Merge pull request 'The proxy's jail reads a refused name as well as a refused certificate (hq ADR 0179)' (#226) from fix/the-proxys-jail-reads-both-refusals into main

fail2ban expands <HOST> to a named group, so two in one pattern is a duplicate group name and
the daemon refuses to start at all -- every jail on the machine, not just this one. Two patterns,
one <HOST> each: the certificate refused for an unserved name, and the request refused for one.
Caught live on the control node (hq ADR 0179).

modules/fail2ban/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# fail2ban's runtime: the tool runtime, carrying the intrusion prevention's verbs and the client they
+# speak through.
+#
+# Built from this module's own directory and nothing else (novox/hq ADR 0069). Two bases, named in
+# module.json's `build.on`: the image this is compiled in and the image it runs in.
+ARG BUILD_BASE
+ARG RUNTIME_BASE
+
+FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
+WORKDIR /app/modules/fail2ban
+COPY . .
+RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts tools/index.ts \
+      --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
+
+FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
+# The daemon runs on the machine, declared by this module; what runs here is only its client, which
+# speaks to the daemon over the socket the machine shares into this container (novox/hq ADR 0179).
+# The package brings the client and the daemon together; the daemon is never started here.
+RUN apt-get update \
+      && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends fail2ban \
+      && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+COPY --from=build /app/modules/fail2ban/dist /app/modules/fail2ban/dist
+ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/fail2ban/dist/tools/index.js

modules/fail2ban/client.ts

@@ -1,51 +1,204 @@
-// fail2ban's own code, in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). The jails and the daemon are declared
+// fail2ban's own code, in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). The jails are composed by the mesh from
-// resources — the mesh writes /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/* and keeps fail2ban.service running (see
+// the modules a machine runs (to-be 31) and written as declared resources; the daemon is kept
-// module.json). This code exists only to read and steer the *live* state the daemon owns at
+// running by one. This code exists only to read and steer the *live* state the daemon owns: who is
-// runtime: which IPs are banned right now, and the manual ban/unban an operator reaches for. That
+// banned now and until when, and the ban or release an operator asks for — the node-intrusion-
-// state (the running bans, /var/lib/fail2ban's sqlite) is fail2ban's, not the mesh's — the mesh
+// prevention seat's four verbs (ADR 0179). The daemon's state is fail2ban's, not the mesh's: the
-// reconciles the config, never the ban list.
+// mesh composes the jails and never writes the ban list.
+//
+// Spoken through fail2ban-client over the daemon's socket, which the machine shares into this
+// runtime; so the client here is the one from the runtime's own package and the daemon is the
+// machine's, and the two meet at /var/run/fail2ban/fail2ban.sock.
 
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { isIP } from "node:net";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
 
-const run = promisify(execFile);
+const execFileP = promisify(execFile);
+
+/** A command runner, so the verbs can be tested without a daemon. */
+export type Runner = (cmd: string, args: string[]) => Promise<string>;
+
+export const execRunner: Runner = async (cmd, args) => {
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await execFileP(cmd, args, { maxBuffer: 16 * 1024 * 1024 });
+    return stdout;
+  } catch (err) {
+    const e = err as { code?: string | number; stderr?: string; stdout?: string; message?: string };
+    const said = `${e.stdout ?? ""}${e.stderr ?? ""}`.trim();
+    if (e.code === "ENOENT") throw new Error(`${cmd} is not in this runtime`);
+    if (/Failed to access socket path|Is fail2ban running/i.test(said)) {
+      throw new Error("fail2ban is not running on this machine, or its socket is not shared with this runtime");
+    }
+    // fail2ban-client's own last line is the one a person reads ("Sorry but the jail 'x' does not exist").
+    const lines = said.split("\n").map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+    throw new Error(lines.length ? lines[lines.length - 1] : (e.message ?? `${cmd} failed`));
+  }
+};
+
+/** One jail as the daemon reports it. */
+export interface JailStatus {
+  jail: string;
+  /** What the jail is reading: files or journal matches, as fail2ban names them. */
+  watching: string[];
+  /** Addresses with failures counted against them right now, and all failures since the jail started. */
+  failing: { now: number; total: number };
+  /** Addresses held right now, and all bans since the jail started. */
+  banned: { now: number; total: number; addresses: string[] };
+}
+
+/** One ban as the daemon holds it. */
+export interface Ban {
+  ip: string;
+  jail: string;
+  /** When the ban was placed, in the machine's local time as fail2ban prints it. */
+  since: string;
+  /** When the ban ends; "never" for a permanent ban. */
+  until: string;
+}
+
+export interface JailSettings {
+  jail: string;
+  bantime: string;
+  findtime: string;
+  maxretry: number;
+  ignoreip: string[];
+  actions: string[];
+  /** The log files the jail reads, when it reads files. */
+  logpath: string[];
+  /** The journal match the jail reads, when it reads the journal. */
+  journalmatch: string;
+}
 
