nftables drops its container, NET_ADMIN, the container-runtime capability, the runtime base
images, the Dockerfile, and the bus credential and state directory only the container read;
its tools are declared as a TypeScript bundle the toolchain compiles and node-tools loads on
every node, and the iptables package the image used to carry is declared on the host. The
runtime runs as the operator's account, so the tool runs the filter's commands through sudo
without a prompt when it is not root (ADR 0175 §4, to-be 38 WP4), naming sudo's absence or
refusal by how it failed; the filter file is the path the manifest's filtering names, held to
it by a test; a found firewall that is present but will not answer stops a removal rather
than passing for inactive; a legacy tool that is present but fails is said, not swallowed.
build-agent holds node-build-agent on all four machines and the controller asks that seat; the one-holder
builder is unassigned and forgotten. Proven live before this: a catalogue module built on a workstation's
agent (step-ca, 2026-10-03 09:35).
"mesh_novox_build_agent" is 22 characters; the mesh refused to send the control node its declaration
for it. "agent" keeps the identifier within what an S3 access key allows on every machine.
step-ca and public-acme both offered acme-ca on novox, and route-proxy's pin names a node, not
a module — so which one certified the public names depended on provider order. After the
controller restart on 2026-10-03 it came out as step-ca, and every public site served a
certificate no browser trusts. step-ca's own names are already certified through
internal-acme-ca; acme-ca is the public authority's alone.
The jail read gitea's container journal, which carries its sshd's lines,
but matched only the web login. 167 ssh attempts an hour from the
internet went unbanned. Two patterns, one per attempt: an unknown user,
and a user sshd refuses; tested against a day of the real log, 946
matches and none on an accepted login.
The builder's manifest with one change that matters: it claims node-build-agent, a node seat, so it
is assignable to every machine with a container runtime, and every holder pulls one build at a time
from the role's one work queue. A tier of many images is then built by as many machines as hold the
seat and are online. The builder module stays until this is assigned where it was; then it goes.
The console was a container per node built on the runtime image, calling everything and serving
nothing. node-tools — the runtime as a module, in the mesh-tools repository — answers MCP on the
same loopback port from the same process that serves every module's tools, so the module that was
only that is gone. Merged once node-tools is assigned where mesh-console was, on every machine.
The home server banned the house's own router within an hour of the first public jail: the router
reflects local traffic, so every client in the building arrives as the gateway's address. Every
private range joins the mesh's own in the never-ban list.
fail2ban expands <HOST> to a named group, so two in one pattern is a duplicate group name and
the daemon refuses to start at all -- every jail on the machine, not just this one. Two patterns,
one <HOST> each: the certificate refused for an unserved name, and the request refused for one.
Caught live on the control node (hq ADR 0179).
The pattern ended at the line's end, which only the certificate refusal does; a request for
an unserved name carries trailing text and never matched. Caught against the live lines
before the jail counted anything (hq ADR 0179).
The module gains a runtime carrying only the fail2ban client with the daemon's socket shared in,
serving status/banned/ban/unban and its own fail2ban_settings. It declares jailing, so the
controller's composition lands in jail.d/mesh.conf and filter.d; mailu, route-proxy and gitea log to
the journal and declare a jail reading it by container name. The base is strict: three in a day for
a day, twice banned in two weeks for four; the mesh's range stays never banned.
Both sources sit in tools/, so tsc took tools/ as the root and wrote
dist/index.js, while the runtime loads dist/tools/index.js: the module
started and served nothing.
Five tools on the machine the lab runs on: check, run beds against
branches on the forge, a run's status, its log, and stop. A run checks
out every repository the lab builds, side by side, and runs the suite;
one at a time, answered at once with an id (novox/hq ADR 0172).
The seat's three verbs over the machine's own tools: the filter as enforced
(nftables and the legacy filter), the mesh's own table reloaded from its file,
and one rule set the mesh did not write removed by the name the host reports
it under (ADR 0168) — a predecessor's chain loses its jumps and goes, the
runtime's user chain is emptied back to its return, a table of the machine's
own goes whole; the mesh's tables, the runtime's chains, a built-in chain and
an active found firewall's chains are refused. Tested over the shapes two
machines of the first mesh reported live. The module's own tool stays.
Which DNS server the home network's DHCP hands out could be changed only
in the controller's own interface or by hand against its API (novox/hq
issue 198).
The addresses dnsmasq listens on beside the machine's are a setting, so a
machine that answers its own LAN can say so (novox/hq issue 198). Docker's
daemon.json no longer merges the module's settings: it needs none, and a
setting reaching it is a key dockerd refuses. The host still merges it
into the existing file.
A module's settings merge into every mergeable file it owns, so the
setting reached docker's daemon.json beside dnsmasq's config, where
dockerd would refuse it (novox/hq issue 198). Back to the fixed
loopback line until settings can be kept out of files they are not for.
Loopback by default, as before. A machine that answers its own LAN adds
its LAN address, and its DNS endpoints' reach opens the filter (novox/hq
issue 198). The mesh-wide default must be set before this lands.
jochen
mesh-admin
jschoubben