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Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben c8935aceca Issue 194 resolved: the fixed host forgot its former archive on all four machines 2026-10-02 11:31:29 +02:00
mesh-admin 29b656f2c0 Merge pull request 'Issue 196: the hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes itself' (#276) from jschoubben/the-hub-relays-the-mesh into main 2026-10-02 09:23:55 +00:00
jschoubben d05ac367f1 Issue 196 resolved: the hub relays the mesh, re-swept live 2026-10-02 11:23:37 +02:00
jschoubben 1c0dafb918 Issue 196: the hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes itself 2026-10-02 11:17:11 +02:00
mesh-admin 018ee359ae Merge pull request 'Issue 194: the host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything' (#274) from issue/194-the-hosts-own-former-archive-stops-every-apply into main 2026-10-02 09:04:30 +00:00
mesh-admin c5535eeebd Merge pull request 'ADR 0163 built: the take digest, the minted-secret refusal, the networks setting, settings judged where stored, genesis raising the forge as declared' (#270) from feat/a-take-is-a-comparison-the-rest into main 2026-10-02 09:04:21 +00:00
mesh-admin dbb9d2bc16 Merge pull request 'Issue 191 and ADR 0167: a membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is' (#273) from jschoubben/an-internal-only-route into main 2026-10-02 07:49:27 +00:00
jschoubben 28d53dcc28 Issue 191 resolved: internal-only routes are served to the mesh, live on both proxies 2026-10-02 09:49:25 +02:00
jschoubben df667eb710 ADR 0167: a membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is
Issue 191's route proxy needs to know who the mesh is to serve an
internal name correctly, and the first fix had it work that out alone.
The membership on the bus now carries it, from the same list the filter
uses. ADR 0138 gains an insight that the proxy is where internal reach
is kept; designs 08 and 25 say how.
2026-10-02 09:49:19 +02:00
jschoubben 098a2ca485 Issue 191: a route with only an internal name is dropped as naming nothing 2026-10-02 09:49:19 +02:00
mesh-admin a34cedeb5d Merge pull request 'Issue 195: every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential' (#275) from jschoubben/issue-195 into main 2026-10-02 00:44:29 +00:00
jschoubben db5ff5a5ee Issue 195: every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential
The status warning names 49 users; 48 are modules that never speak on the
bus, and the one real fault, a declared broker secret filled with a
generated value, looked the same as the rest.
2026-10-02 02:44:24 +02:00
jschoubben 780c2b6e58 Issue 194: the host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything
Rule 5 of ADR 0163 (a former target is removed) met issue 162 (an archive
has no removal) in the host's own archive, the first time a host carrying
former targets replaced itself; every machine applied nothing from then on.
2026-10-02 02:42:19 +02:00
jschoubben c4151e6bc4 ADR 0163 built: the take digest, the minted-secret refusal, the networks setting, settings judged where stored, genesis raising the forge as declared; issues 096, 097, 126 resolved
The record gets its built note; designs 05 and 09 the revisions; 086, 098,
099, 100 and 101 stay located because every machine is converged and the
record's live row — a take read on an adopted machine — has not been run;
090 is built in part, its network difference left for the take to say.
2026-10-01 23:45:57 +02:00
23 changed files with 646 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -124,6 +124,32 @@ This corrects a fact, not the decision: one statement per endpoint, three things
none of them deciding on its own, all stand. The table in the decision should be read with the filter
column applying to an unrouted endpoint.
## Progressive insight — 2026-10-02, from issue 191
**For a routed endpoint, "the proxy serves the internal name" has to mean "serves it to the private
network", and only the proxy can make it mean that.** The decision says `internal` means the proxy
serves the internal name and not the public one. It does not say to whom, and the proxy answered
every name it routes to any request that carried it, on the same listeners as its public names. A
name being internal kept nobody out: a request from the internet only had to send it. While every
routed endpoint also had a public name, nothing showed it. Once an endpoint could be internal alone
([issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md)), serving
its name to everyone would have published exactly what `internal` was chosen to keep private.
The earlier insight above says the port is not the path for a routed endpoint. This is its other
half: the proxy is the path, so the proxy is where `internal` is enforced. It serves an internal name
only to the machines of the mesh and to the machine itself
([ADR 0144](0144-anything-on-a-machine-may-call-anything-on-it.md)). Who the mesh is, it is told,
not left to work out: its membership carries the same list of machine addresses the filter's "from the
mesh" is rendered from ([ADR 0167](0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)).
To anyone else, the name is answered as one never routed, in the handshake and in the request, and not
listed among the names it serves. This holds for the internal name of a `both` endpoint too, whose
outsiders have its public name.
The decision, the options and the consequences stand: one statement per endpoint, three things
derived from it. Checked in the proxy's own tests: an internal-only name is served to a machine the
membership names and to loopback, and refused, unlisted and uncertified for any other request; until
the mesh is issued, it is served to the machine alone.
