ADR 0169: the firewall seat serves its verbs, and a foreign rule set is removed through one of them

Designs 33 and 08 revised. The first node-scoped seat with verbs: rules, reload, remove; the nftables module holds it from a runtime with NET_ADMIN, the first container to declare a capability.
Merge pull request 'ADR 0169 (proposed): a machine joins through the tunnel, and the bus is never public' (#284 ) from jschoubben/a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel into main
2026-10-02 13:27:03 +02:00 · 2026-10-02 11:17:42 +00:00 · 2026-10-02 13:17:32 +02:00 · 2026-10-02 13:13:15 +02:00 · 2026-10-02 10:22:51 +00:00 · 2026-10-02 10:22:40 +00:00
31 changed files with 1192 additions and 44 deletions
@@ -124,6 +124,32 @@ This corrects a fact, not the decision: one statement per endpoint, three things
 none of them deciding on its own, all stand. The table in the decision should be read with the filter
 column applying to an unrouted endpoint.
 ## Progressive insight — 2026-10-02, from issue 191
 **For a routed endpoint, "the proxy serves the internal name" has to mean "serves it to the private
 network", and only the proxy can make it mean that.** The decision says `internal` means the proxy
 serves the internal name and not the public one. It does not say to whom, and the proxy answered
 every name it routes to any request that carried it, on the same listeners as its public names. A
 name being internal kept nobody out: a request from the internet only had to send it. While every
 routed endpoint also had a public name, nothing showed it. Once an endpoint could be internal alone
 ([issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md)), serving
 its name to everyone would have published exactly what `internal` was chosen to keep private.
 The earlier insight above says the port is not the path for a routed endpoint. This is its other
 half: the proxy is the path, so the proxy is where `internal` is enforced. It serves an internal name
 only to the machines of the mesh and to the machine itself
 ([ADR 0144](0144-anything-on-a-machine-may-call-anything-on-it.md)). Who the mesh is, it is told,
 not left to work out: its membership carries the same list of machine addresses the filter's "from the
 mesh" is rendered from ([ADR 0167](0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)).
 To anyone else, the name is answered as one never routed, in the handshake and in the request, and not
 listed among the names it serves. This holds for the internal name of a `both` endpoint too, whose
 outsiders have its public name.
 The decision, the options and the consequences stand: one statement per endpoint, three things
 derived from it. Checked in the proxy's own tests: an internal-only name is served to a machine the
 membership names and to loopback, and refused, unlisted and uncertified for any other request; until
 the mesh is issued, it is served to the machine alone.
 ## Consequences
 - **A manifest gains endpoint names, and a route contribution names an endpoint instead of a port.**
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
 ---
 topic: the mesh
 status: accepted
 date: 2026-10-02
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
 extends: 02-DECISIONS/0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md
 ---
 # 167. A membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is
 ## Context
 A provider learns what it is given from a file. The controller composes every consumer's contribution
 to a requirement, and the node's declaration writes them into the provider's received file. The route
 proxy reads its routes that way: one JSON file, re-read every two seconds.
 [Issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md) showed what
 that file leaves out. Since [ADR 0138](0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md),
 a route whose endpoint reaches only the private network carries an internal name and no public one.
 The proxy dropped it. Serving it was not enough either: the proxy answers public and internal names on
 the same listeners, so an internal name served to every request is public under a guessable name. To
 serve it correctly the proxy needs a second fact, **who the mesh is**, and nothing gave it one.
 The first attempt had the proxy work it out: the mesh's range from an environment variable written by
 the catalogue, and the machine's container bridges read from its own interfaces. That is a second
 definition of "the mesh", kept by one module, beside the one the packet filter already uses. The
 controller resolves "from the mesh" to every machine's address on the private network, and the filter
 is rendered from that list. Two definitions agree until one changes.
 [ADR 0160](0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md)
 already gives every assignment one document on the bus, its membership, read once at connect and
 followed. It says what the assignment serves and reaches. It does not yet say what it is given.
 ## Considered Options
 1. **Keep the file, add the mesh to it.** The proxy keeps polling a file, and the controller writes the
   mesh's addresses beside the routes. It fixes the definition, but delivery stays a file re-read on a
   timer, written by a separate path from the one every other fact a module is told now takes.
 2. **Have the proxy work it out** from a range in its environment and the machine's interfaces. Rejected:
   it is the second definition this record exists to remove.
 3. **The membership carries it.** What each module receives, from the same composition its received
   file is written from, and the mesh's addresses, from the same list the filter is rendered from. The
   proxy follows its membership and serves exactly that.
 ## Decision
 **Option 3.**
 - **A membership carries what its module receives**, by requirement: the contributions every consumer
  made, exactly as composed for its received file. A requirement nobody contributed to is an empty
  list, never absent, for the reason the file is written empty: "nothing asked" and "never told" want
  different responses.
 - **A membership carries who the mesh is**: every machine's address on the private network, the list
  a rule saying "from the mesh" resolves to. One list, two readers: the filter and any module that
  must tell the mesh from the world.
 - **The route proxy reads its routes and the mesh from its membership**, with the bus account every
  module that speaks on the bus is given. It serves an internal name only to the machines the mesh
  names and to the machine itself, and answers anyone else as it answers a name it never routed: in
  the request, in the handshake, and in the list of names it serves.
 - **The file stays until the bus has spoken.** While a proxy has read no membership that carries routes,
  it serves the file, and an internal name only to its own machine: refused, never opened. A
  membership from a controller that issues no routes changes nothing.
 ## Consequences
 - Every membership grows two fields. A machine joining or leaving republishes every membership, which
  a push already does.
 - A provider that receives something is told it twice for now, in its file and on the bus. The file
  goes when every provider reads its membership; that is its own change.
 - The route proxy needs a bus account. It is issued like any module's, so a machine running the proxy
  cannot be composed between the catalogue declaring the account and the operator issuing it. The
  machine keeps what it runs meanwhile.
 - The internal name of a route that also has a public one is now served to the mesh only. Outsiders
  have the public name.
 - A container on the same machine that calls that machine's own internal name arrives from its
  container network, not from a mesh address, and is refused. Calls between machines are unaffected:
  they leave by the machine's mesh address. Whether the mesh should also issue each machine's container
  networks is left open, because the mesh does not record them today.
 ## How this is checked
 | Rule | Checked by |
 |---|---|
 | What a provider receives on the bus is what its received file says, same-node port fix included | a controller test composing a provider and a consumer on one machine and comparing the two |
 | An internal name is served to the machines the membership names and to loopback, and to nobody else | the proxy's tests: served from a named address and from loopback; refused, unlisted and uncertified from any other |
 | A membership that carries no routes, or a mesh that cannot be read, changes nothing | the proxy's tests |
 | Until the mesh is issued, an internal name is served to the machine alone | the proxy's tests |
 | Live: an internal-only route answers over the mesh and is refused from outside | by hand, after the release |
 ## References
 - [ADR 0160](0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md) —
  the membership this extends
 - [ADR 0138](0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md) — reach, and the
  insight of 2026-10-02 that the proxy is where internal reach is kept
 - [ADR 0144](0144-anything-on-a-machine-may-call-anything-on-it.md) — the machine itself is always inside
 - [Issue 191](../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md) — what
  found it
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
 ---
 topic: the mesh
 status: accepted
 date: 2026-10-02
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
 extends: 02-DECISIONS/0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md
 ---
 # 168. A converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone, and the host says what else refuses
 ## Context
 [ADR 0100](0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md) says what converging does to
 the firewall a machine was found with: the mesh's derived filter is loaded in place of the
 refusal-only guard, and the found firewall is retired — disabled, never flushed. Four issues from
 the first two convergences are four ways that sentence was not the machine:
 - the flip reported the found firewall retired and it was active two minutes later; fifty minutes
  on, a reconcile found it disabled by hand and recorded that the mesh had done it
  ([143](../04-ISSUES/143-converging-does-not-retire-the-firewall-it-found/00-report.md));
 - "the firewall found" named one front end, and what filtered the forwarded path on that machine
  was a chain a predecessor had installed in the container runtime's user hook — invisible to the
  mesh, refusing two ports the mesh declared open, and when it was removed, carrying an allowance
  every module reaching another by the machine's own name had been relying on
  ([144](../04-ISSUES/144-the-predecessors-rules-outlive-the-firewall-it-was-found-as/00-report.md),
  [145](../04-ISSUES/145-a-machine-reads-healthy-while-its-modules-cannot-reach-each-other/00-report.md));
 - the forward chain listed address ranges that followed neither the modules nor the machine
  ([141](../04-ISSUES/141-the-forward-chain-does-not-follow-the-modules/00-report.md)), answered by
  [ADR 0140](0140-the-filter-constrains-what-arrives-from-outside.md) before this record;
 - the networking module wrote two machine-wide files whole, so taking it restarted every
  container ([084](../04-ISSUES/084-taking-networking-on-an-adopted-node-restarts-every-container/00-report.md)),
  answered by [ADR 0102](0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md) and the hosts
  file's marked region ([issue 128](../04-ISSUES/128-the-hosts-file-is-written-whole/00-report.md)).
 Read on the four machines of this mesh on 2026-10-02, after every one had converged: on both
 machines that had a front end it is inactive, and the host's record says the mesh retired it on
 both — true of one, false of the other. On the home server the predecessor's chain is still in
 force on the forwarded path, in the legacy packet filter the mesh's reader of rules does not
 consult once a machine is converged, so that machine is filtered by two things and the mesh says
 one. The host's reader already knows how to tell a table that refuses traffic from the runtime's
 own plumbing and from a ban list; it is asked once, at adoption, and only to refuse a machine
 whose firewall nobody speaks. Nothing asks it afterwards, and nothing reports what it saw.
 The group's exit is one sentence: *a converged machine has exactly one thing filtering it, and
 the mesh says truthfully which.* The first half the mesh can enforce only for what it owns; the
 second half it can always do, and it is the half that was missing.
 ## Decision
 **1. Convergence is a state the host keeps, not a step it takes once.** Every apply of a converged
 declaration reads whether the found firewall is in force. Active — enabled again by a package, a
 boot, a hand — it is retired again and said. The record distinguishes *the mesh disabled it* from
 *it was found inactive*, and a reconcile that finds it inactive never records that the mesh did
 it. When the step is skipped because the apply had failures, the report says the found firewall
 was left in force and why; a step that does nothing is never silent.
 **2. The host reports what filters the machine, with every apply, adopted or converged.** Every
 table of the packet filter, and every chain of the legacy filter, that refuses traffic — a drop or
 a reject, or a base chain whose policy drops — with an owner: the *mesh's*, the *found firewall's*,
 the *container runtime's own*, a *ban* (a refusal that names the sources it refuses, in a chain
 that accepts nothing), or *other*. The runtime's own is its plumbing — its chains, the forward
 policy it sets when it turns forwarding on, its guard against reaching a container's address from
 off its bridge. The user chain the runtime leaves for an administrator is not the runtime's:
 anything refusing in it is *other*, which is where both predecessors' chains lived. Each entry
 says in one line what it refuses. The mesh removes none of it: a rule it did not write is the
 operator's to remove, now that they can see it.
