a carried peer needs isn't a guess the operator has to make under
pressure — it's a transcription of a record the predecessor already has and
has been correctly serving for six days. Located in mesh-controller (no way
to attach a name to a carried peer today) and the dnsmasq module (doesn't
emit a wildcard for a named-but-uncarried peer). Not implemented.
hq cannot hold the migration's operational record — it names machines, addresses and
paths, and this repository is public — but it can say where that record is, which is what
this map is for. Asked for by the operator, who had to be told.
jschoubben