## Consequences
- **A manifest gains endpoint names, and a route contribution names an endpoint instead of a port.**
@@ -131,6 +131,32 @@ the plan says it too.
| Genesis raises the forge as its module declares it | a genesis test that raises, assigns, and finds the module holding rather than raising a second |
| Live | the next cutover on an adopted machine: `take` shows the comparison, refuses the downgrade if there is one, and the service keeps its configuration and its secret |
## Built, 2026-10-02
> **Progressive insight — 2026-10-02.** The decision stands; these are the facts of its building.
Built across mesh-host 63 and 64 and mesh-controller 201, 202 and the pull request that followed
them. Rule 1: `take` previews every held thing's comparison and ends with a digest; `take --yes
<digest>` acts on exactly that preview, and a changed preview or an account older than the flip
allows is refused, as the flip's are. A published port's reach is said as the machine reported it,
behind the found firewall whose rules are not read. Rule 2: an older image, a differing file and a
minted, unaccepted secret for found data refuse, overridden by `--downgrade`, `--replace <path>` and
`--mint <name>`; the secrets a module holds on a machine are read with where each came from. Rule 3:
`secret accept --provider` reaches a required secret. Rule 4: the per-machine setting is `networks`,
a container id to the found networks it keeps; judged for an adopted machine only, joined by the host
after the container runs, part of the container's spec, named in the preview. Rule 5: the host's
facts, former targets and strays. Rule 6: one judgement, run where a setting is stored and where a
machine is composed; a module whose stored setting its definition can no longer compose is left out
of the declaration, the envelope says so, the host keeps that module's things, and `plan` and `push`
say it by name. A key that reaches nothing is refused where stored and said by `plan`, and never
costs a module. Rule 7: genesis raises the forge under the module's container name, with its image
digest and its data directory; the network is the one difference left, said by the take, because the
bootstrap forge reaches the store on the machine's loopback.
**Not yet proven live.** Every machine of this mesh is converged, so the table's last row — a take
on an adopted machine — waits for the next adoption. What is live is what the rows above it check.
Issues 086, 098, 099, 100 and 101 stay located until that row is read.
## References
- [ADR 0100](0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md), [ADR 0102](0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md), [ADR 0103](0103-what-an-adopted-node-holds-and-what-its-guard-refuses.md), [ADR 0104](0104-a-provision-may-be-answered-by-an-adapter-to-the-predecessor.md), [ADR 0162](0162-a-merge-produces-a-tiered-plan-the-mesh-keeps.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
---
topic: the mesh
status: accepted
date: 2026-10-02
deciders: jochen
reconstructed: false
extends: 02-DECISIONS/0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md
---
# 167. A membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is
## Context
A provider learns what it is given from a file. The controller composes every consumer's contribution
to a requirement, and the node's declaration writes them into the provider's received file. The route
proxy reads its routes that way: one JSON file, re-read every two seconds.
[Issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md) showed what
that file leaves out. Since [ADR 0138](0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md),
a route whose endpoint reaches only the private network carries an internal name and no public one.
The proxy dropped it. Serving it was not enough either: the proxy answers public and internal names on
the same listeners, so an internal name served to every request is public under a guessable name. To
serve it correctly the proxy needs a second fact, **who the mesh is**, and nothing gave it one.
The first attempt had the proxy work it out: the mesh's range from an environment variable written by
the catalogue, and the machine's container bridges read from its own interfaces. That is a second
definition of "the mesh", kept by one module, beside the one the packet filter already uses. The
controller resolves "from the mesh" to every machine's address on the private network, and the filter
is rendered from that list. Two definitions agree until one changes.
[ADR 0160](0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md)
already gives every assignment one document on the bus, its membership, read once at connect and
followed. It says what the assignment serves and reaches. It does not yet say what it is given.
## Considered Options
1. **Keep the file, add the mesh to it.** The proxy keeps polling a file, and the controller writes the
mesh's addresses beside the routes. It fixes the definition, but delivery stays a file re-read on a
timer, written by a separate path from the one every other fact a module is told now takes.
2. **Have the proxy work it out** from a range in its environment and the machine's interfaces. Rejected:
it is the second definition this record exists to remove.
3. **The membership carries it.** What each module receives, from the same composition its received
file is written from, and the mesh's addresses, from the same list the filter is rendered from. The
proxy follows its membership and serves exactly that.
## Decision
**Option 3.**
- **A membership carries what its module receives**, by requirement: the contributions every consumer
made, exactly as composed for its received file. A requirement nobody contributed to is an empty
list, never absent, for the reason the file is written empty: "nothing asked" and "never told" want
different responses.
- **A membership carries who the mesh is**: every machine's address on the private network, the list
a rule saying "from the mesh" resolves to. One list, two readers: the filter and any module that
must tell the mesh from the world.
- **The route proxy reads its routes and the mesh from its membership**, with the bus account every
module that speaks on the bus is given. It serves an internal name only to the machines the mesh
names and to the machine itself, and answers anyone else as it answers a name it never routed: in
the request, in the handshake, and in the list of names it serves.
- **The file stays until the bus has spoken.** While a proxy has read no membership that carries routes,
it serves the file, and an internal name only to its own machine: refused, never opened. A
membership from a controller that issues no routes changes nothing.