 export class Fail2banClient {
+  private readonly run: Runner;
+
+  constructor(run: Runner = execRunner) {
+    this.run = run;
+  }
+
   static fromEnv(_env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Fail2banClient {
     return new Fail2banClient();
   }
 
-  /** Overview of every jail, or the detailed status of one — currently-banned IPs and totals. */
+  private client(...args: string[]): Promise<string> {
-  async status(jail?: string): Promise<string> {
+    return this.run("fail2ban-client", args);
+  }
+
+  /** The jails the daemon runs, by name. */
+  async jails(): Promise<string[]> {
+    const out = await this.client("status");
+    const m = out.match(/Jail list:\s*(.*)/);
+    if (!m) return [];
+    return m[1].split(",").map((j) => j.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+  }
+
+  /** Every jail with what it watches and holds, or one jail's detail. */
+  async status(jail?: string): Promise<{ jails: JailStatus[] }> {
+    const names = jail ? [jail] : await this.jails();
+    const jails: JailStatus[] = [];
+    for (const name of names) {
+      jails.push(parseJailStatus(name, await this.client("status", name)));
+    }
+    return { jails };
+  }
+
+  /** Every address banned now, with the jail holding it and when the ban ends. */
+  async banned(jail?: string): Promise<{ banned: Ban[] }> {
+    const names = jail ? [jail] : await this.jails();
+    const banned: Ban[] = [];
+    for (const name of names) {
+      banned.push(...parseBans(name, await this.client("get", name, "banip", "--with-time")));
+    }
+    banned.sort((a, b) => a.until.localeCompare(b.until) || a.ip.localeCompare(b.ip));
+    return { banned };
+  }
+
+  /** Ban one address in one jail now. The daemon's own answer is how many addresses it added. */
+  async ban(ip: string, jail: string): Promise<{ banned: Ban | null; added: number }> {
+    address(ip);
+    name(jail);
+    const out = await this.client("set", jail, "banip", ip);
+    const added = Number.parseInt(out.trim(), 10) || 0;
+    const held = (await this.banned(jail)).banned.find((b) => b.ip === ip) ?? null;
+    return { banned: held, added };
+  }
+
+  /** Let one address go, from one jail or from every jail. The daemon's answer is how many it released. */
+  async unban(ip: string, jail?: string): Promise<{ released: number; ip: string; jail: string | "every jail" }> {
+    address(ip);
+    let out: string;
     if (jail) {
-      const { stdout } = await run("sudo", ["fail2ban-client", "status", jail]);
+      name(jail);
-      return stdout;
+      out = await this.client("set", jail, "unbanip", ip);
+    } else {
+      out = await this.client("unban", ip);
     }
-    const { stdout: overview } = await run("sudo", ["fail2ban-client", "status"]);
+    return { released: Number.parseInt(out.trim(), 10) || 0, ip, jail: jail ?? "every jail" };
-    const match = overview.match(/Jail list:\s*(.+)/);
-    if (!match) return overview;
-
-    const jails = match[1].split(",").map((j) => j.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-    const parts: string[] = [overview.trimEnd(), ""];
-    for (const j of jails) {
-      const { stdout } = await run("sudo", ["fail2ban-client", "status", j]);
-      parts.push(`=== ${j} ===`, stdout.trimEnd(), "");
-    }
-    return parts.join("\n");
   }
 