 **3. The mesh says which.** `node show` lists the filters with their owners. `status` names every
 converged machine that something other than the mesh's table, the runtime's plumbing and a ban
 list filters, the way it names strays and untaken modules, and such a machine is not "all well".
 The converge preview lists the filters found and the fate of each: the found firewall retired, the
 runtime's and the bans left, *other* left and named — so a person knows before the flip that the
 machine will not be filtered by the mesh alone until they remove it, and what they would be
 removing. *A converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone* when its list holds nothing but the
 mesh's, the runtime's own and bans.
 **4. Adoption's threshold does not move.** A machine whose front end nobody speaks is still refused
 adoption; a refusing rule in the runtime's user chain still does not refuse it — on both machines
 of this mesh it would have, and the migration would not have happened. It is reported instead,
 from the first report on.
 **5. Two of the group's issues are settled by records already accepted.** The forward chain follows
 the machine's outward links and says nothing about networks ([ADR 0140](0140-the-filter-constrains-what-arrives-from-outside.md)),
 which answers 141 whole. The runtime's file is written into and reloaded, and the hosts file's
 region is the mesh's alone ([ADR 0102](0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md),
 [issue 128](../04-ISSUES/128-the-hosts-file-is-written-whole/00-report.md)), which answers 084. One
 machine-wide file the mesh still writes whole is its own filter, at the path the distribution's
 packet filter reads; an operator's own rules at that path would be contested, and are held as
 found until the filter module is taken ([ADR 0163](0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md)).
 That is a difference a take shows, not a fault, and is decided when it bites.
 ## Consequences
 - The host's report grows by the filters it found and, for a converged machine, the state of its
  found firewall and who retired it; the controller keeps both on the node's record.
 - `retireFirewall` runs on every converged apply and can disable the found firewall more than
  once; the record's *disabled by the mesh* means exactly that.
 - The reader of rules gains an owner per table and chain; what it refuses adoption for does not
  change. A ban stays what it was: not a firewall.
 - Issues 143 and 144 close on rules 1 to 3 once a machine's record names the predecessor's chain;
  141 closes on ADR 0140 and 084 on ADR 0102, both by reading.
 - Removing what is reported is the operator's act, by hand, with the preview's words in front of
  them. The mesh never flushes and never deletes a rule it did not mark.
 ## How this is checked
 | Rule | Checked by |
 |---|---|
 | Every refusing table and chain is classified, the user chain's refusals as *other* | host tests over rulesets captured from three machines of this mesh: a predecessor's chain in the legacy filter, a ban list and empty front-end chains beside the runtime's, a virtualisation host and an endpoint agent that refuse nothing |
 | The found firewall active again on a converged machine is retired again and said; found inactive is recorded as found, not done; a skipped step is said | host tests over a fake front end |
 | The report carries the filters and the found firewall's state for a converged machine | a host test reading the report |
 | `node show` lists filters with owners; `status` names a converged machine something else filters and is not well; the preview lists filters and fates | controller tests over a fixture report |
 | Live | the home server's record names the predecessor's chain in the runtime's user chain as *other*; `status` names the machine; after the operator removes the chain, the next report drops it and `status` is well |
 ## References
 - [ADR 0100](0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md), [ADR 0103](0103-what-an-adopted-node-holds-and-what-its-guard-refuses.md), [ADR 0140](0140-the-filter-constrains-what-arrives-from-outside.md), [ADR 0102](0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md), [ADR 0163](0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md)
 - [Design 08 — Connectivity](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md), [Design 05 — The node host](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/05-the-node-host.md)
 - Issues 084, 141, 143, 144, 145
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
 ---
 topic: the mesh
 status: accepted
 date: 2026-10-02
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
 extends: 02-DECISIONS/0004-a-node-and-how-it-joins.md
 ---
 # 169. A machine joins through the tunnel, and the bus is never public
 ## Context
 The bus is the one channel every machine depends on: enrolment, every declaration, every tool. The
 `nats` module declares it reachable from the mesh only. The controller still opens it to the whole
 internet on the machine that runs it, as a *foundation* port that no module declares and nothing may
 close ([issue 051](../04-ISSUES/051-the-mesh-cannot-update-what-it-depends-on/00-report.md)).
 The reason is joining. [ADR 0004](0004-a-node-and-how-it-joins.md) has a new machine enrol over the bus
 **before** it has a tunnel. [ADR 0007](0007-connectivity.md) states it as a requirement: the node
 running the broker must be reachable from wherever nodes are, at a stable address.
 So the bus listens on the internet permanently, for an event that happens a few times a year. A
 sweep of every machine on 2026-10-02 found no client using the public path. Every connection arrives
 over the tunnel or from the machine itself. The join token does not use it either: it carries the
 controller's configured broker address, a mesh name with the old broker's port.
 ADR 0004 already says what a joining machine needs: *an identity, an address, and one peer to reach*.
 The tunnel can be that peer, if the hub knows the new machine's key before the machine first knocks.
 WireGuard answers nothing to a key it does not know, which is why the tunnel's own port is safe to
 leave open where the bus's is not.
 ## Considered Options
 1. **Keep the bus public.** It is authenticated and encrypted, but every exposure of it, and of the
   server behind it, is exposure of the one thing everything depends on.
 2. **Open the bus publicly only while a join token is live.** Small, and the hub is open only during a
   join window. But the window is real, the rule is about time rather than about who may reach the
   bus, and the opening and closing are pushes that can fail between them.
 3. **The controller makes the new machine's tunnel key and puts it in the token.** One step for the
   operator, but the private half leaves a machine it does not belong to. ADR 0004 refuses that for
   every key a node holds.
 4. **The machine makes its key first, and the token is issued for it.** The machine prints the public
   half of its tunnel key. The operator issues the token for that key. The controller gives the
   machine its address and adds it as a peer on the hub. The token carries the hub's tunnel endpoint
   and key, the machine's address, and the bus's address on the private network. The machine brings
   up its tunnel and enrols over it.
 ## Decision
 **Option 4.**
 - **A machine makes its own tunnel key before it has a token**, and prints the public half. The private
  half never leaves it, as ADR 0004 says of every key a node holds.
 - **A token is issued for a tunnel key.** Issuing it assigns the machine's address on the private
  network, records the key, and makes the machine a peer of the hub. The hub is sent that before the
  token is shown, so the tunnel answers the moment the machine first uses it.
 - **The token carries the one peer.** It adds the hub's tunnel endpoint and public key and the
  machine's own address. **Where** becomes the bus's address on the private network, which needs no
  name resolution.
 - **The machine joins through the tunnel.** It brings the tunnel up from the token alone, then enrols
  over it exactly as before. The enrolment checks that the key it is offered is the one the token was
  issued for.
 - **The bus is never public.** It is no longer a foundation port. Its reach is what the `nats` module
  declares: the mesh. The tunnel's port stays open, as the one way in.
 This changes three things earlier records say. ADR 0004's *where* is the bus's private address, and the
 token carries the peer. ADR 0007's requirement that the broker be reachable from wherever nodes are
 becomes: **the hub's tunnel is**. Issue 051's broker port stops being a foundation port.
 ## Consequences
 - Joining is two commands on the new machine, with the token issued between them. A token issued for
  the wrong key gives a tunnel that never answers, and the machine says so rather than timing out at
  the bus.
 - An unused token leaves a peer on the hub until it expires. Expiry removes it, the same way it voids
  the secret.
 - A machine already in the mesh is unaffected: it reaches the bus over its tunnel today.
 - The genesis machine, the first one, raises the bus on itself and needs no tunnel to reach it.
 ## How this is checked
 | Rule | Checked by |
 |---|---|
 | A token is refused without a tunnel key, and carries the hub's peer and the machine's address | a controller test |
 | Issuing a token makes the machine a peer of the hub before the token is shown | a controller test over the hub's composed tunnel |
 | An expired, unused token's peer is gone from the hub | a controller test |
 | Enrolment refuses a tunnel key other than the one the token was issued for | a controller test |
 | No machine's filter opens the bus to anywhere | a controller test over the composed filter, and the live sweep from outside the mesh |
 | A new machine joins from outside the hub's network with the bus closed to it | the lab, then by hand |
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
 ---
 topic: the mesh
 status: accepted
 date: 2026-10-02
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
 extends: 02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md
 ---
 # 169. The firewall seat serves its verbs, and a foreign rule set is removed through one of them
 ## Context
 [ADR 0168](0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md) made the mesh say truthfully
 what filters a converged machine, and left the removal of what it did not write to the operator's
 hand. The first time that hand was needed — two machines, five rule sets a predecessor and a
 retired front end had left — there was no mesh way to lend it: the packet filter is a seat
 ([ADR 0121](0121-a-system-seat-is-named-for-its-scope-and-modules-define-their-own.md)), a seat's
 holder serves its verbs ([ADR 0154](0154-the-meshs-own-verbs-are-the-controller-seats-tools.md),
 [ADR 0159](0159-a-tool-call-names-the-machine-and-a-holder-serves-its-seats-verbs.md)), and the
 firewall seat declared none. The only remaining path was a shell on the machine, which is the path
 the mesh exists to replace, and which the operator's own tooling rightly refused to an agent.
 A seat's verbs are the contract every holder implements, whatever filter it speaks. What a person
 asks a machine's packet filter is the same whether nftables, a front end or a legacy filter answers:
 what are the rules, reload the mesh's own, remove this thing the mesh did not write. What differs by
 filter is the holder's own business and may be its own tools beside the seat's.
 ## Decision
 **1. The `node-packet-filter` seat serves three verbs**, and a module that claims it serves all
 three or is refused the claim, as with every seat:
 - `rules` — the packet filter as the machine enforces it now: the nftables ruleset, and the legacy
  filter's listings where that tool exists; narrowed to one table or chain when asked. Read-only.
 - `reload` — load the mesh's own filter again from the file the mesh writes, and answer with the
  mesh's table as loaded. The holder's own act on the holder's own rules.
 - `remove` — remove one rule set the mesh did not write, named exactly as the host reports it under
  ADR 0168 (`chain HAL-MESH-ONLY (iptables-legacy)`, `table ip6 filter, chain DOCKER-USER`), and
  answer with what was done. It refuses the mesh's own tables, the container runtime's own chains,
  a built-in chain other than the runtime's user chain, and any chain of a found firewall that is
  in force. The runtime's user chain is emptied back to its one return; another chain loses the
  jumps into it, is flushed and deleted; a table of the machine's own is deleted whole. Each is an
  operator's act, by name, on one thing the mesh reported — never a flush, never a rule the mesh
  itself marked.
 **2. A holder may serve its own tools beside the seat's.** The nftables module keeps its reading of
 the mesh's table as its own tool, and a holder speaking a filter with specifics of its own may add
 tools for them; the seat's three are what every holder owes.
 **3. A container may ask for a capability.** Serving `remove` and `reload` needs the machine's
 network namespace and the right to change its packet filter; a holder's runtime declares
 `capabilities: ["NET_ADMIN"]` on its container and runs on the machine's network. The host grants
 exactly the capabilities declared, names them in the container's spec so a change recreates it, and
 refuses a name that is not a capability's. A privileged container stays undeclarable.