## Consequences
- Every membership grows two fields. A machine joining or leaving republishes every membership, which
a push already does.
- A provider that receives something is told it twice for now, in its file and on the bus. The file
goes when every provider reads its membership; that is its own change.
- The route proxy needs a bus account. It is issued like any module's, so a machine running the proxy
cannot be composed between the catalogue declaring the account and the operator issuing it. The
machine keeps what it runs meanwhile.
- The internal name of a route that also has a public one is now served to the mesh only. Outsiders
have the public name.
- A container on the same machine that calls that machine's own internal name arrives from its
container network, not from a mesh address, and is refused. Calls between machines are unaffected:
they leave by the machine's mesh address. Whether the mesh should also issue each machine's container
networks is left open, because the mesh does not record them today.
## How this is checked
| Rule | Checked by |
|---|---|
| What a provider receives on the bus is what its received file says, same-node port fix included | a controller test composing a provider and a consumer on one machine and comparing the two |
| An internal name is served to the machines the membership names and to loopback, and to nobody else | the proxy's tests: served from a named address and from loopback; refused, unlisted and uncertified from any other |
| A membership that carries no routes, or a mesh that cannot be read, changes nothing | the proxy's tests |
| Until the mesh is issued, an internal name is served to the machine alone | the proxy's tests |
| Live: an internal-only route answers over the mesh and is refused from outside | by hand, after the release |
## References
- [ADR 0160](0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md) —
the membership this extends
- [ADR 0138](0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md) — reach, and the
insight of 2026-10-02 that the proxy is where internal reach is kept
- [ADR 0144](0144-anything-on-a-machine-may-call-anything-on-it.md) — the machine itself is always inside
- [Issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md) — what
found it
+1
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@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ python3 00-META/checks/index.py fail if stale
- **0161** — [What deserves a seat: a role of a module is a seat, a singular fact about machines is a placement with a capacity of one, and a holder's software is the machine's](0161-what-deserves-a-seat.md)
- **0162** — [A merge produces a tiered plan the mesh keeps, and a module's dependencies are one relation in the catalogue](0162-a-merge-produces-a-tiered-plan-the-mesh-keeps.md)
- **0163** — [Taking a module over is a comparison: what it compares, what it refuses, and what it carries](0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md)
- **0167** — [A membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is](0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
### Its tiers, from the bottom up
+14 -1
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
layer: to-be
status: in-progress
code: [mesh-host]
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-02
decisions:
- 02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md
@@ -163,6 +163,19 @@ a resource's former targets, removes a container or file it wrote under a name t
longer names, never removes what was found, and reports what runs on the machine that it neither
wrote nor holds. *How it is checked:* ADR 0163's table.
**What the host joins, keeps and raises for a take** — revision, 2026-10-02
([ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 4, 6 and 7). A
container may name networks it also joins once it runs — the found network a per-machine setting keeps
for a taken container while a neighbour still resolves it there; joined after the run, part of the
container's spec, refused when it cannot be joined. A declaration may name the modules the mesh left
out of it because a stored setting cannot compose with the module's definition: the host keeps what it
wrote and holds for a left-out module and says so, where absence used to read as removal. And genesis
raises the bootstrap forge under the forge module's container name, with the module's image digest and
its data directory, so the module holds it by the found rule; the network is the one difference a take
has left to say. *How it is checked:* a host test joins a kept network and refuses one it cannot; a
host test keeps a left-out module's record and hold and removes an absent module's; a bootstrap test
holds the installer's constants to the module's manifest where the catalogue is checked out beside it.
**Found reaches every kind that can touch what the machine has**
([ADR 0103](../../02-DECISIONS/0103-what-an-adopted-node-holds-and-what-its-guard-refuses.md)). For a module not yet taken, a directory present with no record
keeps its mode and owner, a unit present with no record keeps its state and boot setting, a
+14 -1
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@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ code:
- mesh-controller internal/identity/authority.go
- mesh-host internal/identity/serving.go
- mesh-host internal/apply (the service that reflects a rule set)
updated: 2026-09-30
updated: 2026-10-02
decisions:
- 02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0148-the-meshs-names-are-resolved-not-copied-into-containers.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0151-a-routes-internal-name-is-composed-under-the-node-that-serves-it.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0147-a-module-anchors-the-meshs-authority.md
@@ -842,6 +843,18 @@ One value, three readers:
| `public` | the machine port, to anywhere | the public name | the public authority |
| `both` | the machine port, to anywhere | both names | each name's own authority |
*2026-10-02.* **The proxy serves an internal name to the private network only**
([ADR 0138](../../02-DECISIONS/0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md),
its insight of this date). It answers public and internal names on the same listeners, so the name a
request carries is the request's own claim, not where the request came from. An internal name is
served to the machines of the mesh and to the machine itself; to anyone else it is answered as a name
never routed, in the handshake as well as the request. Without this, an endpoint with reach `internal`
would be public under a name that is easy to guess
([issue 191](../../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md)).
The proxy is told who the mesh is, and its routes, in its membership on the bus — the same machine
addresses the filter's "from the mesh" is rendered from
([ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)).