-  /** Manually ban an IP in a jail. Mutates live state, not a mesh-managed file. */
+  /** One jail's effective settings — the module's own tool, beside the seat's verbs. */
-  async ban(jail: string, ip: string): Promise<string> {
+  async settings(jail: string): Promise<JailSettings> {
-    const { stdout } = await run("sudo", ["fail2ban-client", "set", jail, "banip", ip]);
+    name(jail);
-    return stdout;
+    const get = (key: string) => this.client("get", jail, key);
-  }
+    const [bantime, findtime, maxretry, ignoreip, actions, logpath, journalmatch] = await Promise.all([
-
+      get("bantime"), get("findtime"), get("maxretry"), get("ignoreip"), get("actions"), get("logpath"),
-  /** Unban an IP from one jail, or from every jail when no jail is given. */
+      get("journalmatch"),
-  async unban(ip: string, jail?: string): Promise<string> {
+    ]);
-    const args = jail
+    return {
-      ? ["fail2ban-client", "set", jail, "unbanip", ip]
+      jail,
-      : ["fail2ban-client", "unban", ip];
+      bantime: bantime.trim(),
-    const { stdout } = await run("sudo", args);
+      findtime: findtime.trim(),
-    return stdout;
+      maxretry: Number.parseInt(maxretry.trim(), 10),
+      ignoreip: listed(ignoreip),
+      actions: actions.split("\n").slice(1).map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean),
+      logpath: /No file is currently monitored/.test(logpath) ? [] : listed(logpath),
+      journalmatch: journalmatch.split("\n").slice(1).map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean).join(" "),
+    };
   }
 }
+
+/** fail2ban's tree listings: lines like "|- 127.0.0.0/8" and "`- ::1", after a heading. */
+function listed(out: string): string[] {
+  return out
+    .split("\n")
+    .map((l) => l.replace(/^[\s|`-]+/, "").trim())
+    .filter((l, i) => i > 0 && l.length > 0);
+}
+
+export function parseJailStatus(jail: string, out: string): JailStatus {
+  const field = (label: string) => {
+    const m = out.match(new RegExp(label.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&") + ":\\t?\\s*(.*)"));
+    return m ? m[1].trim() : "";
+  };
+  const num = (label: string) => Number.parseInt(field(label), 10) || 0;
+  const watching = [field("File list"), field("Journal matches")].filter(Boolean);
+  return {
+    jail,
+    watching,
+    failing: { now: num("Currently failed"), total: num("Total failed") },
+    banned: {
+      now: num("Currently banned"),
+      total: num("Total banned"),
+      addresses: field("Banned IP list").split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/** `get <jail> banip --with-time` prints one ban per line: "IP \tsince + seconds = until". */
+export function parseBans(jail: string, out: string): Ban[] {
+  const bans: Ban[] = [];
+  for (const line of out.split("\n")) {
+    const m = line.match(/^(\S+)\s+(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}) \+ (-?\d+) = (\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}|\S+)/);
+    if (!m) continue;
+    bans.push({ ip: m[1], jail, since: m[2], until: Number(m[3]) < 0 ? "never" : m[4] });
+  }
+  return bans;
+}
+
+function address(ip: string): void {
+  if (!isIP(ip)) throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(ip)} is not an address`);
+}
+
+function name(jail: string): void {
+  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$/.test(jail)) throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(jail)} is not a jail's name`);
+}