 **4. ADR 0168's "by hand" is read as "by the operator, through the seat".** Removing what the mesh
 reports as *other* is still the operator's act and is still never the mesh's own doing; the verb is
 how the act reaches the machine, recorded on the bus like every other, instead of a shell.
 ## Consequences
 - The seat's row gains the three verbs; a mesh that already runs widens its row at the next
  controller start. The nftables module claims them and gains a runtime — a tool server with the
  packet filter's tools in its image, on the machine's network, with `NET_ADMIN`.
 - The host's container vocabulary grows by `capabilities`; an older host refuses a declaration that
  carries it, so the host rolls before the module.
 - The two machines of this mesh that ADR 0168 found not filtered by the mesh alone are cleaned
  through `remove`, and read *the mesh alone* afterwards; `status` returns to well without a hand on
  either machine.
 ## How this is checked
 | Rule | Checked by |
 |---|---|
 | The seat declares the three verbs; a claim that serves fewer is refused by name | the catalogue's seat tests |
 | `remove` refuses the mesh's tables, the runtime's chains, a built-in chain and an active front end's chains, and removes a user chain with its jumps, empties the user chain, deletes an own table | the module's tests over a fake command runner, with the shapes the host reported live |
 | A container's capabilities reach the runtime and its spec; an unknown name is refused | host tests |
 | Live | `node-packet-filter.remove@<node>` on the home server and the control node; `node show` reads *the mesh alone* on both; `status` is well |
 ## References
 - [ADR 0168](0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md), [ADR 0154](0154-the-meshs-own-verbs-are-the-controller-seats-tools.md), [ADR 0159](0159-a-tool-call-names-the-machine-and-a-holder-serves-its-seats-verbs.md), [ADR 0121](0121-a-system-seat-is-named-for-its-scope-and-modules-define-their-own.md)
 - [Design 33 — The tools the mesh answers](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/33-the-tools-the-mesh-answers.md), [Design 08 — Connectivity](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md)
@@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ python3 00-META/checks/index.py            fail if stale
 - **0161** — [What deserves a seat: a role of a module is a seat, a singular fact about machines is a placement with a capacity of one, and a holder's software is the machine's](0161-what-deserves-a-seat.md)
 - **0162** — [A merge produces a tiered plan the mesh keeps, and a module's dependencies are one relation in the catalogue](0162-a-merge-produces-a-tiered-plan-the-mesh-keeps.md)
 - **0163** — [Taking a module over is a comparison: what it compares, what it refuses, and what it carries](0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md)
 - **0167** — [A membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is](0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
 - **0168** — [A converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone, and the host says what else refuses](0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md)
 - **0169** — [A machine joins through the tunnel, and the bus is never public](0169-a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel-and-the-bus-is-never-public.md)
 - **0169** — [The firewall seat serves its verbs, and a foreign rule set is removed through one of them](0169-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md)
 ### Its tiers, from the bottom up
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ status: in-progress
 code: [mesh-host]
 updated: 2026-10-02
 decisions:
  - 02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0100-a-node-in-use-is-adopted-before-it-is-converged.md
@@ -176,6 +177,14 @@ has left to say. *How it is checked:* a host test joins a kept network and refus
 host test keeps a left-out module's record and hold and removes an absent module's; a bootstrap test
 holds the installer's constants to the module's manifest where the catalogue is checked out beside it.
 **What filters the machine, and the found firewall kept retired** — revision, 2026-10-02
 ([ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md)). The host
 reports, with every apply, every table and legacy chain that refuses traffic and whose it reads it as —
 the mesh's, the found firewall's, the container runtime's own, a ban, or other — and, converged, whether
 the firewall it was found with is in force and who retired it. It retires that firewall on every
 converged apply, not once, records *found inactive* apart from *disabled by the mesh*, and says when the
 step was skipped. *How it is checked:* ADR 0168's table.
 **Found reaches every kind that can touch what the machine has**
 ([ADR 0103](../../02-DECISIONS/0103-what-an-adopted-node-holds-and-what-its-guard-refuses.md)). For a module not yet taken, a directory present with no record
 keeps its mode and owner, a unit present with no record keeps its state and boot setting, a
@@ -7,8 +7,12 @@ code:
  - mesh-controller internal/identity/authority.go
  - mesh-host internal/identity/serving.go
  - mesh-host internal/apply (the service that reflects a rule set)
-updated: 2026-09-30
+updated: 2026-10-02
 decisions:
  - 02-DECISIONS/0169-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0169-a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel-and-the-bus-is-never-public.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0148-the-meshs-names-are-resolved-not-copied-into-containers.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0151-a-routes-internal-name-is-composed-under-the-node-that-serves-it.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0147-a-module-anchors-the-meshs-authority.md
@@ -171,6 +175,28 @@ the broker's node must be dialable by every node, at a stable address, and so mu
 reachable; on one network it does not. A mesh whose nodes are all behind NAT cannot be raised, and
 a broker node whose address moves invalidates every token issued for it.
 *2026-10-02.* **The order changes at step 1: the tunnel comes first, from the token**
 ([ADR 0169](../../02-DECISIONS/0169-a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel-and-the-bus-is-never-public.md)).
 The circularity above is real, and it is broken differently. The overlay is configured by the mesh,
 except for the one peer a joining machine needs, and the token carries that peer. So the sequence
 becomes:
 ```
 0  the node has an underlay address     the machine's own
 1  the node makes its tunnel key        before any token; it prints the public half
 2  a token is issued for that key       its address assigned, and the hub sent it as a peer
 3  the tunnel comes up to the hub       from the token alone: the hub's endpoint and key, its address
 4  the node dials the bus               OVER THE TUNNEL, at the bus's private address
 5  it proves itself, and is proved to   enrolment, checking the key is the one the token named
 6  the rest of the overlay              the whole peer set, delivered as files
 7  names, filtering, routes             as before
 ```
 The link no longer stays on the underlay. The bus is reached over the tunnel by every machine,
 including one that is joining, so it is never opened to the internet. The precondition becomes: **the
 hub's tunnel must be dialable by every node, at a stable address.** That port answers nothing to a
 key it does not know.
 **Whether the link should later move onto the overlay, with the underlay as fallback, is
 [open](../../02-DECISIONS/0007-connectivity.md).** It is a decision rather than a derivation: the
 gain is which network carries bytes, not what an attacker can reach, since the link is already
@@ -709,6 +735,43 @@ needs no new filter; a declared port is reachable from off the private network a
 not; no address of a machine's own networks appears in a rendered filter, asserted on the text; and a
 machine reporting no outward link is refused in the control plane with its existing filter left alone.
 ### A converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone, and the host says what else refuses
 *2026-10-02, [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md),
 from [issues 143](../../04-ISSUES/143-converging-does-not-retire-the-firewall-it-found/00-report.md) and
 [144](../../04-ISSUES/144-the-predecessors-rules-outlive-the-firewall-it-was-found-as/00-report.md).*
 Retiring the found firewall was a step the flip took once, and said it had taken whatever happened;
 on the first machine with one it did not take, and a hand's work fifty minutes later was recorded as
 the mesh's. And "the firewall found" named one front end while a predecessor's chain in the container
 runtime's user hook — legacy iptables on one machine, invisible to a reader of nftables — filtered the
 forwarded path, refused ports the mesh declared open, and carried an allowance every module reaching
 another by the machine's own name relied on.
 **Convergence is a state the host keeps.** Every converged apply reads whether the found firewall is in
 force; enabled again, it is retired again and said; the record says whether the mesh disabled it or
 found it inactive, and a skipped step is said. **The host reports what filters the machine**, every
 apply, adopted or converged: every table and legacy chain that refuses, with an owner — the mesh's,
 the found firewall's, the runtime's own plumbing, a ban, or *other*, which is where the runtime's user
 chain's refusals go. **The mesh says which:** `node show` lists them; `status` names a converged machine
 anything *other* filters and is not well; the converge preview lists what filters the machine and the
 fate of each — retired with the front end, left as the runtime's, left as a ban, or *left in force and
 not the mesh's*. The mesh removes none of it; adoption's threshold does not move.
 *How it is checked:* host tests over rulesets captured from three machines of this mesh classify every
 refusing chain (a predecessor's chain in the legacy filter as *other*, a ban list reached through the
 user chain as a ban, a leftover front-end chain as *other*); a fake front end enabled again on a
 converged machine is retired again and said, found inactive is recorded as found; the report carries
 the filters and the found firewall's state and a change in them is worth an unasked report; controller
 tests over a fixture report check the recording, the preview's fates, the status JSON and the well
 predicate. Live: the home server's record names the predecessor's chain as *other* and `status`
 names the machine until the chain is removed by hand.
 *2026-10-02, [ADR 0169](../../02-DECISIONS/0169-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md):* removing what
 the host reports as *other* is reached through the packet filter seat's `remove` verb, an operator's act
 by name on the bus; the seat also serves `rules` and `reload`, and its holder's runtime declares the
 `NET_ADMIN` capability on the machine's network. See design 33.
 ## 5 — Certificates
 **Two authorities, kept separate on purpose.**
@@ -842,6 +905,18 @@ One value, three readers:
 | `public` | the machine port, to anywhere | the public name | the public authority |
 | `both` | the machine port, to anywhere | both names | each name's own authority |
 *2026-10-02.* **The proxy serves an internal name to the private network only**
 ([ADR 0138](../../02-DECISIONS/0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md),
 its insight of this date). It answers public and internal names on the same listeners, so the name a
 request carries is the request's own claim, not where the request came from. An internal name is
 served to the machines of the mesh and to the machine itself; to anyone else it is answered as a name
 never routed, in the handshake as well as the request. Without this, an endpoint with reach `internal`
 would be public under a name that is easy to guess
 ([issue 191](../../04-ISSUES/191-a-route-with-only-an-internal-name-is-dropped/00-report.md)).
 The proxy is told who the mesh is, and its routes, in its membership on the bus — the same machine
 addresses the filter's "from the mesh" is rendered from
 ([ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)).
 **An endpoint that is not routed is reached and never named.** No route contribution means no name is
 composed and no certificate requested, while the filter still acts on it. That is the case the model
 could not express at all, and it is the ordinary case for anything that is not HTTP.
@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ code:
  - mesh-tools src/broker-amqp.ts (to be replaced)
  - mesh-catalog modules/nats (to be written)
  - mesh-sdk src (the protocol's NATS binding, step 3)
-updated: 2026-10-01
+updated: 2026-10-02
 decisions:
  - 02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0157-a-build-says-what-it-does-on-the-bus-as-it-happens.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0106-the-bus-is-nats.md
@@ -94,6 +95,12 @@ list; the account's grant is the same membership read the other way; the console
 tool's subject. The one rule a runtime keeps is the membership's own subject, from the two names in its
 credential.
 **Revised 2026-10-02** ([ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)):
 a membership also carries **what its module receives**, by requirement — the contributions its
 received file is written from, from the same composition — and **who the mesh is**, every machine's
 address on the private network, the list the filter's "from the mesh" is rendered from. The route
 proxy is the first reader of both.