**An endpoint that is not routed is reached and never named.** No route contribution means no name is
composed and no certificate requested, while the filter still acts on it. That is the case the model
could not express at all, and it is the ordinary case for anything that is not HTTP.
+16 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ code:
- mesh-host packaging/nox-mesh-host-network.sh
- mesh-controller internal/token
- mesh-controller internal/inventory/nodes.go
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-02
decisions:
- 02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md
@@ -323,6 +323,21 @@ network are said. `take --yes <digest>` cuts over what was previewed, as the fli
container may keep a found network by a per-machine setting while its neighbours are not yet taken.
*How it is checked:* ADR 0163's table.
**A setting is judged where it is stored, and the take's words** — revision, 2026-10-02
([ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 1, 2, 4 and 6).
The preview ends with a digest of what it said; `take --yes <digest>` acts on that preview and nothing
else, and a preview that has changed since, or an account of the machine older than the flip allows, is
refused as the flip's is. A module the machine holds nothing for has nothing to compare, and `--yes`
suffices. The overrides are `--downgrade`, `--replace <path>` and `--mint <name>`; the per-machine
setting that keeps a found network is `networks`, a container id to the networks it keeps, accepted
for an adopted machine only. Storing a setting composes it against the module's current definition and
refuses, naming node, module, layer and key, what cannot compose or reaches nothing. A definition that
later moves under a stored setting costs that module its place in the machine's declaration, said by
name in `plan`, `push` and the declaration itself, and the machine is told everything else; a stray
setting no longer refuses the machine where it is read. *How it is checked:* controller tests over the
one judgement — refused where stored, a module left out where composed, the envelope naming it — and
over a take's digest, staleness and secrets.
A candidate machine is not empty. It has a package manager, probably a container runtime,
configuration somebody chose. [ADR 0005](../../02-DECISIONS/0005-the-node-host.md)
says the host never touches what it did not create — adoption is the deliberate act of taking
+8 -1
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ code:
- mesh-tools src/broker-amqp.ts (to be replaced)
- mesh-catalog modules/nats (to be written)
- mesh-sdk src (the protocol's NATS binding, step 3)
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-02
decisions:
- 02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0157-a-build-says-what-it-does-on-the-bus-as-it-happens.md
- 02-DECISIONS/0106-the-bus-is-nats.md
@@ -94,6 +95,12 @@ list; the account's grant is the same membership read the other way; the console
tool's subject. The one rule a runtime keeps is the membership's own subject, from the two names in its
credential.
**Revised 2026-10-02** ([ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)):
a membership also carries **what its module receives**, by requirement — the contributions its
received file is written from, from the same composition — and **who the mesh is**, every machine's
address on the private network, the list the filter's "from the mesh" is rendered from. The route
proxy is the first reader of both.
**Revised 2026-09-27** ([ADR 0129](../../02-DECISIONS/0129-a-seat-carries-the-protocol-of-its-role.md)):
**`mesh.build.request`, `mesh.control.built` and the BUILDS stream are gone.** A build is work submitted to a role, and the
mesh already has a shape for that — a seat's `accept` subjects, on a work queue with a queue group of
@@ -40,3 +40,9 @@ it changes before it changes it, and for taking a module this one does not.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 1 and 2: the preview names a narrowing. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built, 2026-10-02
mesh-controller 201 and the pull request after it: the preview names it, and `take --yes <digest>`
acts on the preview that was read. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted machine — every
machine of this mesh is converged today, so the record's live row has not been run.
@@ -53,3 +53,13 @@ network, or it is not a takeover.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rule 7: genesis raises as the module declares. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built in part, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 64: genesis raises the forge under the module's container name (`gitea`), pinned to the
module's image digest, with the module's data directory mounted at `/data` — so the module finds it,
holds it, and a take compares equal images and the same data. A test holds the installer's constants
to the module's manifest where the catalogue is checked out beside it. The network is the difference
left: the bootstrap forge runs on the machine's network to reach the store on its loopback, the module
runs bridged and publishes its ports, and the take says so. Closing waits for group 9's genesis test —
a mesh raised, the module assigned, and the module found holding rather than raising a second forge.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
status: located
status: resolved
opened: 2026-09-23
located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
fixed-by:
fixed-by: mesh-controller (the pull request after 201: JudgeSettings, LeftOut), mesh-host 64 (left_out kept)
amended-design:
---
@@ -63,3 +63,12 @@ knowing the code.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rule 6: judged where stored; an impossible statement costs a module. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Resolved, 2026-10-02
One judgement, in the catalogue, run where a setting is stored and where a machine is composed. Stored,
a setting that cannot compose with the module's current definition is refused naming the node, the
module, the layer and the key; a key that reaches nothing is refused there too. Composed, a definition
that moved under a stored setting leaves that module out of the machine's declaration — the envelope
names it, the host keeps what it holds and wrote for it, `plan` and `push` say it — and the machine is
told everything else. A stray setting no longer refuses the whole machine where it is read.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
status: located
status: resolved
opened: 2026-09-23
located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
fixed-by:
fixed-by: mesh-host 63 (former targets removed, strays reported), mesh-controller 201/202 (strays shown)
amended-design:
---
@@ -80,3 +80,11 @@ found, and so would be kept for ever on purpose.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rule 5: former targets are removed and strays reported. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Resolved, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 63: the host's record keeps a resource's former targets, removes a container or file it
wrote under a name the declaration no longer names, never what was found, and reports strays — what
runs on the machine that the mesh neither wrote nor holds. mesh-controller 201 and 202 show strays
on `node show` for an adopted and a converged machine alike; the live mesh reported four on the
control node the evening it rolled.