modules/fail2ban/module.json

@@ -7,9 +7,25 @@
   "claims": [
     {
       "name": "node-intrusion-prevention",
-      "scope": "node"
+      "scope": "node",
+      "serves": [
+        "status",
+        "banned",
+        "ban",
+        "unban"
+      ]
     }
   ],
+  "tools": [
+    "fail2ban_settings"
+  ],
+  "own-secrets": {
+    "broker": "${dir:mesh-state}/broker"
+  },
+  "jailing": {
+    "into": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/mesh.conf",
+    "filter-into": "/etc/fail2ban/filter.d"
+  },
   "resources": [
     {
       "id": "package",
@@ -28,19 +44,37 @@
       "path": "/etc/fail2ban/action.d",
       "mode": "0755"
     },
+    {
+      "id": "filter-d",
+      "type": "directory",
+      "path": "/etc/fail2ban/filter.d",
+      "mode": "0755"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "run-dir",
+      "type": "directory",
+      "path": "/var/run/fail2ban",
+      "mode": "0755"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "mesh-state",
+      "type": "directory",
+      "mode": "0700",
+      "place": "mesh"
+    },
     {
       "id": "jail-local",
       "type": "file",
       "path": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.local",
       "mode": "0644",
-      "content": "[INCLUDES]\n\nbefore = paths-arch.conf\n\n[DEFAULT]\n\n# Never act on the machine itself or on a tunnel peer: the mesh's private range is\n# ${machine:mesh-range}, named here rather than written as a value the module cannot\n# know (novox/hq ADR 0112). Without this, fail2ban could ban the mesh's own nodes.\nignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 ${machine:mesh-range}\n\nbantime  = 10m\nfindtime = 10m\nmaxretry = 5\n\n# Ban through iptables, not through a firewall front-end the machine may not have. ufw is\n# installed on two of this mesh's machines and absent on the other two, and fail2ban finds out\n# only at ban time: the service reports healthy, the jail counts the attempt, the ban command\n# exits 127, and nothing is blocked. Proven on 2026-09-28 -- 'ufw: command not found' on a\n# machine the mesh reported as protected.\n#\n# The action below is this module's own, already used by the recidive jail on every machine\n# here, and it bans in DOCKER-USER as well as INPUT, so a container's published port is\n# covered too.\nbanaction = iptables-allports-dualchain\nbanaction_allports = iptables-allports-dualchain\n\n[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport    = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\n"
+      "content": "[INCLUDES]\n\nbefore = paths-arch.conf\n\n[DEFAULT]\n\n# Never act on the machine itself or on a tunnel peer: the mesh's private range is\n# ${machine:mesh-range}, named here rather than written as a value the module cannot\n# know (novox/hq ADR 0112). Without this, fail2ban could ban the mesh's own nodes.\nignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 ${machine:mesh-range}\n\n# Three failures in a day ban for a day (novox/hq ADR 0179). The attackers this mesh sees pace\n# themselves at one try every ten minutes, under any ten-minute window; a day's window counts\n# them, and a day's ban costs a person who mistyped three times once, from one address, while\n# the mesh's own range is never banned at all.\nbantime  = 1d\nfindtime = 1d\nmaxretry = 3\n\n# Ban through iptables, not through a firewall front-end the machine may not have. ufw is\n# installed on two of this mesh's machines and absent on the other two, and fail2ban finds out\n# only at ban time: the service reports healthy, the jail counts the attempt, the ban command\n# exits 127, and nothing is blocked. Proven on 2026-09-28 -- 'ufw: command not found' on a\n# machine the mesh reported as protected.\n#\n# The action below is this module's own, already used by the recidive jail on every machine\n# here, and it bans in DOCKER-USER as well as INPUT, so a container's published port is\n# covered too.\nbanaction = iptables-allports-dualchain\nbanaction_allports = iptables-allports-dualchain\n\n[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport    = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\n"
     },
     {
       "id": "jail-sshd",
       "type": "file",
       "path": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf",
       "mode": "0644",
-      "content": "[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport    = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\nmaxretry = 5\n"
+      "content": "[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport    = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\nmaxretry = 3\nfindtime = 1d\nbantime  = 1d\n"
     },
     {
       "id": "log",
@@ -55,7 +89,7 @@
       "type": "file",
       "path": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/recidive.conf",
       "mode": "0644",
-      "content": "[recidive]\nenabled = true\nlogpath  = /var/log/fail2ban.log\n# Ban in both INPUT (host services like SSH) and DOCKER-USER (container services)\nbanaction = iptables-allports-dualchain\nbantime  = 1w\nfindtime = 1d\n"
+      "content": "[recidive]\nenabled = true\nlogpath  = /var/log/fail2ban.log\n# Ban in both INPUT (host services like SSH) and DOCKER-USER (container services)\nbanaction = iptables-allports-dualchain\n# Banned twice in two weeks, by any jail, is banned for four (novox/hq ADR 0179).\nbantime  = 4w\nfindtime = 2w\nmaxretry = 2\n"
     },
     {
       "id": "action-dualchain",
@@ -81,8 +115,44 @@
         "jail-local",
         "jail-sshd",
         "jail-recidive",
-        "action-dualchain"
+        "action-dualchain",
+        "composed-jails"
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "runtime",
+      "type": "container",
+      "name": "mesh-fail2ban",
+      "artifact": "runtime",
+      "network": "host",
+      "volumes": [
+        "${dir:mesh-state}/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
+        "/var/run/fail2ban:/var/run/fail2ban"
+      ],
+      "env": {
+        "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker"
+      }
     }
-  ]
+  ],
+  "build": {
+    "on": [
+      {
+        "arg": "BUILD_BASE",
+        "module": "mesh-tools",
+        "artifact": "build"
+      },
+      {
+        "arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
+        "module": "mesh-tools",
+        "artifact": "runtime"
+      }
+    ],
+    "artifacts": [
+      {
+        "name": "runtime",
+        "kind": "image",
+        "from": "Dockerfile"
+      }
+    ]
+  }
 }