 **Revised 2026-09-27** ([ADR 0129](../../02-DECISIONS/0129-a-seat-carries-the-protocol-of-its-role.md)):
 **`mesh.build.request`, `mesh.control.built` and the BUILDS stream are gone.** A build is work submitted to a role, and the
 mesh already has a shape for that — a seat's `accept` subjects, on a work queue with a queue group of
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 ---
 layer: to-be
-status: proposed
+status: in-progress
-code: []
+code:
-updated: 2026-09-27
+  - mesh-controller internal/inventory
  - mesh-controller internal/catalogue
  - mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller
 updated: 2026-10-01
 decisions:
  - 02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md
@@ -14,10 +17,10 @@ decisions:
 # 29 — A node has operator accounts, and the mesh owns what lives under a home
 **The mesh models machines but not the people on them.** A node record holds its name, its
-address, its mode — and nothing about *who a person is* on it: `jochens` on novox, `ace` on ace,
+address, its mode — and nothing about *who a person is* on it: one login name on the build node,
-`jochen` on shanks and g14. That username is not incidental. It decides who a file under `~` is
+another on the home-server, a third on both workstations. That username is not incidental. It
-owned by, who a user service runs as, and — the case that surfaced this — which account `ssh
+decides who a file under `~` is owned by, who a user service runs as, and — the case that surfaced
-<node>` logs in as. The predecessor knew it (its per-node `user:`, and the modules that wrote a
+this — which account `ssh <node>` logs in as. The predecessor knew it (its per-node `user:`, and the modules that wrote a
 person's `~/.ssh/config`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.config`); the mesh, taking those over, kept the machine
 facts and dropped the human one.
@@ -28,8 +31,9 @@ Several things are missing, and they are one idea.
 A node has one or more **operator accounts**: the human logins on it. At minimum a name; the
 mesh already knows the node and its address, so `<account>@<node>` is then a complete answer to
 "who am I, where." It is the mesh's to hold because everything below is derived from it, and
-because it is exactly the fact that was silently lost — `ssh ace` failed to `ace` because nothing
+because it is exactly the fact that was silently lost — `ssh home-server` logged in under the
-in the mesh said ace's account is `ace`.
+workstation's own name, because nothing in the mesh said the home-server's account is a different
 one.
 ## 2. A resource may live under a home, owned by its account
@@ -65,14 +69,14 @@ create `~/.ssh` at `0700`, chown it to the account, and own the files it places
 **The boundary — and it is the reason this is safe:** `~/.ssh` is the one directory where a wrong
 declaration locks a person out of their own machine. So the mesh's *found-vs-owned* semantics
-([ADR 0126](../../02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md),
+([ADR 0118](../../02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md),
 adoption) apply *inside* the home directory. The mesh **owns** the directory and the files above; it
 **holds as found — never rewrites, never removes** — the operator's own contents: their **private
 keys** and their **personal drop-ins** (`config.d/personal`, the personal `Host` aliases a
 workstation carries, exactly as `hosts.local` is the home the mesh never rewrites for `/etc/hosts`).
 Reconcile removing an unassigned `config.d/mesh` is fine; the same logic aimed at `id_ed25519` or an
 operator's own `authorized_keys` entry is a lockout. This is the login-channel cousin of the rule
-[ADR 0125](../../02-DECISIONS/0117-a-machines-uplink-is-a-seat.md) draws for the uplink and the sshd
+[ADR 0117](../../02-DECISIONS/0117-a-machines-uplink-is-a-seat.md) draws for the uplink and the sshd
 module draws for the firewall: **the mesh must never be able to arrange the one failure that severs
 its own way back in.** The carve-out is not a convenience; it is that rule, in `~/.ssh`.
@@ -108,12 +112,12 @@ found-vs-owned boundary of §3 is exactly what guarantees nothing already there
 None of this needs a node to discover the mesh, and none of it needs a control-plane module of its
 own. The ssh files are **roster facts**
-([ADR 0128](../../02-DECISIONS/0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md)): once the
+([ADR 0120](../../02-DECISIONS/0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md)): once the
 roster view carries a node's **host key** and its **account** beside its name and address, the
 `ssh-client` module ships a template for `known_hosts`, `config` and `authorized_keys`, and the
 controller renders each node's copy from the full roster and pushes it. The mesh owns the data; the
 module owns ssh's format; the control plane gains no ssh syntax. It is the same act as composing a
-peer list or `/etc/hosts` — which is why there is **no novox-only "mesh-ssh" module**: the
+peer list or `/etc/hosts` — which is why there is **no control-node-only "mesh-ssh" module**: the
 centralization is the controller's composition, not a module that runs somewhere. Only non-secret
 facts travel (names, addresses, accounts, host keys, the CA public key); the private key stays the
 operator's, placed as an operator-owned file, referenced by path.
@@ -129,6 +133,44 @@ operator's, placed as an operator-owned file, referenced by path.
 They meet at the account and the CA, not at a bespoke module. The `sshd` server side already exists;
 the client/identity side and the CA are the open pieces.
 ## What has shipped, and what has not
 *Recorded 2026-10-01 from the controller's main branch, not from intent.*
 **Built (mesh-controller, merged 2026-09-27):**
 - **§1, the account as a node fact.** A node record carries an operator account and, optionally,
  its home. Empty is a real state — a freshly enrolled or headless machine has no operator account
  known yet — and an empty home means *derive it* (the superuser's home for the superuser, the
  conventional per-user home otherwise), so the common case needs no entry. The controller's node
  command sets it. One account per node is what exists; "one or several" below is still open.
 - **§2, resources under a home.** The account and its home are offered as machine facts, and a
  resource's *path and owner* resolve placeholders exactly as its content does — so a module places
  a file under a person's home, owned by that person, naming neither. A roster file may say it lives
  under the home: it is rendered per node, placed under that node's account's home, chowned to the
  account, and a node with no account gets none.
 - **§5, the composed ssh config.** The roster rendering carries each node's account, so the
  `ssh-client` template can emit a `Host` block per node with the right login name. Composed
  end-to-end in the controller's tests.
 **Written but not shipped:** the `ssh-client` catalogue module itself exists on a branch of the
 module repository; its pull request was closed with a hold until this design is deployed, and
 nothing has deployed it since. The predecessor's generator still writes every workstation's ssh
 client blocks today — which is where [issue 172](../../04-ISSUES/172-the-ssh-client-block-matches-one-spelling-of-a-machine/00-report.md)
 was found.
 **Not built:** the SSH CA and certificates (§4), `known_hosts` and `authorized_keys` as roster files,
 the found-vs-owned boundary inside `~/.ssh` (§3 — the controller has no rule yet that refuses to
 rewrite a private key), adoption of existing keys, the ssh-agent as a user service, and user-scoped
 services in general. The host vocabulary still has no user-scope unit at all; a workstation's
 per-user daemons (a bar watchdog, a config reloader, an audio service masked per user) have no form
 the mesh can send.
 **A gap this surfaced:** §1 shipped as code before it had a decision record. The account as a node
 fact, the home as a placement root, and what the mesh may and may not do under a home are each a
 decision this document names but no record states. They are the next records to write, before the
 family of §2 modules is built.
 ## Why now, and why not yet
 **Why it matters:** when HAL retires, the generators that keep `~/.ssh`, shell config and the
@@ -137,7 +179,7 @@ alias and its trust, and a fresh machine has no operator dotfiles at all — the
 service and leave the human unable to work on the box.
 **Why not build it reflexively:** it is a real addition to the node model, the resource model, and
-the seat set, and must be gotten right. The mechanism half is now settled — ADR 0128 is what lets
+the seat set, and must be gotten right. The mechanism half is now settled — ADR 0120 is what lets
 the ssh files be templates with no control-plane format — so what remains to decide here is the
 model:
@@ -156,15 +198,18 @@ model:
  unnecessary, and forwarding an agent into a node exposes the operator's keys to that node's root —
  so prefer certificates and `ProxyJump` over forwarding.
-**Not urgent, not blocking.** ssh and dotfiles work today because HAL's generators still run as the
+**Now load-bearing.** The migration of every node to the mesh is complete; what remains of the
-substrate. This becomes load-bearing in the node-by-node retirement phase, not before — which is the
+predecessor is exactly the user environment this design covers — ssh config, dotfiles, the desktop
-right time to build it, once the account and CA model are decided here.
+stack and the per-user services of the two workstations. Those generators are the last thing
 keeping the predecessor running, so the model questions above are no longer deferred: the account
 record, the home as a placement root, user-scoped services and the one-off steps a hook used to run
 each need a decision before the modules that replace the generators can be written.
 ## References
 - The gap was found generating `~/.ssh/config` from the *HAL* registry (`hal/terminal`'s
  postConfigure hook), which the nox mesh has no equivalent for.
- [ADR 0128](../../02-DECISIONS/0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md) — the roster
+- [ADR 0120](../../02-DECISIONS/0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md) — the roster
  fact mechanism that renders the ssh files, format owned by the module.
 - [ADR 0112](../../02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md) — the
  system-path placement this mirrors for home paths.
@@ -173,6 +218,6 @@ right time to build it, once the account and CA model are decided here.
 - [ADR 0113](../../02-DECISIONS/0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md) — the CA key is a secret the
  vault makes; [ADR 0114](../../02-DECISIONS/0114-a-shared-credential-rotates-over-two-credentials.md)
  — short-lived certs as rotation.
- [ADR 0125](../../02-DECISIONS/0117-a-machines-uplink-is-a-seat.md),
+- [ADR 0117](../../02-DECISIONS/0117-a-machines-uplink-is-a-seat.md),
-  [ADR 0126](../../02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md) —
+  [ADR 0118](../../02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md) —
  the never-sever-the-channel rule and the found-vs-owned semantics, applied here to `~/.ssh`.
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
 layer: to-be
 status: implemented
 code: [mesh-controller, mesh-tools]
-updated: 2026-10-01
+updated: 2026-10-02
 decisions:
  - 02-DECISIONS/0169-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0160-the-mesh-issues-an-assignments-subjects-and-a-runtime-serves-what-it-is-issued.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0159-a-tool-call-names-the-machine-and-a-holder-serves-its-seats-verbs.md
  - 02-DECISIONS/0154-the-meshs-own-verbs-are-the-controller-seats-tools.md
@@ -169,6 +170,18 @@ either way.
 What stays as designed and not built: which verbs any *other* seat serves, and §3 for module-declared
 seats' schemas beyond the names their manifests already list.
 ## The firewall seat's verbs, 2026-10-02
 [ADR 0169](../../02-DECISIONS/0169-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md). The first node-scoped seat
 to carry verbs: `node-packet-filter` serves `rules` (the filter as the machine enforces it, nftables
 and legacy), `reload` (the mesh's own filter from its file) and `remove` (one rule set the mesh did
 not write, named as the host reports it under ADR 0168; refusing the mesh's tables, the runtime's
 own chains, a built-in chain and an active found firewall's). Every holder serves all three; the
 nftables module does so from a runtime on the machine's network with `NET_ADMIN`, which is the first
 container to declare a capability. Removing a predecessor's rule set is an operator's act reached
 through the seat, recorded on the bus, instead of a shell on the machine. *How it is checked:* ADR
 0169's table.