@@ -68,3 +68,9 @@ written.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 1 and 2: the difference is shown and a differing file refuses. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 63 reports the difference between the kept original and the declared content; mesh-controller
201 shows it in the preview and refuses a differing file unless `--replace <path>` names it, or the
module declares the file partially. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted machine.
@@ -65,3 +65,9 @@ expected rate.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 1 and 2: the images are compared by age and a downgrade refuses. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 63 reports the found image and both images' creation dates; mesh-controller 201 says
DOWNGRADE and refuses unless `--downgrade` is said. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted
machine.
@@ -70,3 +70,11 @@ the module can only be installed fresh.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 2 and 3: a minted secret for found data refuses; secret accept reaches required secrets. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built, 2026-10-02
`secret accept <node> <module> <name> --provider <node>` reaches a required secret (mesh-controller 201).
The pull request after it reads every secret a module holds on a machine with its origin, and a take
of a module whose data was found refuses a minted, unaccepted one — naming the accept that carries
the existing value in, or `--mint <name>` to let the service take the new one. Stays located until
a take is read on an adopted machine.
@@ -66,3 +66,10 @@ exercise.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 1 and 4: the neighbours are named; a found network may be kept by a setting. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Built, 2026-10-02
The preview names every neighbour on a found network (mesh-controller 201). The pull request after it
adds the per-machine setting `networks` — a container id to the found networks it keeps — judged for an
adopted machine only, and mesh-host 64 has the taken container join each once it runs. Stays located
until a take is read on an adopted machine.
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
---
status: located
status: resolved
opened: 2026-09-26
located-in: [mesh-host internal/apply]
fixed-by: mesh-host 63 (every written field compared), mesh-controller 201 (build says the policy)
amended-design:
---
# 126 — a volume path is not in the spec comparison, and a roll-out raced a data move
@@ -50,3 +52,9 @@ the install-page junk was discarded twice.
[ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rules 5 and 7: every field compared; build says the policy. Building follows,
host first, then the controller's `take`.
## Resolved, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 63: every field the host writes is compared before a container is called current, volumes
and paths included. mesh-controller 201: `build` and the take-in say when a module's policy rolls a
result out at once; under ADR 0162 the plan says it too.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
---
status: resolved
opened: 2026-10-01
located-in: [mesh-controller examples/route-proxy/main.go (routesFrom requires a route's public `name` and treats `internal-name` only as an alias of it; the handler serves every routed name to any source), mesh-controller internal/broker/membership.go (a membership says nothing of what its module receives or who the mesh is)]
fixed-by: mesh-controller PR 207 (the membership carries what a module receives and who the mesh is; the proxy follows it and serves internal names to the mesh only), mesh-catalog PR 211 (the proxy's bus account), mesh-controller PR 208 (the issue verb that delivers it), live 2026-10-02
amended-design: [03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md, 03-DESIGN/01-to-be/25-the-bus-on-nats.md]
---
# 191 — A route with only an internal name is dropped as naming nothing
## What was observed
A module whose endpoint reaches only the private network could not be reached by its internal name.
The module ran and answered on its own port. Its route's internal name resolved to the serving node.
The request failed during the TLS handshake:
```
http: TLS handshake error from …: no public route for "unifi.home-server.internal" in this mesh,
so no certificate is asked for
```
The proxy's own log said why, every time it re-read its routes:
```
unifi on home-server asked for a route and named nothing; skipped
```
The route it skipped was not empty. The mesh had given it an endpoint, a port, a scheme and an internal
name, and no public name:
| route | `name` | `internal-name` | served |
|---|---|---|---|
| home-assistant | a public name | `home-assistant.home-server.internal` | under both |
| unifi | — | `unifi.home-server.internal` | under neither |
Three other modules on the same node were skipped with the same line on the same pass.
## Why it matters
**Reach is decided in one place, and the proxy reads the old shape of the decision.**
[ADR 0138](../../02-DECISIONS/0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md)
made an endpoint's reach decide which names exist. The controller composes the public name, the
internal name, or both, and composes no name that nobody asked for
([issue 140](../140-an-endpoints-reach-is-not-declared/01-resolution.md)). An endpoint that reaches
only the private network is the ordinary case for anything that should not face the internet. It is
exactly the case the proxy drops.
**The failure is quiet and points the wrong way.** Nothing marks the module unhealthy. The handshake
error says *no public route*, which reads as a certificate fault on the reader's side. The line that
gives the real cause is one of four identical lines repeated every few seconds in a log nobody reads
until they already suspect the proxy.