modules/fail2ban/package.json

@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
 {
   "name": "@novox/module-fail2ban",
   "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "fail2ban — intrusion prevention: the mesh declares the jails and keeps the daemon running; its ban/unban/status tools live here.",
+  "description": "fail2ban \u2014 intrusion prevention: the mesh composes the jails and keeps the daemon running; this module holds the node-intrusion-prevention seat and serves its verbs status, banned, ban and unban (novox/hq to-be 31, ADR 0179).",
   "type": "module",
   "private": true,
   "dependencies": {
-    "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
+    "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
     "typescript": "^5.6.0"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc client.ts tools/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
+    "test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
   }
 }

modules/fail2ban/test/client.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// The intrusion prevention's verbs over a fake daemon, with the shapes fail2ban-client 1.1.0 printed
+// on the control node on 2026-10-02 (novox/hq ADR 0179).
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { Fail2banClient, parseBans, parseJailStatus, type Runner } from "../client.ts";
+
+const STATUS = "Status\n|- Number of jail:\t2\n`- Jail list:\trecidive, sshd\n";
+const RECIDIVE =
+  "Status for the jail: recidive\n|- Filter\n|  |- Currently failed:\t36\n|  |- Total failed:\t149\n" +
+  "|  `- File list:\t/var/log/fail2ban.log\n`- Actions\n   |- Currently banned:\t9\n   |- Total banned:\t13\n" +
+  "   `- Banned IP list:\t195.178.110.30 45.148.10.240 92.118.39.71\n";
+const SSHD =
+  "Status for the jail: sshd\n|- Filter\n|  |- Currently failed:\t5\n|  |- Total failed:\t11776\n" +
+  "|  `- Journal matches:\t_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service + _COMM=sshd\n`- Actions\n   |- Currently banned:\t0\n" +
+  "   |- Total banned:\t150\n   `- Banned IP list:\t\n";
+const WITH_TIME =
+  "195.178.110.30 \t2026-09-26 23:18:47 + 604800 = 2026-10-03 23:18:47\n" +
+  "92.118.39.71 \t2026-09-28 10:33:49 + 604800 = 2026-10-05 10:33:49\n";
+
+function fake(answers: Record<string, string>, calls: string[][] = []): Runner {
+  return async (cmd, args) => {
+    calls.push([cmd, ...args]);
+    const key = args.join(" ");
+    if (key in answers) return answers[key];
+    throw new Error(`unexpected ${cmd} ${key}`);
+  };
+}
+
+test("a jail's status is read into numbers, what it watches and who it holds", () => {
+  const s = parseJailStatus("recidive", RECIDIVE);
+  assert.deepEqual(s, {
+    jail: "recidive",
+    watching: ["/var/log/fail2ban.log"],
+    failing: { now: 36, total: 149 },
+    banned: { now: 9, total: 13, addresses: ["195.178.110.30", "45.148.10.240", "92.118.39.71"] },
+  });
+  const j = parseJailStatus("sshd", SSHD);
+  assert.deepEqual(j.watching, ["_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service + _COMM=sshd"]);
+  assert.deepEqual(j.banned, { now: 0, total: 150, addresses: [] });
+});
+
+test("status covers every jail the daemon lists, or the one named", async () => {
+  const calls: string[][] = [];
+  const f = new Fail2banClient(fake({ status: STATUS, "status recidive": RECIDIVE, "status sshd": SSHD }, calls));
+  const all = await f.status();
+  assert.deepEqual(all.jails.map((j) => j.jail), ["recidive", "sshd"]);
+  const one = await f.status("sshd");