 ## What this does not settle
 - Which verbs each seat should serve. That is a decision per seat, and the reason to do it slowly: a
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ document is written and this one's status becomes `implemented`.
 | [`26-the-seats.md`](26-the-seats.md) | **Proposed.** What a mesh can have one of, who fills each, and a seat's holder answering for the provision it delivers — including the `git` seat a build's source can live on | [ADR 0126](../../02-DECISIONS/0126-a-module-declares-its-own-seats.md) (superseding [ADR 0110](../../02-DECISIONS/0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md)), [ADR 0111](../../02-DECISIONS/0111-a-build-source-is-on-the-git-seat-or-external.md), [ADR 0109](../../02-DECISIONS/0109-a-package-registry-seat-is-one-per-ecosystem.md) |
 | [`27-a-module-requires-the-mesh-resolves.md`](27-a-module-requires-the-mesh-resolves.md) | **Proposed.** One concept for everything a module needs: a requirement with a contract, answered by one of four kinds of provider, resolved at assignment or refused. Retires settings, placeholders, facts and paths in definitions | [ADR 0112](../../02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md), [ADR 0113](../../02-DECISIONS/0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md), [ADR 0114](../../02-DECISIONS/0114-a-shared-credential-rotates-over-two-credentials.md), [ADR 0126](../../02-DECISIONS/0126-a-module-declares-its-own-seats.md) (superseding [ADR 0110](../../02-DECISIONS/0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md)) |
 | [`28-building-the-bus.md`](28-building-the-bus.md) | **Proposed.** The five steps of the bus work in the order their dependencies allow, each ending at a bed — with the surface measured, so no step's size is a guess | [ADR 0116](../../02-DECISIONS/0116-the-bus-is-built-in-five-steps.md), [ADR 0106](../../02-DECISIONS/0106-the-bus-is-nats.md), [ADR 0074](../../02-DECISIONS/0074-the-wire-is-specified-not-the-types.md) |
-| [`29-a-node-has-operator-accounts.md`](29-a-node-has-operator-accounts.md) | **Proposed.** The mesh models machines but not the humans on them: a node gains operator accounts, and a resource may live under a home owned by its account — what would own ~/.ssh, dotfiles and ~/.config when HAL retires | [ADR 0112](../../02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md), [ADR 0051](../../02-DECISIONS/0051-shared-data-is-the-operators.md) |
+| [`29-a-node-has-operator-accounts.md`](29-a-node-has-operator-accounts.md) | **In progress.** A node has an operator account and a resource may live under its home — built in the controller; the ssh-client module, the SSH CA, the `~/.ssh` boundary and user-scoped services are not. The account fact still wants its decision record | [ADR 0112](../../02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md), [ADR 0051](../../02-DECISIONS/0051-shared-data-is-the-operators.md) |
 | [`32-what-a-module-declares.md`](32-what-a-module-declares.md) | **Proposed.** What a module declares and what the bus derives from it: three namespaces, subjects from local names, queues never declared, the five relationships, and the build-publish-deploy lifecycle on one bus | [ADR 0126](../../02-DECISIONS/0126-a-module-declares-its-own-seats.md), [ADR 0127](../../02-DECISIONS/0127-amqp-is-a-provision-not-the-bus.md), superseded by [ADR 0131](../../02-DECISIONS/0131-everything-on-the-mesh-speaks-to-the-broker-seat.md) (superseding [ADR 0125](../../02-DECISIONS/0125-the-bus-is-the-only-broker.md)), [ADR 0041](../../02-DECISIONS/0041-events-are-a-relationship.md) |
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-22
 located-in: [mesh-controller internal/overlay, mesh-host internal/apply]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: ADR 0102 (mesh-controller internal/overlay: the runtime file written into, reloaded), issue 128 (the hosts file as a region)
 amended-design: 03-DESIGN/01-to-be/05-the-node-host.md
 ---
@@ -56,3 +56,12 @@ and nothing checks for it today.
 - Should an adopted node that cannot trust the registry be refused a module that needs to pull?
  Or should the refusal come earlier, when the node joins?
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 The runtime's file is written into and the runtime reloaded, never restarted
 ([ADR 0102](../../02-DECISIONS/0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md), the
 diagnosis above); the hosts file is a marked region the mesh owns alone
 ([issue 128](../128-the-hosts-file-is-written-whole/00-report.md)). Neither whole file remains. Read
 into [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md), rule 5,
 which names the one whole machine-wide file the mesh still writes — its own filter at the
 distribution's path — as a difference a take shows, not a fault.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-22
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-controller 201 (the preview names the narrowing and the port's reach), 206 (`take --yes <digest>` acts on the preview read)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -46,3 +46,7 @@ host first, then the controller's `take`.
 mesh-controller 201 and the pull request after it: the preview names it, and `take --yes <digest>`
 acts on the preview that was read. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted machine — every
 machine of this mesh is converged today, so the record's live row has not been run.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02 with the built and tested code live on every machine (mesh-controller 206, mesh-host 64), not on a take read on an adopted machine: every machine of this mesh is converged, so none holds a found thing to compare, and the record's live row — ADR 0163's last — will be read at the next real adoption rather than staged. Said here so nobody later believes that row was run.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-22
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-host 64 (genesis raises the forge as `gitea`, on the module's image digest, with the module's data directory at /data; a test holds the installer to the module's manifest)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -63,3 +63,7 @@ to the module's manifest where the catalogue is checked out beside it. The netwo
 left: the bootstrap forge runs on the machine's network to reach the store on its loopback, the module
 runs bridged and publishes its ports, and the take says so. Closing waits for group 9's genesis test —
 a mesh raised, the module assigned, and the module found holding rather than raising a second forge.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02. Name, image and data directory align; the network does not — the bootstrap forge runs on the machine's network to reach the store on its loopback, the module runs bridged — and a take says so rather than hides it. Whether genesis should move the forge onto a bridge, and the test that raises a mesh and finds the module holding rather than raising a second forge, belong to group 9's genesis work and are not owed by this record any more.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-23
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-host 63 (the kept original's difference), mesh-controller 201 (shown; a differing file refuses unless `--replace <path>`)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -74,3 +74,7 @@ host first, then the controller's `take`.
 mesh-host 63 reports the difference between the kept original and the declared content; mesh-controller
 201 shows it in the preview and refuses a differing file unless `--replace <path>` names it, or the
 module declares the file partially. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted machine.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02 with the built and tested code live on every machine (mesh-controller 206, mesh-host 64), not on a take read on an adopted machine: every machine of this mesh is converged, so none holds a found thing to compare, and the record's live row — ADR 0163's last — will be read at the next real adoption rather than staged. Said here so nobody later believes that row was run.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-23
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-host 63 (both images' creation dates), mesh-controller 201 (DOWNGRADE said; refused unless `--downgrade`)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -71,3 +71,7 @@ host first, then the controller's `take`.
 mesh-host 63 reports the found image and both images' creation dates; mesh-controller 201 says
 DOWNGRADE and refuses unless `--downgrade` is said. Stays located until a take is read on an adopted
 machine.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02 with the built and tested code live on every machine (mesh-controller 206, mesh-host 64), not on a take read on an adopted machine: every machine of this mesh is converged, so none holds a found thing to compare, and the record's live row — ADR 0163's last — will be read at the next real adoption rather than staged. Said here so nobody later believes that row was run.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-23
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-controller 201 (`secret accept --provider` reaches a required secret), 206 (a module's secrets listed with origin; a minted one for found data refuses unless `--mint <name>`)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -78,3 +78,7 @@ The pull request after it reads every secret a module holds on a machine with it
 of a module whose data was found refuses a minted, unaccepted one — naming the accept that carries
 the existing value in, or `--mint <name>` to let the service take the new one. Stays located until
 a take is read on an adopted machine.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02 with the built and tested code live on every machine (mesh-controller 206, mesh-host 64), not on a take read on an adopted machine: every machine of this mesh is converged, so none holds a found thing to compare, and the record's live row — ADR 0163's last — will be read at the next real adoption rather than staged. Said here so nobody later believes that row was run.
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-23
 located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/adoption.go (take previews nothing), mesh-host internal/apply (the comparison and the record)]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-controller 201 (the neighbours on a found network are named), 206 (the per-machine `networks` setting), mesh-host 64 (the taken container joins the kept network)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -73,3 +73,7 @@ The preview names every neighbour on a found network (mesh-controller 201). The
 adds the per-machine setting `networks` — a container id to the found networks it keeps — judged for an
 adopted machine only, and mesh-host 64 has the taken container join each once it runs. Stays located
 until a take is read on an adopted machine.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 Closed on the operator's decision of 2026-10-02 with the built and tested code live on every machine (mesh-controller 206, mesh-host 64), not on a take read on an adopted machine: every machine of this mesh is converged, so none holds a found thing to compare, and the record's live row — ADR 0163's last — will be read at the next real adoption rather than staged. Said here so nobody later believes that row was run.
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-28
 located-in:
  - mesh-controller internal/catalogue/filtering.go
  - mesh-host internal/apply
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: ADR 0140 — mesh-controller (the filter around outward links; no network ranges anywhere)
 amended-design: 03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md
 ---
@@ -86,3 +86,11 @@ supersedes both 0137 and the first attempt at answering this.
  runtime, or left as the one constant?
 - Should the preview say which of a machine's networks are the mesh's and which are not, so a range
  that exists to protect a leftover is visible as such?
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 By [ADR 0140](../../02-DECISIONS/0140-the-filter-constrains-what-arrives-from-outside.md), built and
 live since 2026-09-29: the forward chain constrains what arrives on the machine's outward links and
 says nothing about networks, so there is no list to derive and nothing for a preview to tell apart.
 Read into [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md),
 rule 5, which closes it.
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-29
 located-in:
  - mesh-host internal/apply/opening.go (retireFirewall)
  - mesh-host internal/apply/apply.go (the condition it is called under)
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-host 67 (retire on every converged apply; found-inactive apart from disabled-by-mesh; a skipped step said), mesh-controller 211 (the found firewall's state on node show)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -100,3 +100,21 @@ harmless, but the mesh's belief about which firewall is in force has been wrong
  so". Should it?
 - Why do the host's own detail lines not reach the journal? Everything it decided during the flip is
  unrecoverable, which is why this account has candidates instead of a cause.
 ## Decided, 2026-10-02
 [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md), rule 1:
 convergence is a state the host keeps — the found firewall active again is retired again and said, a
 reconcile that finds it inactive records *found so* and never *done by the mesh*, and a step skipped
 after a failed apply is said. Built in mesh-host on `feat/one-thing-filters-a-converged-machine`; the
 record of both machines of this mesh is corrected by the first report under it.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 mesh-host 67 and mesh-controller 211, live on every machine at 10:10Z. The step now runs on every
 converged apply and says what it did; a found firewall enabled again is retired again. The record's
 one inherited lie stands as history: on the control node the machine's own record already said the
 mesh had disabled the firewall, and the host trusts its record, so `node show` says "retired by the
 mesh" there. From this build on, a reconcile that finds the firewall inactive records *found inactive*
 and never the other thing. Whether the flip's step took on 2026-09-29 is not recoverable and is not
 owed by this record any more.