**The opposite move is not a workaround.** Giving the endpoint public reach makes the proxy serve it.
It also publishes an administration interface to the internet to get a name on the private network.
## Open questions
- Should the proxy refuse a route it cannot serve in a way the controller or an operator sees, not
only in its own log? The same silent skip covers a route with no usable port or an unknown scheme.
- What checks that what the controller composes and what the proxy serves stay the same shape? ADR
0138 changed one side and nothing failed on the other.
## Resolved (2026-10-02)
Built as [ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
decided, and live on both machines that run the proxy. Each logs that its routes now come from its
membership, and serves internal names to the four machines the mesh names. Checked by hand:
- the internal-only route answers through the proxy from the serving machine and from two other
machines of the mesh, over a certificate from the mesh's own authority that each verifies;
- the same name asked from an address outside the mesh is answered as a name never routed, over plain
HTTP, and refused in the TLS handshake; the list of served names it is shown leaves out every internal
name.
Two things the rollout found are their own records: the proxy's bus account could be issued only from
the controller's command line, until mesh-controller PR 208 added the `issue` verb, and the status line
counting every module as a bus user without a credential is
[issue 195](../195-every-assigned-module-is-counted-as-a-bus-user-without-a-credential/00-report.md).
The serving machine also lacked the certificate-trust module, so it could not verify the mesh's own
certificates until it was assigned there.
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
# Diagnosis
*2026-10-01.*
**Ruled out first: the module itself.** Its container was up and had not restarted. The controller's
status endpoint answered on its own port with `"up": true`. The tool wrapper beside it was serving
all its tools.
**Ruled out: name resolution.** The internal name resolved to the serving node's private-network
address, which is where the proxy listens. Plain HTTP to the name reached the proxy and got a 404.
HTTPS failed in the handshake, and the proxy logged that it had no route for the name.
**The route as the proxy received it.** The mesh-written route file held a complete contribution
for the module: endpoint `web`, port, scheme `https`, `insecure`, a label, and `internal-name`. It had
no `name`. That is what the controller composes for an endpoint whose reach stops at the private
network (ADR 0138, `composeName`). The contribution was correct.
**Located: `routesFrom` in the proxy.** It reads `name` first and skips the contribution if `name`
is empty. It reads `internal-name` only at the end, as a second host for a rule that already has a
public one. So the proxy can serve an internal name only next to a public one. That matched the
mesh before ADR 0138, when both names were always composed. It has been wrong since then.
The other half of the proxy already handles the case. Certificates for a host are split by whether it
is in the public set: hosts outside it go to the internal authority, and only hosts inside it are
eligible for ACME. A host that is only ever an internal name falls on the correct side of both checks
without change. For certificates, only reading the route was wrong; who may reach the route is the next section.
**The fix.** `routesFrom` takes a route that names either host, serves each name it carries, and
marks only the public one as public. It still skips a route that names neither, with the same log line.
A test proves an internal-only route is served, certified by the internal authority, and refused by
the public one. That test fails against the code before the change.
## The first fix would have made the name public — 2026-10-02, from review
Serving the dropped route was not enough. The proxy picks a route from the name a request carries
and never from where the request came from, and it answers public and internal names on the same
listeners. Its public names resolve to an address the internet reaches. So once the internal-only
route was served, any request from the internet carrying `unifi.home-server.internal` — a name of a
fixed, guessable shape — would have reached an administration interface that reach `internal` was
chosen to keep private. Before the fix the route was unreachable from everywhere. After it, it would
have been reachable from everywhere. Two more leaks came with it: the proxy's answer for an unrouted
name listed every name it serves, internal ones included, and the handshake handed a certificate
naming the internal host to any client.
Nothing showed this while every routed endpoint also had a public name: its internal name exposed
nothing the public one did not. It is a gap in the decision's wording, not only in the proxy — ADR
0138 says the proxy *serves* the internal name without saying to whom — so it is recorded there as a
progressive insight and in the to-be connectivity design.
**Where "inside" is decided: told, not worked out.** The first correction had the proxy work it out
for itself — the mesh's range from an environment variable the catalogue wrote, and the machine's
container bridges from its own interfaces. That was a second definition of "the mesh", kept by one
module beside the one the controller already has: it resolves "from the mesh" to every machine's
address on the private network, and the packet filter is rendered from that list. Reviewed, it was
replaced: [ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
has every membership on the bus carry what its module receives and that list, and the proxy follows
its membership. One composition, read by the filter and by the proxy.
The proxy reads the source address, where the guard reads the interface, because it cannot see the
interface a request arrived on. A claimed source does not carry here: a connection needs its replies,
and replies to a mesh address leave by the tunnel.
**What changed with it.** The internal name of a route that also has a public one is now served to the
mesh only, like any other internal name. Outsiders have the public name, so nothing they could reach is
lost. A container calling its own machine's internal name arrives from its container network and is
refused; whether the mesh should issue those networks too is left open in ADR 0167.
**Order of release.**
1. The catalogue change, which gives the proxy a bus account. A machine running the proxy is not
composed until its account is issued, so the account is issued straight after
(`module issue route-proxy --node <machine>`), and then the machine is pushed.