+  assert.equal(one.jails.length, 1);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls[calls.length - 1], ["fail2ban-client", "status", "sshd"]);
+});
+
+test("bans are read with when they were placed and when they end, a permanent one as never", () => {
+  const bans = parseBans("recidive", WITH_TIME + "203.0.113.9 \t2026-10-01 00:00:00 + -1 = never\n");
+  assert.equal(bans.length, 3);
+  assert.deepEqual(bans[0], { ip: "195.178.110.30", jail: "recidive", since: "2026-09-26 23:18:47", until: "2026-10-03 23:18:47" });
+  assert.equal(bans[2].until, "never");
+  assert.deepEqual(parseBans("sshd", "\n"), []);
+});
+
+test("banned gathers every jail's bans, soonest to end first", async () => {
+  const f = new Fail2banClient(fake({
+    status: STATUS,
+    "get recidive banip --with-time": WITH_TIME,
+    "get sshd banip --with-time": "198.51.100.7 \t2026-10-02 15:06:58 + 600 = 2026-10-02 15:16:58\n",
+  }));
+  const { banned } = await f.banned();
+  assert.deepEqual(banned.map((b) => `${b.ip}@${b.jail}`), ["198.51.100.7@sshd", "195.178.110.30@recidive", "92.118.39.71@recidive"]);
+});
+
+test("ban asks the daemon by jail and answers with the ban as held; a non-address is refused before anything runs", async () => {
+  const calls: string[][] = [];
+  const f = new Fail2banClient(fake({
+    "set recidive banip 198.51.100.7": "1\n",
+    "get recidive banip --with-time": WITH_TIME + "198.51.100.7 \t2026-10-02 17:00:00 + 604800 = 2026-10-09 17:00:00\n",
+  }, calls));
+  const r = await f.ban("198.51.100.7", "recidive");
+  assert.equal(r.added, 1);
+  assert.equal(r.banned?.until, "2026-10-09 17:00:00");
+  assert.deepEqual(calls[0], ["fail2ban-client", "set", "recidive", "banip", "198.51.100.7"]);
+  await assert.rejects(() => f.ban("not-an-ip", "recidive"), /is not an address/);
+  await assert.rejects(() => f.ban("198.51.100.7", "a jail; rm"), /is not a jail's name/);
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 2);
+});
+
+test("unban releases from one jail or from every jail", async () => {
+  const calls: string[][] = [];
+  const f = new Fail2banClient(fake({ "set sshd unbanip 198.51.100.7": "1\n", "unban 198.51.100.7": "2\n" }, calls));
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.unban("198.51.100.7", "sshd"), { released: 1, ip: "198.51.100.7", jail: "sshd" });
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.unban("198.51.100.7"), { released: 2, ip: "198.51.100.7", jail: "every jail" });
+  assert.deepEqual(calls[1], ["fail2ban-client", "unban", "198.51.100.7"]);
+});
+
+test("a jail's settings are read from the daemon's listings", async () => {
+  const f = new Fail2banClient(fake({
+    "get sshd bantime": "86400\n", "get sshd findtime": "86400\n", "get sshd maxretry": "3\n",
+    "get sshd ignoreip": "These IP addresses/networks are ignored:\n|- 127.0.0.0/8\n|- 10.10.0.0/24\n`- ::1\n",
+    "get sshd actions": "The jail sshd has the following actions:\niptables-allports-dualchain\n",
+    "get sshd logpath": "No file is currently monitored\n",
+    "get sshd journalmatch": "Current match filter:\n_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service + _COMM=sshd\n",
+  }));
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.settings("sshd"), {
+    jail: "sshd", bantime: "86400", findtime: "86400", maxretry: 3,
+    ignoreip: ["127.0.0.0/8", "10.10.0.0/24", "::1"], actions: ["iptables-allports-dualchain"],
+    logpath: [], journalmatch: "_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service + _COMM=sshd",
+  });
+});