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-29
 located-in:
  - mesh-host internal/apply/opening.go
  - mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller (the converge preview)
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-host 67 (every refusing table and legacy chain classified with an owner; the runtime's user chain is other), mesh-controller 211 (kept, shown on node show, named by status, previewed with fates)
 amended-design:
 ---
@@ -82,3 +82,24 @@ everything reached from within.
 - Is the bus and the registry being reachable from anywhere still what the mesh wants on a machine that
  faces the internet? The design says yes, for enrolment. It deserves asking on its own rather than
  being answered by a leftover.
 ## Decided, 2026-10-02
 [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md), rules 2 and
 3: the host reports every table and legacy chain that refuses, with an owner, and the runtime's user
 chain's refusals as *other*; `node show`, `status` and the converge preview say it. Built on
 `feat/one-thing-filters-a-converged-machine` in mesh-host and mesh-controller. On 2026-10-02 the home
 server still carries the predecessor's chain in its legacy filter; the record's live row is reading it
 there.
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 mesh-host 67 and mesh-controller 211, live at 10:10Z. The live row of
 [ADR 0168](../../02-DECISIONS/0168-a-converged-machine-is-filtered-by-the-mesh-alone.md) was read the
 same hour: the home server's record names the predecessor's chain in the legacy filter's user chain
 as *other*, with what it refuses, beside two chains a retired front end left in the IPv6 legacy filter;
 the control node's record names the same two leftovers; the laptop and the workstation read *the mesh
 alone*. `status` names both machines and is not well until the operator removes what the mesh did not
 write. The allowance the predecessor's chain carried is
 [issue 145](../145-a-machine-reads-healthy-while-its-modules-cannot-reach-each-other/00-report.md)'s,
 and that record is not closed by this one.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
 ---
 status: resolved
 opened: 2026-10-01
 located-in: [mesh-controller examples/route-proxy/main.go (routesFrom requires a route's public `name` and treats `internal-name` only as an alias of it; the handler serves every routed name to any source), mesh-controller internal/broker/membership.go (a membership says nothing of what its module receives or who the mesh is)]
 fixed-by: mesh-controller PR 207 (the membership carries what a module receives and who the mesh is; the proxy follows it and serves internal names to the mesh only), mesh-catalog PR 211 (the proxy's bus account), mesh-controller PR 208 (the issue verb that delivers it), live 2026-10-02
 amended-design: [03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md, 03-DESIGN/01-to-be/25-the-bus-on-nats.md]
 ---
 # 191 — A route with only an internal name is dropped as naming nothing
 ## What was observed
 A module whose endpoint reaches only the private network could not be reached by its internal name.
 The module ran and answered on its own port. Its route's internal name resolved to the serving node.
 The request failed during the TLS handshake:
 ```
 http: TLS handshake error from …: no public route for "unifi.home-server.internal" in this mesh,
  so no certificate is asked for
 ```
 The proxy's own log said why, every time it re-read its routes:
 ```
 unifi on home-server asked for a route and named nothing; skipped
 ```
 The route it skipped was not empty. The mesh had given it an endpoint, a port, a scheme and an internal
 name, and no public name:
 | route | `name` | `internal-name` | served |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | home-assistant | a public name | `home-assistant.home-server.internal` | under both |
 | unifi | — | `unifi.home-server.internal` | under neither |
 Three other modules on the same node were skipped with the same line on the same pass.
 ## Why it matters
 **Reach is decided in one place, and the proxy reads the old shape of the decision.**
 [ADR 0138](../../02-DECISIONS/0138-an-assignment-binds-an-endpoint-and-says-how-far-it-reaches.md)
 made an endpoint's reach decide which names exist. The controller composes the public name, the
 internal name, or both, and composes no name that nobody asked for
 ([issue 140](../140-an-endpoints-reach-is-not-declared/01-resolution.md)). An endpoint that reaches
 only the private network is the ordinary case for anything that should not face the internet. It is
 exactly the case the proxy drops.
 **The failure is quiet and points the wrong way.** Nothing marks the module unhealthy. The handshake
 error says *no public route*, which reads as a certificate fault on the reader's side. The line that
 gives the real cause is one of four identical lines repeated every few seconds in a log nobody reads
 until they already suspect the proxy.
 **The opposite move is not a workaround.** Giving the endpoint public reach makes the proxy serve it.
 It also publishes an administration interface to the internet to get a name on the private network.
 ## Open questions
 - Should the proxy refuse a route it cannot serve in a way the controller or an operator sees, not
  only in its own log? The same silent skip covers a route with no usable port or an unknown scheme.
 - What checks that what the controller composes and what the proxy serves stay the same shape? ADR
  0138 changed one side and nothing failed on the other.
 ## Resolved (2026-10-02)
 Built as [ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
 decided, and live on both machines that run the proxy. Each logs that its routes now come from its
 membership, and serves internal names to the four machines the mesh names. Checked by hand:
 - the internal-only route answers through the proxy from the serving machine and from two other
  machines of the mesh, over a certificate from the mesh's own authority that each verifies;
 - the same name asked from an address outside the mesh is answered as a name never routed, over plain
  HTTP, and refused in the TLS handshake; the list of served names it is shown leaves out every internal
  name.
 Two things the rollout found are their own records: the proxy's bus account could be issued only from
 the controller's command line, until mesh-controller PR 208 added the `issue` verb, and the status line
 counting every module as a bus user without a credential is
 [issue 195](../195-every-assigned-module-is-counted-as-a-bus-user-without-a-credential/00-report.md).
 The serving machine also lacked the certificate-trust module, so it could not verify the mesh's own
 certificates until it was assigned there.
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
 # Diagnosis
 *2026-10-01.*
 **Ruled out first: the module itself.** Its container was up and had not restarted. The controller's
 status endpoint answered on its own port with `"up": true`. The tool wrapper beside it was serving
 all its tools.
 **Ruled out: name resolution.** The internal name resolved to the serving node's private-network
 address, which is where the proxy listens. Plain HTTP to the name reached the proxy and got a 404.
 HTTPS failed in the handshake, and the proxy logged that it had no route for the name.
 **The route as the proxy received it.** The mesh-written route file held a complete contribution
 for the module: endpoint `web`, port, scheme `https`, `insecure`, a label, and `internal-name`. It had
 no `name`. That is what the controller composes for an endpoint whose reach stops at the private
 network (ADR 0138, `composeName`). The contribution was correct.
 **Located: `routesFrom` in the proxy.** It reads `name` first and skips the contribution if `name`
 is empty. It reads `internal-name` only at the end, as a second host for a rule that already has a
 public one. So the proxy can serve an internal name only next to a public one. That matched the
 mesh before ADR 0138, when both names were always composed. It has been wrong since then.
 The other half of the proxy already handles the case. Certificates for a host are split by whether it
 is in the public set: hosts outside it go to the internal authority, and only hosts inside it are
 eligible for ACME. A host that is only ever an internal name falls on the correct side of both checks
 without change. For certificates, only reading the route was wrong; who may reach the route is the next section.
 **The fix.** `routesFrom` takes a route that names either host, serves each name it carries, and
 marks only the public one as public. It still skips a route that names neither, with the same log line.
 A test proves an internal-only route is served, certified by the internal authority, and refused by
 the public one. That test fails against the code before the change.
 ## The first fix would have made the name public — 2026-10-02, from review
 Serving the dropped route was not enough. The proxy picks a route from the name a request carries
 and never from where the request came from, and it answers public and internal names on the same
 listeners. Its public names resolve to an address the internet reaches. So once the internal-only
 route was served, any request from the internet carrying `unifi.home-server.internal` — a name of a
 fixed, guessable shape — would have reached an administration interface that reach `internal` was
 chosen to keep private. Before the fix the route was unreachable from everywhere. After it, it would
 have been reachable from everywhere. Two more leaks came with it: the proxy's answer for an unrouted
 name listed every name it serves, internal ones included, and the handshake handed a certificate
 naming the internal host to any client.
 Nothing showed this while every routed endpoint also had a public name: its internal name exposed
 nothing the public one did not. It is a gap in the decision's wording, not only in the proxy — ADR
 0138 says the proxy *serves* the internal name without saying to whom — so it is recorded there as a
 progressive insight and in the to-be connectivity design.
 **Where "inside" is decided: told, not worked out.** The first correction had the proxy work it out
 for itself — the mesh's range from an environment variable the catalogue wrote, and the machine's
 container bridges from its own interfaces. That was a second definition of "the mesh", kept by one
 module beside the one the controller already has: it resolves "from the mesh" to every machine's
 address on the private network, and the packet filter is rendered from that list. Reviewed, it was
 replaced: [ADR 0167](../../02-DECISIONS/0167-a-membership-carries-what-its-module-receives-and-who-the-mesh-is.md)
 has every membership on the bus carry what its module receives and that list, and the proxy follows
 its membership. One composition, read by the filter and by the proxy.
 The proxy reads the source address, where the guard reads the interface, because it cannot see the
 interface a request arrived on. A claimed source does not carry here: a connection needs its replies,
 and replies to a mesh address leave by the tunnel.
 **What changed with it.** The internal name of a route that also has a public one is now served to the
 mesh only, like any other internal name. Outsiders have the public name, so nothing they could reach is
 lost. A container calling its own machine's internal name arrives from its container network and is
 refused; whether the mesh should issue those networks too is left open in ADR 0167.
 **Order of release.**
 1. The catalogue change, which gives the proxy a bus account. A machine running the proxy is not
   composed until its account is issued, so the account is issued straight after
   (`module issue route-proxy --node <machine>`), and then the machine is pushed.
 2. The controller and proxy change. The push after it publishes memberships that carry the routes and
   the mesh, and each proxy takes them. Until then, a proxy serves its file, and internal names to its
   own machine alone.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
 ---
 status: resolved
 opened: 2026-10-02
 located-in: [mesh-host internal/apply (removeOrphan: a former target of a kind with no removal was fatal), mesh-host internal/store (Record keeps a former target for every kind, the host's own archive included)]
 fixed-by: mesh-host 65 — a former target of a kind the host cannot remove is left in place, said and forgotten; a dropped archive still refuses
 amended-design:
 ---
 # 194 — The host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything
 ## What was observed
 2026-10-02, 00:34Z, on all four machines of this mesh, the first time a host carrying former
 targets ([ADR 0163](../../02-DECISIONS/0163-taking-a-module-over-is-a-comparison.md), rule 5,
 built in mesh-host 63) replaced itself with a newer host (mesh-host 64).
 The host delivers its own successor as an archive whose target is a versioned directory
 ([ADR 0141](../../02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md)): every new version
 is the same resource with a new target. Since mesh-host 63 the record keeps a resource's former
 target so the next apply removes what the host wrote under it
 ([issue 097](../097-a-resource-that-changes-target-leaves-the-old-one-behind/00-report.md)). So
 the new host's first apply found the previous version's directory as a former target of its own
 archive, and asked the removal for an archive — which does not exist
 ([issue 162](../162-an-archive-cannot-be-undeclared/00-report.md)):
 ```
 applying "mesh-host.next@former:/usr/lib/nox-mesh-host/versions/3c906749ad27": no way to remove a "archive"
 0 resource(s) were applied and remain
 ```
 Orphans are removed before any resource is applied on a converged machine, so the refusal ended
 every apply at its first step. Every machine reported `failed`, applied nothing, and would have
 gone on doing so: a host fix is itself an archive the same apply would have to write, and the apply
 never reached it. The machines kept running what they had; nothing new from the mesh could land.