2. The controller and proxy change. The push after it publishes memberships that carry the routes and
the mesh, and each proxy takes them. Until then, a proxy serves its file, and internal names to its
own machine alone.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
---
status: resolved
opened: 2026-10-02
located-in: [mesh-host internal/apply (removeOrphan: a former target of a kind with no removal was fatal), mesh-host internal/store (Record keeps a former target for every kind, the host's own archive included)]
fixed-by: mesh-host 65 — a former target of a kind the host cannot remove is left in place, said and forgotten; a dropped archive still refuses
amended-design:
---
# 194 — The host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything
## What was observed
2026-10-02, 00:34Z, on all four machines of this mesh, the first time a host carrying former
targets ([ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rule 5,
built in mesh-host 63) replaced itself with a newer host (mesh-host 64).
The host delivers its own successor as an archive whose target is a versioned directory
([ADR 0141](../../02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md)): every new version
is the same resource with a new target. Since mesh-host 63 the record keeps a resource's former
target so the next apply removes what the host wrote under it
([issue 097](../097-a-resource-that-changes-target-leaves-the-old-one-behind/00-report.md)). So
the new host's first apply found the previous version's directory as a former target of its own
archive, and asked the removal for an archive — which does not exist
([issue 162](../162-an-archive-cannot-be-undeclared/00-report.md)):
```
applying "mesh-host.next@former:/usr/lib/nox-mesh-host/versions/3c906749ad27": no way to remove a "archive"
0 resource(s) were applied and remain
```
Orphans are removed before any resource is applied on a converged machine, so the refusal ended
every apply at its first step. Every machine reported `failed`, applied nothing, and would have
gone on doing so: a host fix is itself an archive the same apply would have to write, and the apply
never reached it. The machines kept running what they had; nothing new from the mesh could land.
## Why it matters beyond this instance
Two rules that are each right met in the one resource the host cannot afford to stop on. Rule 5
says a former target is removed and said; issue 162 says an archive has no removal, deliberately,
so an unassignment nothing can undo is never reported as done. Neither rule was wrong; their
meeting was never tested, because the bed that would have found it is a host replacing itself
under the new rule, and the first such replacement was the live one. The fix is narrow: a former
target of a kind the host cannot remove is left in place, said, and forgotten — never fatal,
because nobody dropped it. An archive the declaration dropped still refuses, as 162 has it.
## What it took to recover
The broken host cannot apply its own fix: the fix is delivered as an archive, and the apply fails
before writing anything. On each machine the host's record (`/var/lib/mesh-host/state.json`) had to
lose the one `@former:` entry by hand, once, so that the next push could write the fixed archive and
stand aside for it. A manual edit of the host's record is otherwise never done; it is written here
because the alternative was four machines that could apply nothing.
## Open questions
- Should `Record` keep a former target for a kind the host cannot remove at all? The trace is
useful; the removal it implies is not. Keeping it and letting the apply forget it is what the fix
does; not recording it would be quieter.
- Should the host's own versions directory be cleaned by the launcher rather than by the apply —
the one archive whose former targets are genuinely removable, by the thing that knows which one
runs?
- Is there a bed that replaces a host under the current rules before the live mesh does
(the proof row of [ADR 0141](../../02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md) was
a single crossover, before former targets existed)?
## Resolved, 2026-10-02
mesh-host 65, merged 07:35Z. Recovered as the record above says: the operator dropped the one
`@former:` entry from each machine's host record and pushed; the fixed host then ran on all four and
its first apply said `forgotten mesh-host.next@former:… a former target left in place` and applied the
rest. The open questions stand as questions for the host's own versions, not as faults.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
---
status: open
opened: 2026-10-02
located-in: []
fixed-by:
amended-design:
---
# 195 — Every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential, and the real gaps are lost in the count
## What was observed
`status`, and `plan` for any machine, open with one line before anything else:
```
the bus's user list leaves out 49 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: <node>.<module>, …
Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
```
The 49 are spread over four machines and name 26 distinct modules. Checked against the catalogue on
2026-10-02:
| what the module's definition says | modules |
|---|---|
| declares an own secret named `broker` | 1 — the route proxy, which needed a bus account for issue 191 |
| declares no `broker` secret, and emits, consumes and serves nothing on the bus | 17 — the packet filter, the intrusion filter, the ssh daemon, the resolver configuration, the certificate authority, the broker itself and others |
| declares no `broker` secret, and **emits events** | 1 |
| not in this catalogue, so not checked | 7 |
So the line counts every module assigned anywhere as a bus user. For almost all of them that is not a
missing credential. A module with no `broker` secret has nowhere to receive one, and the mesh already
says an account nothing reads is an orphan ([issue 078](../078-a-delivered-secret-is-accepted-under-any-name/00-report.md)).
Two real gaps sit inside the count and cannot be told from the noise:
- **A declared `broker` secret was filled with a value that is not an account.** Before its account was
issued, the route proxy's plan on both machines already carried a sealed `broker` file, while the same
status line said no credential had been minted for it. A push had made the declared secret the way it
makes any own secret. The module would have started with a credential the bus does not know, and
nothing would have said why. It was found only because the account was being issued by hand.
