225: a grant secret is composed with the account that reads it — the node's
account for a bundle, the declared secrets-owner for a container. Zero EACCES
since 12:30:10 where there had been 4330, both users created, mongodb logging
Authentication succeeded for each. The harness also stops calling a permanent
refusal a race, which is the half that cost three hours.
226: normalising moved to the records, where the provenance is known, and a
reference the sweep will not address is skipped rather than ending the sweep.
The first build after the roll-out collected 200 and said 1126 remain — the
backlog falls with every build instead of standing at 1681 for ever.
227: the three photo modules publish the endpoint they declare, and a
catalogue-wide test makes it a rule: a container publishes only a port its
module declares, or the mesh has nothing to assign and the number escapes.
232 came out from under 225: photos asked for a database its user does not
live in, invisible while no user existed at all.
Found fixing 225: with the secrets readable the provisioner created both
users at once, and photos still could not connect because it asks for admin
while its user lives in its own database. The password was never wrong — the
grant secret and the consumer's environment hash identically.
One fault wore the other's clothes: while no user existed anywhere, the
error was a complete account of 225. Worth keeping as a habit — fix the
first and look again.
Eleven node seats; a display as a provision with the machine's reach; other
modules' lines through the tool's own drop-in directory or ADR 0204's slots,
now also for xinitrc and xresources; the display server's module writes the
session's start.
A service needs node-service-manager held on its node, a package
node-package-manager, a container node-container-runtime: derived from the
resources, never stated; refused at assign, reported at composition until the
three holders are on every node. Glossary: depends on a seat; nothing claims a
package.
The operator's flow: clients publish what their credentials file holds, the
manager takes in a licence it does not own and rotates it from then on. The
token itself cannot be published (design 32 §10, ADR 0201), so a node reports
fingerprints and identity as state and hands the grant over only when the
manager asks; adopting is refreshing, newest login first; bindings with a
generation replace the rotated/switched events. Designs 36 and 39 and to-be 40
amended; a pointer note on ADR 0183.
ADR 0173 §2: a module is what it declares, and there are no kinds of module. The two records called
a resource under a home and a module placing one home-scoped; the wording is corrected in place,
marked and dated, the decisions unchanged. Design 36 and to-be 40 now say the module declares
/etc/claude-code and ~/.claude as directories, so the ownership check sees both, and declares no file
under either (mesh-catalog #244).
The dated note on ADR 0183 now rests on ADR 0193 and 0198 rather than on a bundle having no way to
call: the manager starts every exchange by the operator's direction, through mesh/ask. To-be 40's
WP4 no longer waits on a record — ADR 0198 is it — and the live proofs count the console's five
tools (ADR 0195).
Design 38's WP1-WP4b ran: the node's tool runtime is live on all four machines as the operator
account, tools are bundles given only their declared words, and a bundle has no bus credential.
So the wait on design 38 WP3 is over, the agent module calls nothing and the manager starts every
exchange (key, hand-over, waiting login, reconcile), and the manager's daemon now waits on WP4c's
record instead. Accounts are stated on all four, sudo -n works for each, the agent is installed on
all four; the plan's WP0 shrinks and WP2 gets a configuration-only live proof before any licence.
Designs 36 and 39 say what is built; this says in which order and what proves each step, in the
shape to-be 38 gave the operator's machine. Seven packages: the operator states the facts (accounts,
roles, licences); the console provides its endpoint; the licence manager and the agent module are
built and unit-tested in parallel; the manager goes live on the control node; the agent on one
workstation, with the switch and the predecessor's files removed as the proof of the whole; then the
rest of the nodes and the retirement of the two catalogue modules built on the old placement. The
live proofs wait for to-be 38's WP3, because both modules' tools run in the node's tool runtime
(ADR 0175) and a per-module tool container would rebuild what that record retires.
Evidence from both workstations and all four machines, read-only, and the
questions each must answer: seats and gating for the display stack, who starts
the session with which environment, contributions beyond shells, sway as a
sibling session; the container runtime with docker-compose on workstations
only, software outside the official repositories, secrets in the account's
environment, and three security findings.
mesh-admin
jochen
jschoubben