modules/fail2ban/tools/index.ts

@@ -1,55 +1,62 @@
-// fail2ban's tools — reading and steering the live ban state. The jails themselves are declared
+// The intrusion prevention's tools: the node-intrusion-prevention seat's four verbs — who is banned,
-// resources (module.json); these three touch what the running daemon holds: what is banned now,
+// the jails' state, ban one, let one go — and the module's own reading of a jail's settings
-// and the manual ban/unban an operator reaches for. The daemon's state is fail2ban's own, so this
+// (novox/hq to-be 31, ADR 0179). The jails themselves are composed by the mesh from the modules a
-// is the only way to see or change it — the mesh reconciles the config, not the bans.
+// machine runs and written as declared resources; these touch only what the running daemon holds.
 
 import { registerModuleTools, type ToolDefinition } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/tools";
 import { Fail2banClient } from "../client.js";
 
-export function getFail2banTools(fail2ban: Fail2banClient): ToolDefinition[] {
+export function getSeatVerbs(fail2ban: Fail2banClient): ToolDefinition[] {
   return [
     {
-      name: "fail2ban_status",
+      name: "status",
       description:
-        "fail2ban status on this node — the jails and their live bans. Omit `jail` for every jail, or name one for its detail.",
+        "Every jail on this machine with what it watches, how many addresses it is counting failures against and holding now, and the totals since it started; one jail's detail when named.",
-      input: {
+      input: { jail: { type: "string", description: "one jail (optional)" } },
-        type: "object",
+      run: async (args) => fail2ban.status(args.jail ? String(args.jail) : undefined),
-        properties: {
-          jail: {
-            type: "string",
-            description: "A specific jail (e.g. sshd, recidive); omit for the overview of all jails.",
-          },
-        },
-      },
-      run: async (args) => ({ status: await fail2ban.status(args.jail as string | undefined) }),
     },
     {
-      name: "fail2ban_ban",
+      name: "banned",
-      description: "Manually ban an IP address in a jail — a live change to the running daemon, not a mesh-managed file.",
+      description: "Every address banned on this machine right now, with the jail that holds it, when it was banned and when the ban ends.",
-      input: {
+      input: { jail: { type: "string", description: "one jail (optional)" } },
-        type: "object",
+      run: async (args) => fail2ban.banned(args.jail ? String(args.jail) : undefined),
-        properties: {
-          jail: { type: "string", description: "Jail name (e.g. sshd, recidive)." },
-          ip: { type: "string", description: "IP address to ban." },
-        },
-        required: ["jail", "ip"],
-      },
-      run: async (args) => ({ result: await fail2ban.ban(args.jail as string, args.ip as string) }),
     },
     {
-      name: "fail2ban_unban",
+      name: "ban",
-      description: "Unban an IP address from one jail, or from every jail when `jail` is omitted.",
+      description:
+        "Ban one address in one jail now, for the jail's ban time — an operator's act on the live ban list, which the mesh never writes itself.",
       input: {
-        type: "object",
+        ip: { type: "string", description: "the address" },
-        properties: {
+        jail: { type: "string", description: "the jail to hold it (recidive for the long ban)" },
-          ip: { type: "string", description: "IP address to unban." },
-          jail: { type: "string", description: "A specific jail; omit to unban from all jails." },
-        },
-        required: ["ip"],
       },
-      run: async (args) => ({ result: await fail2ban.unban(args.ip as string, args.jail as string | undefined) }),
+      run: async (args) => fail2ban.ban(String(args.ip ?? ""), String(args.jail ?? "")),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "unban",
+      description: "Let one address go, from one jail or from every jail when none is named.",
+      input: {
+        ip: { type: "string", description: "the address" },
+        jail: { type: "string", description: "one jail (optional)" },
+      },
+      run: async (args) => fail2ban.unban(String(args.ip ?? ""), args.jail ? String(args.jail) : undefined),
     },
   ];
 }
 
-registerModuleTools("fail2ban", () => getFail2banTools(Fail2banClient.fromEnv()));
+export function getFail2banTools(fail2ban: Fail2banClient): ToolDefinition[] {
+  return [
+    {
+      name: "fail2ban_settings",
+      description:
+        "One jail's effective settings on this machine: ban time, window, tries, the addresses it never bans, its actions and what it reads.",
+      input: { jail: { type: "string", description: "the jail" } },
+      run: async (args) => fail2ban.settings(String(args.jail ?? "")),
+    },
+  ];
+}
+
+const fail2ban = Fail2banClient.fromEnv();
+// The seat's verbs under the seat's name: the runtime serves them on the seat's subjects where this
+// module holds it (ADR 0159, 0160). The module's own under its own.
+registerModuleTools("node-intrusion-prevention", () => getSeatVerbs(fail2ban));
+registerModuleTools("fail2ban", () => getFail2banTools(fail2ban));

modules/gitea/module.json

@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@
       "volumes": [
         "${dir:data}:/data"
       ],
-      "secrets-in-environment": "gitea honours GITEA__database__PASSWD__FILE and GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN__FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it"
+      "secrets-in-environment": "gitea honours GITEA__database__PASSWD__FILE and GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN__FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it",
+      "logging": "journald"
     },
     {
       "id": "admin-bootstrap",
@@ -237,5 +238,12 @@
         "from": "Dockerfile"
       }
     ]
-  }
+  },
+  "jails": [
+    {
+      "name": "gitea",
+      "failregex": "^.*Failed authentication attempt for .* from <HOST>(?::\\d+)?\\s*$",
+      "jail": "backend = systemd\njournalmatch = CONTAINER_NAME=gitea\nport = http,https,222\nmaxretry = 3\nfindtime = 1d\nbantime = 1d"
+    }
+  ]
 }

modules/lab/Dockerfile

@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
 FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
 WORKDIR /app/modules/lab
 COPY . .
-RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc tools/index.ts tools/runs.ts \
+RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc tools/index.ts tools/runs.ts --rootDir . \
       --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
 
 FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
 RUN apt-get update \
- && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git make ca-certificates curl \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git make ca-certificates curl python3 file iproute2 sudo \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/go.tgz https://go.dev/dl/go1.26.8.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
  && echo "d0f743b33e8d8945e6b1f432edd15785c70507121d6e2a723b21285eddf8b57b  /tmp/go.tgz" | sha256sum -c - \

modules/lab/module.json

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
   "module": "lab",
   "version": "1",
   "capabilities": [
-    "container-runtime"
+    "container-runtime",
+    "virtualisation"
   ],
   "own-secrets": {
     "broker": "${dir:mesh-state}/broker"

modules/lab/tools/runs.ts

@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ node -e ${shellQuote(
     `const fs=require("fs");const f=${JSON.stringify(join(dir, "status.json"))};const s=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f,"utf8"));s.commits=Object.fromEntries(fs.readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(join(dir, "commits.txt"))},"utf8").trim().split("\\n").map(l=>l.split(" ")));fs.writeFileSync(f,JSON.stringify(s,null,2))`,
   )}
 ${setState("building")}
+# The @novox scope resolves from the mesh's own package registry on the forge, as the build machine
+# resolves it; nothing else is asked of it.
+printf '%s\n' ${shellQuote(`@novox:registry=${forge}/api/packages/novox/npm/`)} > ${shellQuote(join(dir, ".npmrc"))}
+export NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG=${shellQuote(join(dir, ".npmrc"))}
 for repo in mesh-sdk mesh-tools mesh-lab; do (cd ${shellQuote(dir)}/$repo && npm ci --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=error); done
 (cd ${shellQuote(dir)}/mesh-sdk && npm run build --if-present)
 (cd ${shellQuote(dir)}/mesh-tools && npm run build --if-present)

modules/mailu/module.json

@@ -462,7 +462,8 @@
       ],
       "dns": [
         "192.168.203.254"
-      ]
+      ],
+      "logging": "journald"
     },
     {
       "id": "runtime-config",
@@ -561,5 +562,12 @@
   },
   "grants": {
     "smtp": "${dir:grants}"
-  }
+  },
+  "jails": [
+    {
+      "name": "mailu-front",
+      "failregex": "^.*(?:imap|pop3|submission|managesieve)-login: .*\\(auth failed, \\d+ attempts(?: in \\d+ secs)?\\):.*rip=<HOST>(?:,|$)",
+      "jail": "backend = systemd\njournalmatch = CONTAINER_NAME=mailu-front\nport = smtp,submission,submissions,imap,imaps,pop3,pop3s\nmaxretry = 3\nfindtime = 1d\nbantime = 1d"
+    }
+  ]
 }

modules/nftables/module.json

@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@
         "filtering"
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "front-end",
+      "type": "package",
+      "package": "ufw",
+      "absent": true
+    },
     {
       "id": "runtime",
       "type": "container",

modules/route-proxy/module.json

@@ -163,7 +163,8 @@
         "acme-env",
         "internal-trust",
         "internal-acme-env"
-      ]
+      ],
+      "logging": "journald"
     }
   ],
   "build": {
@@ -194,5 +195,12 @@
         "image": "alpine@sha256:d9e853e87e55526f6b2917df91a2115c36dd7c696a35be12163d44e6e2a4b6bc"
       }
     ]
-  }
+  },
+  "jails": [
+    {
+      "name": "route-proxy",
+      "failregex": "^.*TLS handshake error from <HOST>:\\d+: (?:no public route for|acme/autocert: missing server name)\n            ^.*refused: no route for .*, asked from <HOST>:\\d+$",
+      "jail": "backend = systemd\njournalmatch = CONTAINER_NAME=route-proxy\nport = http,https\nmaxretry = 10\nfindtime = 1d\nbantime = 1d"
+    }
+  ]
 }