- **A module that emits events declares no way to reach the bus.** Its events can go nowhere, and no
check refuses that.
## Why it matters
**A warning that is always on is read as never on.** The line names 49 users on every `status` and every
`plan`. An operator, or an agent, learns to scroll past it. The one entry that was a real fault looked
exactly like the 48 that were not.
**The fault that was real is the silent kind.** A module whose broker credential is a generated value
starts, fails to authenticate, and reports that three layers away from the cause. That is the failure
the composition already refuses for a secret that was never made at all ("declared and not made"). Here
a value was made, so the refusal never fired.
## Open questions
- Should a bus user be composed for a module that declares no `broker` secret at all? If not, the line
shrinks to the modules that can actually use an account.
- Is a `broker` secret ever correctly made by the generic generator? If not, should composition refuse
a declared `broker` until it is issued, or should the mesh issue it as part of placing the module?
- Should a module that emits, consumes or serves on the bus be refused when it declares no `broker`
secret?
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
---
status: resolved
opened: 2026-10-02
located-in: [mesh-controller internal/catalogue/filtering.go (AsNftables: the forward chain has no rule for the mesh passing through, so a relayed packet is judged by this machine's own published ports)]
fixed-by: mesh-controller PR 209 (the forward chain relays what comes in and goes out on the tunnel), live 2026-10-02
amended-design: []
---
# 196 — The hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes for itself
## What was observed
A sweep of every listening port on every machine, from every other machine, on 2026-10-02. Two home
machines, neither of which can be dialled, reach a third home machine through the hub, as
[ADR 0007](../../02-DECISIONS/0007-connectivity.md) says every path between machines that are not
co-located does.
From either of the two, the third answered on **17 of its 55** listening ports over the mesh. The hub
itself, probing the same machine directly, reached all the ports that machine's rules open to the mesh.
The result was the same at 40 probes in parallel and at 4, so it was not load.
The 17 were not a property of the target. They were exactly the ports **the hub** publishes for its own
containers: ssh, the proxy's two, and the hub's own block of published ports. A capture on the target
during one probe to a port that answered and one that did not:
- the answering one: the SYN arrives on the tunnel, reaches the container, and the reply leaves by the
tunnel;
- the other: nothing arrives at all, on any interface.
## Why it matters
**ADR 0007's hub carries every path between machines that are not co-located, and the filter breaks
that path without saying so.** Whether one home machine can reach a service on another depends on
whether the hub happens to publish the same port number for something of its own. Adding or removing
a module on the hub silently opens or closes paths between two other machines that it has nothing to
do with.
It also hid behind another fault. A missing placement made the same pair look disconnected earlier the
same day, and that explanation fit well enough that the per-port pattern was not looked for.
## Open questions
- The relaying rule accepts what comes in on the tunnel and leaves on it, and leaves judging to the
machine it is for. Should the hub also restrict relayed traffic to what that machine opens to the
mesh? That would duplicate the target's rules on the hub.
- No test raises two machines behind a hub and checks a port between them that the hub does not
publish. The lab's beds have one machine per site.
## Resolved (2026-10-02)
Live on all four machines after one push each. The same sweep, from both home machines to the third
over the mesh: 45 of 55 ports answer, the same 45 the hub reaches directly. The 9 that do not are
ports the target opens to nobody on the mesh, and one is refused because it listens only on a LAN
address. Nothing answers that the target's rules do not open.
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
# Diagnosis
*2026-10-02.*
**Not the tunnel.** The route from either home machine to the target is the tunnel, and traffic to the
17 ports travels it in both directions. A placement fault would have stopped every port.
**Not the target's filter.** The target opens the failing ports to every address of the mesh in its
input chain and its forward chain, the hub reaches them directly, and the SYN for a failing port never
arrived at the target to be judged.
**The hub's forward chain.** A relayed packet comes in on the tunnel and leaves on it, so the hub's
forward hook judges it. The chain the controller renders (`AsNftables`) has a default of drop, accepts
established traffic, and accepts what did not arrive on an outward link or the tunnel. That last rule is
for the machine's own containers reaching outward. After that come the rules for this machine's own
published ports, each matching the **original destination port** of the connection. None of them names
an outgoing interface or a destination. So a relayed packet to another machine's port 20000 matched the
hub's own rule for its own port 20000 and passed. One to port 8080, which the hub does not publish,
matched nothing and was dropped.
**The fix.** One rule: in on the tunnel **and** out on the tunnel is accepted. That is the mesh passing
through to another of its machines, which filters it against its own rules. It does not widen anything
on the hub. A packet for the hub itself is the input chain's, and one for the hub's own containers
leaves by a bridge, not the tunnel. Both still meet their rules. WireGuard only accepts a packet from a
peer whose address that peer is allowed to use, so in-on-the-tunnel means from a machine of the mesh.
A controller test asserts the rule in the forward chain only, never in the input chain, and absent on a
machine with no tunnel. It fails without the fix, and the rendered set loads with `nft -c`.