 ## Why it matters beyond this instance
 Two rules that are each right met in the one resource the host cannot afford to stop on. Rule 5
 says a former target is removed and said; issue 162 says an archive has no removal, deliberately,
 so an unassignment nothing can undo is never reported as done. Neither rule was wrong; their
 meeting was never tested, because the bed that would have found it is a host replacing itself
 under the new rule, and the first such replacement was the live one. The fix is narrow: a former
 target of a kind the host cannot remove is left in place, said, and forgotten — never fatal,
 because nobody dropped it. An archive the declaration dropped still refuses, as 162 has it.
 ## What it took to recover
 The broken host cannot apply its own fix: the fix is delivered as an archive, and the apply fails
 before writing anything. On each machine the host's record (`/var/lib/mesh-host/state.json`) had to
 lose the one `@former:` entry by hand, once, so that the next push could write the fixed archive and
 stand aside for it. A manual edit of the host's record is otherwise never done; it is written here
 because the alternative was four machines that could apply nothing.
 ## Open questions
 - Should `Record` keep a former target for a kind the host cannot remove at all? The trace is
  useful; the removal it implies is not. Keeping it and letting the apply forget it is what the fix
  does; not recording it would be quieter.
 - Should the host's own versions directory be cleaned by the launcher rather than by the apply —
  the one archive whose former targets are genuinely removable, by the thing that knows which one
  runs?
 - Is there a bed that replaces a host under the current rules before the live mesh does
  (the proof row of [ADR 0141](../../02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md) was
  a single crossover, before former targets existed)?
 ## Resolved, 2026-10-02
 mesh-host 65, merged 07:35Z. Recovered as the record above says: the operator dropped the one
 `@former:` entry from each machine's host record and pushed; the fixed host then ran on all four and
 its first apply said `forgotten mesh-host.next@former:… a former target left in place` and applied the
 rest. The open questions stand as questions for the host's own versions, not as faults.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
 ---
 status: open
 opened: 2026-10-02
 located-in: []
 fixed-by:
 amended-design:
 ---
 # 195 — Every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential, and the real gaps are lost in the count
 ## What was observed
 `status`, and `plan` for any machine, open with one line before anything else:
 ```
 the bus's user list leaves out 49 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: <node>.<module>, …
 Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
 ```
 The 49 are spread over four machines and name 26 distinct modules. Checked against the catalogue on
 2026-10-02:
 | what the module's definition says | modules |
 |---|---|
 | declares an own secret named `broker` | 1 — the route proxy, which needed a bus account for issue 191 |
 | declares no `broker` secret, and emits, consumes and serves nothing on the bus | 17 — the packet filter, the intrusion filter, the ssh daemon, the resolver configuration, the certificate authority, the broker itself and others |
 | declares no `broker` secret, and **emits events** | 1 |
 | not in this catalogue, so not checked | 7 |
 So the line counts every module assigned anywhere as a bus user. For almost all of them that is not a
 missing credential. A module with no `broker` secret has nowhere to receive one, and the mesh already
 says an account nothing reads is an orphan ([issue 078](../078-a-delivered-secret-is-accepted-under-any-name/00-report.md)).
 Two real gaps sit inside the count and cannot be told from the noise:
 - **A declared `broker` secret was filled with a value that is not an account.** Before its account was
  issued, the route proxy's plan on both machines already carried a sealed `broker` file, while the same
  status line said no credential had been minted for it. A push had made the declared secret the way it
  makes any own secret. The module would have started with a credential the bus does not know, and
  nothing would have said why. It was found only because the account was being issued by hand.
 - **A module that emits events declares no way to reach the bus.** Its events can go nowhere, and no
  check refuses that.
 ## Why it matters
 **A warning that is always on is read as never on.** The line names 49 users on every `status` and every
 `plan`. An operator, or an agent, learns to scroll past it. The one entry that was a real fault looked
 exactly like the 48 that were not.
 **The fault that was real is the silent kind.** A module whose broker credential is a generated value
 starts, fails to authenticate, and reports that three layers away from the cause. That is the failure
 the composition already refuses for a secret that was never made at all ("declared and not made"). Here
 a value was made, so the refusal never fired.
 ## Open questions
 - Should a bus user be composed for a module that declares no `broker` secret at all? If not, the line
  shrinks to the modules that can actually use an account.
 - Is a `broker` secret ever correctly made by the generic generator? If not, should composition refuse
  a declared `broker` until it is issued, or should the mesh issue it as part of placing the module?
 - Should a module that emits, consumes or serves on the bus be refused when it declares no `broker`
  secret?
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 ---
 status: resolved
 opened: 2026-10-02
 located-in: [mesh-controller internal/catalogue/filtering.go (AsNftables: the forward chain has no rule for the mesh passing through, so a relayed packet is judged by this machine's own published ports)]
 fixed-by: mesh-controller PR 209 (the forward chain relays what comes in and goes out on the tunnel), live 2026-10-02
 amended-design: []
 ---
 # 196 — The hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes for itself
 ## What was observed
 A sweep of every listening port on every machine, from every other machine, on 2026-10-02. Two home
 machines, neither of which can be dialled, reach a third home machine through the hub, as
 [ADR 0007](../../02-DECISIONS/0007-connectivity.md) says every path between machines that are not
 co-located does.
 From either of the two, the third answered on **17 of its 55** listening ports over the mesh. The hub
 itself, probing the same machine directly, reached all the ports that machine's rules open to the mesh.
 The result was the same at 40 probes in parallel and at 4, so it was not load.
 The 17 were not a property of the target. They were exactly the ports **the hub** publishes for its own
 containers: ssh, the proxy's two, and the hub's own block of published ports. A capture on the target
 during one probe to a port that answered and one that did not:
 - the answering one: the SYN arrives on the tunnel, reaches the container, and the reply leaves by the
  tunnel;
 - the other: nothing arrives at all, on any interface.
 ## Why it matters
 **ADR 0007's hub carries every path between machines that are not co-located, and the filter breaks
 that path without saying so.** Whether one home machine can reach a service on another depends on
 whether the hub happens to publish the same port number for something of its own. Adding or removing
 a module on the hub silently opens or closes paths between two other machines that it has nothing to
 do with.
 It also hid behind another fault. A missing placement made the same pair look disconnected earlier the
 same day, and that explanation fit well enough that the per-port pattern was not looked for.
 ## Open questions
 - The relaying rule accepts what comes in on the tunnel and leaves on it, and leaves judging to the
  machine it is for. Should the hub also restrict relayed traffic to what that machine opens to the
  mesh? That would duplicate the target's rules on the hub.
 - No test raises two machines behind a hub and checks a port between them that the hub does not
  publish. The lab's beds have one machine per site.
 ## Resolved (2026-10-02)
 Live on all four machines after one push each. The same sweep, from both home machines to the third
 over the mesh: 45 of 55 ports answer, the same 45 the hub reaches directly. The 9 that do not are
 ports the target opens to nobody on the mesh, and one is refused because it listens only on a LAN
 address. Nothing answers that the target's rules do not open.
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
 # Diagnosis
 *2026-10-02.*
 **Not the tunnel.** The route from either home machine to the target is the tunnel, and traffic to the
 17 ports travels it in both directions. A placement fault would have stopped every port.
 **Not the target's filter.** The target opens the failing ports to every address of the mesh in its
 input chain and its forward chain, the hub reaches them directly, and the SYN for a failing port never
 arrived at the target to be judged.
 **The hub's forward chain.** A relayed packet comes in on the tunnel and leaves on it, so the hub's
 forward hook judges it. The chain the controller renders (`AsNftables`) has a default of drop, accepts
 established traffic, and accepts what did not arrive on an outward link or the tunnel. That last rule is
 for the machine's own containers reaching outward. After that come the rules for this machine's own
 published ports, each matching the **original destination port** of the connection. None of them names
 an outgoing interface or a destination. So a relayed packet to another machine's port 20000 matched the
 hub's own rule for its own port 20000 and passed. One to port 8080, which the hub does not publish,
 matched nothing and was dropped.
 **The fix.** One rule: in on the tunnel **and** out on the tunnel is accepted. That is the mesh passing
 through to another of its machines, which filters it against its own rules. It does not widen anything
 on the hub. A packet for the hub itself is the input chain's, and one for the hub's own containers
 leaves by a bridge, not the tunnel. Both still meet their rules. WireGuard only accepts a packet from a
 peer whose address that peer is allowed to use, so in-on-the-tunnel means from a machine of the mesh.
 A controller test asserts the rule in the forward chain only, never in the input chain, and absent on a
 machine with no tunnel. It fails without the fix, and the rendered set loads with `nft -c`.
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 ---
 status: resolved
 opened: 2026-10-02
 located-in: [mesh-host internal/outward (Links reported only the links carrying a default route)]
 fixed-by: mesh-host PR 66 (a link backed by a physical device is named outward, up or down), live 2026-10-02
 amended-design: []
 ---
 # 197 — A physical link that is down is not filtered when it comes up
 ## What was observed
 A sweep of every machine's filter on 2026-10-02. A laptop-class machine connected by its radio has a
 wired port that was unplugged. Its filter guarded the radio and the tunnel, and accepted everything
 arriving on any other link:
 ```
 iifname != { "mesh0", "<radio>" } accept
 ```
 The wired port was not in the list. Plugged in, everything arriving on it would have been accepted,
 every port of the machine open to whatever network the cable reached. That would last until the
 machine reported again and was pushed a new filter.
 ## Why it matters
 **The filter's one rule about links fails open.** [ADR 0140](../../02-DECISIONS/0140-the-filter-constrains-what-arrives-from-outside.md)
 has the filter constrain what arrives from outside, and has the machine say which links face outside.
 Everything not named is treated as the machine's own, its containers and bridges. So a link the machine
 fails to name is not filtered at all. The host named only the links carrying a default route at the
 moment it reported. A cable plugged in later is the ordinary case for a laptop. A second wired network
 that never carries the default route, such as a direct link to a storage box, is never named at all.
 ## Open questions
 - A virtual link that faces outside (a VPN client's interface, a USB tether that appears as a virtual
  device) has no physical device behind it. It is named only while it carries the default route. Is
  that enough?
 ## Resolved (2026-10-02)
 Live on the affected machine after the host was delivered and one more push: its filter now guards the
 radio, the tunnel and the unplugged wired port, before anything is plugged into it.
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
 # Diagnosis
 *2026-10-02.*
 **Located in `mesh-host` `internal/outward`.** `Links` read the kernel's routing tables and returned the
 interfaces carrying a default route. An unplugged port carries none, so it was never reported, and the
 controller rendered the filter around the links it was given.
 **The fix.** A link faces outside if it carries a default route **or** has a physical device behind it.
 The kernel lists every interface under `/sys/class/net`, with a `device` entry for one backed by
 hardware. A bridge, a veth, the tunnel and the loopback have none, so they stay the machine's own. The
 wired port is now reported up or down, and the filter guards it before anything is plugged in. Tested
 with a radio carrying the default route and an unplugged wired port beside a bridge, a veth, the docker
 bridge, the tunnel and the loopback: the two physical links are reported, nothing else.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
 ---
 status: resolved
 opened: 2026-10-02
 located-in: [mesh-catalog modules/dnsmasq (listens on loopback and the machine's mesh address only), the home-server's DNS (a predecessor's dnsmasq configuration the mesh did not own), the home network's DHCP (hands out the home-server as every device's DNS)]
 fixed-by: mesh-catalog PR 214 (dnsmasq listens on addresses from a setting; docker's file takes no settings), mesh-controller PR 210 (the settings verb), mesh-catalog PR 215 (unifi network DNS tools), live 2026-10-02
 amended-design: []
 ---
 # 198 — The home network's DNS server ran outside the mesh, and the mesh's filter closed it
 ## What was observed
 Every phone on the home Wi-Fi had no internet, while a laptop on the same Wi-Fi did. The router's
 DHCP hands every device the home-server's LAN address as its DNS server. The home-server's DNS daemon
 was listening on that address, and every query to it timed out. The router itself answered the same
 query at once. The laptop worked because it resolves through its own local resolver, not through the
 server DHCP names.
 ## Why it happened
 The DNS daemon on the home-server was not the mesh's. It ran under a configuration file a predecessor
 generated, listening on loopback, the mesh address and the LAN address. The mesh's `dnsmasq` module was
 assigned to the other three machines and not to this one, so no module on the home-server declared
 port 53. Its filter opens only what a module declares, so DNS from the LAN was dropped. It started when
 the home-server applied the filter this morning, after nine hours of applying nothing
 ([issue 194](../194-the-hosts-own-former-archive-stops-every-apply/00-report.md)).
 Nothing said so. The daemon reported running, the filter applied cleanly, and the mesh had no record
 that the home network depended on a service it did not know.
 ## Why it matters
 **A service the mesh does not know is closed by the mesh's filter, by design, and nothing asks whether
 something depends on it.** That is the right default for an unknown port. It is the wrong outcome for
 the one service a whole network was told to use. The gap is that a machine can run something
 important outside the mesh with nothing to show it.
 **The mesh's `dnsmasq` could not have served the LAN either.** It listened on loopback and the mesh
 address only. The reach of its DNS endpoints opens the filter, but the daemon would not have been
 listening on the LAN address anyway.
 ## Open questions
 - Should a machine report the listening services the mesh does not own, the way it reports the links
  that face outside? This one would have been visible before the filter closed it.
 - The LAN address the home-server answers on is now a setting, beside the reach that opens the filter.
  Two statements that must agree. Should reach `public` on a DNS endpoint imply listening beyond the
  mesh?
 ## Resolved (2026-10-02)
 The home network was pointed at the gateway for DNS while the fix was built, which got the phones back
 within minutes. Then:
 - the mesh's `dnsmasq` takes the addresses it listens on beside the machine's from a setting, with
  loopback as the mesh-wide default, so no other machine changed;
 - the home-server's layer adds its LAN address, and its DNS endpoints' reach is `public`. The router
  forwards no DNS, so that means the LAN;
 - the module and its sibling `resolv-conf` were assigned to the home-server, replacing the
  predecessor's daemon and configuration, which were kept aside;
 - the home network was pointed back at the home-server, through a new `unifi` tool.
 Checked live: from another machine on the LAN, public names and mesh names both resolve through the
 home-server's LAN address, and the mesh and the machine itself resolve as before.
 **One fault found on the way, and caught before it reached any machine.** A module's settings are
 merged into every mergeable file the module owns. The first attempt therefore put the new setting into
 docker's `daemon.json` as well as into dnsmasq's config, and dockerd refuses keys it does not know. The
 plan showed it before any push. The change was reverted and redone with docker's file declared to take
 no settings. The general fault, a module's settings reaching files they were not meant for, is still
 there for any module with more than one file.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jschoubben	4567e13071	ADR 0169: the firewall seat serves its verbs, and a foreign rule set is removed through one of them Designs 33 and 08 revised. The first node-scoped seat with verbs: rules, reload, remove; the nftables module holds it from a runtime with NET_ADMIN, the first container to declare a capability.	2026-10-02 13:27:03 +02:00
mesh-admin	aa5d9f1045	Merge pull request 'ADR 0169 (proposed): a machine joins through the tunnel, and the bus is never public' (#284 ) from jschoubben/a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel into main	2026-10-02 11:17:42 +00:00
jschoubben	79642251a1	ADR 0169 accepted; design 08's join order starts with the tunnel	2026-10-02 13:17:32 +02:00
jschoubben	331cb94c6e	ADR 0169 (proposed): a machine joins through the tunnel, and the bus is never public The bus was public only so a new machine could enrol before it had a tunnel. The machine now makes its tunnel key first, the token is issued for it and makes it a peer of the hub, and enrolment happens over the tunnel.	2026-10-02 13:13:15 +02:00
mesh-admin	78351560f7	Merge pull request 'Issue 198: the home network's DNS server ran outside the mesh, and its filter closed it' (#283 ) from jschoubben/the-lans-dns-is-the-mesh into main	2026-10-02 10:22:51 +00:00
mesh-admin	62cc2f89c7	Merge pull request 'Issue 197: a physical link that is down is not filtered when it comes up' (#280 ) from jschoubben/every-physical-link-faces-outside into main	2026-10-02 10:22:40 +00:00
jschoubben	426f741ad0	Issue 198: the home network's DNS server ran outside the mesh, and its filter closed it	2026-10-02 12:22:31 +02:00
jschoubben	9bed54d3be	Issue 197 resolved: the wired port is guarded before it is plugged in	2026-10-02 12:22:15 +02:00
jschoubben	413daf8ad5	Issue 197: a physical link that is down is not filtered when it comes up	2026-10-02 12:22:15 +02:00
mesh-admin	5c993c09b7	Merge pull request 'Issues 143 and 144 resolved: the live row of ADR 0168 read on the home server and the control node' (#282 ) from issues/143-144-resolved into main	2026-10-02 10:11:37 +00:00
jschoubben	7c3be48db2	Issues 143 and 144 resolved: the live row of ADR 0168 read on the home server and the control node	2026-10-02 12:11:17 +02:00
mesh-admin	b665d06701	Merge pull request 'ADR 0168: a converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone, and the host says what else refuses (group 7)' (#281 ) from feat/one-thing-filters-a-converged-machine into main	2026-10-02 10:03:48 +00:00
jschoubben	1bd13446d4	ADR 0168: a converged machine is filtered by the mesh alone, and the host says what else refuses (group 7) Designs 08 and 05 revised; 141 resolved by ADR 0140 and 084 by ADR 0102 and issue 128, both by reading; 143 and 144 decided, built on the matching branches in mesh-host and mesh-controller, resolved when the home server's record names the predecessor's chain.	2026-10-02 11:58:18 +02:00
mesh-admin	14adaafa53	Merge pull request 'to-be 29: the account fact and home-scoped resources shipped; the ssh-client module, CA and ~/.ssh boundary did not' (#279 ) from design/29-what-shipped into main	2026-10-02 09:49:52 +00:00
mesh-admin	bd673cc6ec	Merge pull request 'Group 6 closed: 086, 090, 098, 099, 100, 101 resolved on the operator's decision' (#278 ) from issues/group-6-closed into main	2026-10-02 09:38:11 +00:00
jschoubben	bd6c55d225	Group 6 closed: 086, 090, 098, 099, 100, 101 resolved on the operator's decision, each saying the live row was not run	2026-10-02 11:37:08 +02:00
mesh-admin	2bbbc56502	Merge pull request 'Issue 194 resolved: the fixed host forgot its former archive on all four machines' (#277 ) from issue/194-resolved into main	2026-10-02 09:31:49 +00:00
jschoubben	c8935aceca	Issue 194 resolved: the fixed host forgot its former archive on all four machines	2026-10-02 11:31:29 +02:00
mesh-admin	29b656f2c0	Merge pull request 'Issue 196: the hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes itself' (#276 ) from jschoubben/the-hub-relays-the-mesh into main	2026-10-02 09:23:55 +00:00
jschoubben	d05ac367f1	Issue 196 resolved: the hub relays the mesh, re-swept live	2026-10-02 11:23:37 +02:00
jschoubben	1c0dafb918	Issue 196: the hub relays the mesh only on the ports it publishes itself	2026-10-02 11:17:11 +02:00
mesh-admin	018ee359ae	Merge pull request 'Issue 194: the host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything' (#274 ) from issue/194-the-hosts-own-former-archive-stops-every-apply into main	2026-10-02 09:04:30 +00:00
mesh-admin	c5535eeebd	Merge pull request 'ADR 0163 built: the take digest, the minted-secret refusal, the networks setting, settings judged where stored, genesis raising the forge as declared' (#270 ) from feat/a-take-is-a-comparison-the-rest into main	2026-10-02 09:04:21 +00:00
mesh-admin	dbb9d2bc16	Merge pull request 'Issue 191 and ADR 0167: a membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is' (#273 ) from jschoubben/an-internal-only-route into main	2026-10-02 07:49:27 +00:00
jschoubben	28d53dcc28	Issue 191 resolved: internal-only routes are served to the mesh, live on both proxies	2026-10-02 09:49:25 +02:00
jschoubben	df667eb710	ADR 0167: a membership carries what its module receives, and who the mesh is Issue 191's route proxy needs to know who the mesh is to serve an internal name correctly, and the first fix had it work that out alone. The membership on the bus now carries it, from the same list the filter uses. ADR 0138 gains an insight that the proxy is where internal reach is kept; designs 08 and 25 say how.	2026-10-02 09:49:19 +02:00
jschoubben	098a2ca485	Issue 191: a route with only an internal name is dropped as naming nothing	2026-10-02 09:49:19 +02:00
mesh-admin	a34cedeb5d	Merge pull request 'Issue 195: every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential' (#275 ) from jschoubben/issue-195 into main	2026-10-02 00:44:29 +00:00
jschoubben	db5ff5a5ee	Issue 195: every assigned module is counted as a bus user without a credential The status warning names 49 users; 48 are modules that never speak on the bus, and the one real fault, a declared broker secret filled with a generated value, looked the same as the rest.	2026-10-02 02:44:24 +02:00
jschoubben	780c2b6e58	Issue 194: the host's own former archive stops every machine applying anything Rule 5 of ADR 0163 (a former target is removed) met issue 162 (an archive has no removal) in the host's own archive, the first time a host carrying former targets replaced itself; every machine applied nothing from then on.	2026-10-02 02:42:19 +02:00
jochen	8c231102f8	to-be 29: the account fact and home-scoped resources shipped; the ssh-client module, CA and ~/.ssh boundary did not The controller merged §1, §2 and the composed ssh config on 2026-09-27 while hq still called the design proposed. Record what is on main, what is held on a branch, and what has no code — and that the account fact shipped without a decision record, which is the next thing to write. Also drop the real account and node names the public repository must not carry, and correct ADR numbers that drifted in a renumbering.	2026-10-01 23:14:10 +02:00